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I. INTRODUCTION-

A. 	METHODS AND PURPOSES
 
- We prepared this report for the use of the Advanced Concepts and 
Missions Division (ACMD; formerly the Missions Analysis Division) of 
the office of Advanced Research and Technology (OART) of NASA. In order 
to bolster AMCD's capability for making prelimiiary selections among
 
alternative space program objectives, we undertook to look into possi­
bilities for making improvements in the following areas:
 
1. 	Projecting alternative future contexts, in terms of techno­
logical, economic, political', and social factors, inwhich
 
.such programs might operate and in which their values would 
have to be assessed; ­
2. 	Evaluating and comparing the Iong-term consequences, both
 
immediate and second-order, both beneficial and.costly, of
 
program alternatives;
 
3. 	Exploring systematically means of generating, defining,
 
collecting, and keeping alive additi'onal program alter­
natives;
 
4. 	Developing addi'tional methods for-making explicit and
 
systematic, insofar as these are both desirable and feas­
ible, criteria for assessment and selection of alternative
 
program objectives.
 
It is noteworthy that these tasks would have been unnecessary a few
 
years ago, when NASA's priorities were set by the Apollo program. Now.
 
the question arises, "What should be done for an encore?" The very
 
magnitude of NASA's achievements makes the next set of choices much more
 
troublesome.
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In attempting to provide some materials to help with these choices,
 
we have attempted to relate projections of future environments to current
 
choices by doing the following:
 
I. 	Proposing a comprehensive list of possible policy goals
 
at a high level of abstraction.
 
2. 	Evaluating space programs in relation to these goals.
 
3. 	Estimating the likely attitudes of society and of groups
 
within society toward space goals and programs.
 
4. 	Projecting scenarios of the future social and political
 
environment inwhich NASA will operate.
 
5. 	Providing some illustrative applications of the method
 
to decisions currently facing -NASA.
 
6. 	Attempting to demonstrate how NASA Could-benefit by taking
 
alternative futures into consideration so that alternate
 
programs together with plausible estimates of their effect
 
on 	the public and on political leadership could be made
 
available to NASA decision makers.
 
In so doing, we have limited ourselves to certain broad, general
 
approaches to planning that pre the appropriate concern and responsibility
 
of those with an outside perspective. We have entered into detail occa­
sionally, chiefly for illustrative purposes. We have assumed that respon­
sibility for detailed implementation of any approach to planning rests
 
necessarily with those who know the agency's problems best--its own staff ­
in collaboration with outside consultants on, as much as possible, specif­
ic and real planning decisions.
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A contextual planning process would ideally include the following
 
elements:
 
I. 	An 6xplicit statement about policy goals of any proposed program;
 
2. 	An analysis'of past and present attitudes of key groups in rela­
tion to NASA--and, if feasible, to the specific project--to de­
termine whether and what degree of public support is critical;
 
3. 	Future-oriented estimates addressed to issues such as the
 
following:
 
a. 	How are national policy goals likely to change
 
si~nificantly for the duration of a particular
 
program or in relation to closely-linked, syner­
bistic efforts?
 
b. 	Are attitudes of key groups likely to change?
 
Could such changes be critical to NASA's efforts?
 
Can such changes benefit or hurt NASA, or be
 
safely ignored?
 
c. 	What are the prospects for successful completion
 
of a given program in the context of different
 
general and agency-specific alternate futures and
 
scenarios? How much of a risk is involved in
 
launching new programs or making fresh and sub­
stantial commitments to old ones?
 
Inthis report we have tried to err on the side of inclusiveness and
 
diversity in order to accomplish one purpose: to reinforce a sense of the
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richness and complexity of variables that are always present in policy
 
planning, but are most often not explicit. We have tried to counter the
 
seductive idea that there are techniques pf planning that can somehow
 
substitute automatic and mechanical--or even rigorous and explicit-­
"methodologies" for comprehensive and thoughtful decisions about subtle
 
and elusive matters.
 
To gain reasonably reliable perspectives on NASA's future economic,
 
social, and-political environments, planning analysts must consciously and
 
rationally apply their main efforts to describing the "most likely" future
 
environment while giving due consideration to more 'positive" or "negative"
 
visions.
 
It iseasy to be skeptical about usefulness of projections of the
 
environment by overemphasis of the role of the incalculable. Neverthe­
less, attempts to analyze the past and present, to identify, define and
 
clarify recurring patterns and enduring trends have been rewarding. Not
 
only have they been helpful in c.- atin, necessary frameworks for the
 
construction and consideration of plausible images and alternatives, but
 
these attempts have contributed to the process of establishing a working
 
iieilectual communication based on commonly held assumptions couched in
 
commonly accepted language. Moreover, man's capacity to "predict" the
 
future is also affected by the current great interest in studying and
 
shaping the future--since the future may be as much influenced by our ex­
pectations as by our action-oriented commitments. Indeed, influential
 
images of the future can generate both self-fulfilling and, more often,
 
self-defeating prophecies, in which warnings are followed by preventive
 
action.
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We have used two approaches common in the study of political-military
 
and other kinds of public policy problems--the scenario and the systematic.
 
context, or "alternative future.' These methodological devices are espe­
cially valuable in the study and evaluation of the interaction of complex
 
and/or uncertain factors. Scenarios are hypothetical sequences of events
 
constructed for the purpose of focusing attention on causal processes and
 
decision-points. They answer two kinds of questions: (1) Precisely how
 
might some hypothetical situation come about, step by step? and (2) What
 
alternatives exist, for each actor, at each step, for preventing, divert­
ing, or facilitating the process?
 
Alternative futures focus on the situation reached at the end of the
 
process described in the scenario. Theyfurnish a context in which par­
ticular elements can be appraised. They can be used for generating addi­
tional scenarios, for setting forth and discussing criteria, for the sys­
tematic comparison of various alternative policies (or alternative combi­
nations of assumptions and objectives), or for the analysis and examination
 
of specific issues. They are also of interest in making assumptions and
 
contexts explicit, as should be done, for example, in any analysis of di­
rections and destinations.
 
Clearly, the distinction between scenario and alternative future
 
isone of degree; typically, they are used together. With a set of
 
alternative futures and scenarios that lead to them by alternative routes,
 
one may see better what is to be avoided or facilitated, and one may also
 
gain a useful perspective on the kinds of decisions that may be neces­
sary, and the points in time after which various branching-points will
 
have been passed.
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We have found it useful to cbnstrdct a range of- future contexts that
 
include'not only some of the main expectations (bqth hopes and fears) of
 
policy Planners, but also other cases of interest.' By constructing a
 
series 6f named futures *and treating all.the factors involved
,,concrbtel 

in an internally consistent fashion, we hope to be better able to under­
stand not only the separate factors and their interactions,'but important
 
or abstract'
 
consequences of these that are often overlooked in general 

By making potential directions and destinations
analyses and discussions. 

clearer, the construction of these contexts can also lead to better under­
alternatives

standing of the signifi'cance of current emphases, of the major 

and of how different these may be.
 
-A fuller discussion of methodological aspects of long-range planning
 
and future studies would be relevant at this point. However, we have
 
discussed many aspects of the method followed here in previous work, and­
the interested reader might simply refer to Herman Kahn and Anthony J..
 
Wiener, the Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation (New York: The Mac­
1-39,' 66270, 262-264, 386-409. Of par-.
millan Company, 1967), esp. pp. 

ticular interest forpresent purposes in that volume is the discussion,o.
 
the "Standard World," or minimum-surprise projections which furnishes,.a­
startinq pdint for -the consideration of 'alternatives (see pp. 7-8 andthe
 
in the index on pp. 427-8).
additional'reference 
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This project was conceived as "an experimental study of alternative
 
methodologies for dealing with NASA's special long-range planning issues,"
 
and the "dominant purpose" of Hudson's work was "to provide context,
 
education, and training for NASA Advanced Concepts and Missions personnel so
 
as to facilitate their own preliminary analysis of the long-range plan­
ning probiems of NASA." For this purpose, emphasis was put on "visits,
 
conferences, memoranda, and informal documents." This report Is the
 
second "workbook" of materials produced under Contract NAS2-5431. The
 
contract did not call for a "'final" report, and this report is quite
 
clearly "experimental" rather than "final." 
Inthe course of our work, we took into consideration a number of
 
alternative economic, social, and political prospects. We developed
 
these in order to construct scenarios designed to focus attention on
 
alternative contexts in which alternative NASA programs might be eval­
uated. As originally intended, we attempted to focus this material, in
 
collaboration with ACMD personnel, on case studies of decisions
 
of particular interest.to NASA. However, it came to seem desirable,
 
inorder to facilitate subsequent work, to gather together a comprehensive
 
"workbook" of scenario material and related methodological comments. This
 
report is a second edition of that workbook, written inpart as though it
 
were an early draft of portions of a report on long-range planning that
 
might be produced by subsequent work. Thus, for example, we have even
 
prepared a "conclusion!' which draws lessons from the scenarios for NASA's
 
long-range plan. As we point out, our work has not reached the point
 
where such conclusions can be fully justified. Nevertheless, we believe,
 
a "workbook" should suggest the form such conclusions might ultimately
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take and indicate how they might,be derived from the alternative futures
 
themselves.
 
We have found it necessary, at some points, to repeat essential
 
material from our previous report, so that this report can be reasonably
 
complete and self-contained. At other points we have cut last year's
 
discussion, occasionally adding a reference to material which we are.no
 
longer including, but to which the especially interested reader might
 
wish to refer. We have rewritten and elaborated throughout, and in two
 
areas haye added extended new discussions: the analysis of U.S. atti­
tudes, by Frank Armbruster, which constitutes a detailed Appendix,. and
 
the consideration of scenarios involving the impact of international
 
relations on NASA. We have also revised and extended our conclusions.
 
B. A BASIC PERSPECTIVE ON NASA'S FUTURE
 
At this time NASA must make decisions with respect to alternative
 
missions which will not come to fruition for ten-to twenty years. In the
 
time that will pass between decisions and outcome of the decisions, the
 
criteria which shape the original decisions will inevitably'shift.- For'
 
example, the factors affecting the 1961 decision-to initiate the Apo l'o
 
program to reac the Moon within"the decade would obviously not havethe
 
same weight in the mind of a President who had to decide whether to begin'
 
the program today. Isthere any way *nwhich NASA can anticipatelthese
 
shifts?
 
Obviously there is no way of scudying the future directly, since it
 
does not yet exist. Many of the events that will occur are not sped'I 
2
"of
 
ically predictable; but there are many trends under way which'can-be
 
examined, and scenarios can be constructed to investigate factors wfiich
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will cause shifts in these trends in the future. By such means one's
 
expectations about the milieu in which the programs will come to fruition
 
can be examined and this may shed some light on the current decisions.
 
In order to anticipate how the public might value a NASA program, such as
 
an unmanned Mars probe or an orbiting space laboratory, as compared with
 
other alternatives such as spending less on NASA or putting more emphasis
 
on earth applications, one must begin with an examination of the current
 
state of mind of the American public about alternative NASA programs or
 
better alternative objectives of NASA programs. For this purpose we have
 
conducted an intensive analysis of American public opinion with emphasis
 
on those attitudes of the American public which tend to be neglected by
 
many analysts and commentators, particularly by the mass media and by
 
most of the academic experts, whose views are more likely to come to the
 
Of course, NASA itself is not in the business of
attention of NASA. 

public opinion polling.
 
This analysis may be particularly valuable to NASA because the
 
attitudes toward NASA programs shared by NASA personnel and by other
 
likely to have conversations,
scientists and engineers with whom they are 

turn out on investigation to be quite different from those of the'great
 
The only views differing from their own
majority of the American people. 

which NASA people are likely to hear are those of "humanist left" intel­
lectuals which are even more different than those of the great majority
 
it is not so much the criticisms of the
of the American people, and 

as those of
literary intellectuals which need to be taken into account 

the great mass of the public.
 
it is
It is one thing to describe the current state of opinion; 

another to anticipate what it will be in another ten or fifteen years:
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In order to do this we must ask what are the forces which are likely to
 
cause shifts in these opinions; and this means in effect that we must
 
construct some scenarios for NASA programs and for other social and
 
political events which will impinge on public attitudes and for under­
lying trends, particularly economic, which will alter the socio-economic
 
composition of the American public in the next fifteen years.
 
Having done this for domestic factors, we must then ask about
 
another class of variables which can impinge upon the current situation
 
as the years go by and cause possibly dramatic alterations in the domi­
nant opinions with respect to NASA. For example, one need remember only
 
the importance of the Sputnik in changing attitudes toward what the U.S.
 
commitment toward a space program ought to be. Therefore one part of our
 
study has been an attempt to identify some events which might be com­
parable to Sputnik in their consequences and to antic-ipate in some detail
 
what these consequences might be. Inour previous report our conclusions
 
dealt wioth the need on the part of NASA to operate within low budgets for
 
the foreseeable-future, while at the same-time continuing to produce
 
achievements which will appear to the public and to Congress to justify
 
even those budgets. This is a difficult dilemma to negotiate, but
 
apparently a necessary one for quite some time.
 
From our analysis of alternate future environments for NASA,.we must
 
regre.tfully come to the conclusion that in the short run, during the
 
decade of the 1970's, a pessimistic, restrained environment is more
 
likely than an optimistic one. Not only is a straight line, '"standard
 
world for society and NASA likely to be seriously restricted, but also,
 
the range of possible alternative environments would appear to include
 
more plausible pessimistic than optimistic variations.
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However, in the longer-term future, toward the end of this century,
 
we believe that the most 
likely projection will once again be potentially
 
very favorable to NASA.
 
The biggest question concerns the middle-range future, that is the
 
decade of the 1980's. Unfortunately, this is the very period for which
 
NASA must pian today. This could be a period of great possibilities, and
 
great risk for the agency. For this reason we fell that NASA might con­
centrate a good deal of attention upon. establishing a firm mobilization
 
base to provide for-potential opportunities in the 1980's and 1990's.
 
We feel that the question of surviving the 70's is crucial for NASA,
 
because the end of the century is likely to be a more favorable period
 
for ambitious space ventures.
 
At the present time, we believe it unlikely that there will be
 
ch'anges inthe domestic or international environments during the 1970's
 
sufficient to cause large deviations from current NASA budget levels, as
 
a percentage of GNP. The basic structure of the international system
 
seems likely to continue: essehtially bipolar but polycentric; charac­
terized by conventional crises dampened by-the superpowers. However, as
 
the decade continues, the mostly bipolar world seems likely to evolve to
 
some extent in the direction of a balance-of-power situation in which
 
Communist China, Western Europe, and Japan also play great-power roles-­
though not yet superpower.' Domestic politics may be characterized by an
 
increase in Middle-American influence and demand for direct economic
 
benefiis from their tax dollars. At the same time, there is likely to be
 
an increase in New Left dissent and an even greater reaction agaiist such
 
dissent;
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areas that should be monitored for
 
their potential impact on NASA. These include:
 
In this context there are several 

1. 	attitudes of Middle-America toward Federal spending,
 
especially increased resistance to possible unsuccessful
 
large-scale educational and welfare programs;
 
2. 	hostility of some students, intellectuals: the Humanist
 
Left generally toward technology seems likely to intensify
 
andspread as ecological problems become more obvious and
 
as the arms.race continues (even at a moderated pace);
 
3. 	increasing numbers of college-educated people, who have
 
traditionally been NASA's strongest base of public support, 
- may offset (1)and (2) to some extent; 
4. 	prospects for significant Soviet space challenges and
 
resulting revival of support from Middle-America;
 
5. 	emergence of significant Nth-country space programs, notably
 
European and Japanese, with some resulting increase in
 
public support as these powers are increasingly perceived
 
as competitive toward the end of the decade;
 
6. 	emergence of more visible benefits of space programs, such
 
as. in-satellite broadcasting, weather forecasting, air
 
traffic control, and earth resource programs.
 
In general, on the basis of studies of changing American values,
 
international cooperation with non-Communist nations seems likely to con­
tinue to. receive moderate public support, provided such programs do not
 
cost much. But cooperation with the Soviet Union seems likely to result
 
in diminishing public support, while heightened competition with the
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SovfetUnion seems likely to remain the most imp6rtant element in Main­
taining public support for NASA.
 
NASA's critical policy'goal for the 1970's 'eems likely to be insti­
tutional'survival as a base for the space missions of the 1980-20OO,
 
when several factors--including the resolution of many currently pressing
 
social problems and increasing GNP--may permit more ambitious space
 
programs.
 
It seems to us, then, that NASA's priorities for the 70's should
 
therefore emphasize programs on which major long-range missions can be
 
built, as well as programs likely to produce clearly defined, real eco­
nomic and social benefits for the nation as a whole.'
 
Many of us regard our space effort as, on balance, a national neces­
sity, an essential program to extend the frontiers of discovery and
 
understanding and to support new sciences and new technologies that will
 
ultimately be of immense value to mankind.
 
Still, controversy in which these relatively long-run benefits are
 
weighed against relatively short-term priorities is setious. At one
 
extreme, there are those who view the space program as a mere luxury--a
 
program promising only long-deferred and quite uncertai'n benefits, yet
 
one which absorbs substantial funds and technical skills which could be
 
better used to improve man's day-to-day life more directly.
 
At the other extreme there are those who consider the current fact
 
of international competition for technological prowess sufficient justi­
fication for.ambitious aerospace programs, regardless of current economic
 
or social benefits; or there are those quite different people who feel
 
that the exploration of space is an ultimate adventure, a triumph of man's
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expanding-courage, intelligence, and will to achieve, that should not.,be;
 
cramped by crass and parsimonious concerns.
 
.But responsible support of any long-term.program requires that the
 
full range of benefits of all kinds be weighed against both current and
 
future costs' The lead-times of space programs are such that we are cur­
rently planning missions that will not come to fruition until the 1980!s,
 
later, and the decisions we make today will have important consequences
or 

for everyday life in the 21st century.
 
Currently; there is increasing concern about the often unintended
 
and occasional-ly harmful social effects of new techno.logy--effects which
 
can occur in surprising ways even though the technology has been
 
As the President's
developed,-successfully, for the sake of its benefits. 

National Aoals Research Staff reported last year,
 
The Nation's-infatuation with technology is at a turning
 
point as profound as that of its relationship to the
 
environment. Historically,"we have tended to do that
 
which was technically possible, if it were economically
 
advantageous, on the simple ground that this represented
 
"progress." However, as technology has increased with
 
great rapidity, it has forced on us increasing unplanned
 
social change and environmental problems we did not
 
antic-ipate and do not want. At the same time, our notions
 
of the complexity of social and environmental problems
 
haye'made us increasingly cautious with respect to the
 
actions we plan to take. Our level of affluence has given
 
us.a, longer time perspectivewithin which to assess the ..
 
consequences of our actions. As with so many other of the
 
debates with which we have been concerned, the technology
 
assessment movement--which embodies this new attitude
 
toward,technology7-asks us to judge our actions by a
 
wider range of criteria than we have used in the past.
 
Raymond A. Bauer et al., Toward
 
Balanced Growth: Quantity with
 
Quality: Report of the President's
 
National .Goals Research Staff,
 
July 4, 1970, pp. 133-4.
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The wide range of criteria described extensively in the White
 
House report includes benefits as well as costs or harms. The growth
 
of the space program must be in,"balance" with other national goals.
 
Over the long run, there are good reasons to think that this balance
 
can be achieved, and that the divergent bases for support of the
 
space program which animate the current controversy--practical social
 
applications, international competition, scientific curiosity, tech­
nological development, and historic adventure, to name only a few­
can find much common ground.
 
By the year 2000 we can anticipate three major developments that
 
will affect our thinking about the goals of the space program.
 
1. Reduction of Social Problems. Fi-rst, as economic growth
 
continues, the benefits of affluence will be increased and more equitably
 
shared by ill groups in American society. While some groups will
 
still have more than others--particularly in areas of private con­
sumption--basic public services at a high level of quality should
 
be available to all Americans. In education, employment, housin'g,.
 
health, transportation, most of the basic needs we see.today will'
 
probably have been met--not only for those Americans who will still
 
consider themselves poor even though they may be rich by today's
 
*Prospects for-future social changes are being treated systemat'ic­
ally by increasing numbers of scholars and political and economi c ana­
lysts; standard works include the Report of-the President's National
 
Goals Research Staff, cited above; work sponsored by the Commission
 
on the Year 2000 of the Academy of Arts and Sciences, comprehensive
 
reports.made available by the long-range planning departments of
 
several majorcorporations, and studies produced by research institutes
 
such as the RAND Corporation, the Hudson Institute, the .Institute for
 
the Future, the National Industrial Conference Board, the Research
 
Institute of America, and others.
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standards--but also for-the perhaps 80 million additional Americans
 
who will be added to the population over the next 30 years.
 
With a population of 250-300 million sharing a gross national
 
product in excess of $3 trillion, per-capita consumption will be
 
2 to 3.5 times higher than it is today. Potentially, life will be.
 
extremely good for the overwhelming majority of the American people.
 
Poverty, racial conflict, and student unrest can be substantially
 
reduced, in part because of.intelligent and well-run reforms by
 
government: The spectacular decrease in the economic and social
 
inequality affecting some minority groups will also reduce illegal
 
or unreasonable acts by destructive and extremist protest groups.
 
There will be, of course, some hard-core problems and much alienation
 
among the remnants of Lhe poor, unassimilated minority groups, and
 
some "drop-outs," but these problems will be regarded as soluble and
 
the protests mainly "rhetorical." In addition, there will have been
 
a burst of creativity among Negroes which will show up in almost all
 
aspects of culture and many areas of political, business, commercial,
 
technical and governmental life. Thi-s will give black Americans self­
confidence and a feeling of pride and participation in "the system."
 
Before the end of the century, America can deliver on its
 
promises of freedom and prosperity for the common man.
 
To be sure, America will not become a Utopia. And many new
 
problems we may not anticipate today may plague us. But the in­
equalities, deprivations and injustices that disturb us today should
 
be substantially alleviated.
 
2. Changing Life-Styles. Second, increased national wealth
 
and the absence of serious economic deprivation will permit generally
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more relaxed styles of life. 
 People will have much more leisure time.
 
The more relaxed society wil'l be more inclined to finance science and
 
technology. The disputebetween those who view science as 
a luxury
 
and those who see it as a hecessity, will be resolved by the realities
 
of abundance. Some feel that boredom could-become our chief national
 
prbblem. But leisure will permit men to'express and satisfy their
 
curiosity. At the personal level, more'people will spend time--on and
 
off the job--learning, satisfying their curiosity, perhaps "practicing"
 
science as a "hobby." In fact, we may expect a fading of our tradi­
tional distinction between "Work" and "play."
 
The new "Renaissance Man" may become a recognized social type.
 
Millions of men and women will aspire to be poets or scientists, culti­
vating a relaxed and casual, but highly competent and sophisticated
 
style in the manner of the humanist gentlemen of the Renaissance or
 
the enlightened aristocrats of the 18th Century.
 
Many-people will feel free to address themselves to the universal
 
problems of physics, mathematics, literature and ph-ilosophy.
 
The elites'of all the industria'lized countries may
 
become increasingly similar in their life-styles, values, and goals.
 
They will form an international community of technicians and'managers.
 
Having little local 
or family loyalty, the new renaissance man will be
 
internationally mobile. He will be in contact with his peers through­
out the world through soDhisti'cated communications systems and in
 
person via high-speed intercontinental transportation.
 
Government and economic leadership will be in the hands of cul­
tivated men measured more by their personal qualities than by standards
 
of performance. Performance standards will be stated in terms of being
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a patron of
 
a 'good citizen" and participating in community life as 

the arts, science, culture and as an innovator in various areas.
 
This picture represents the culmination of a trend toward sub­
non-economic achievement, curiosity, and art
jective values such as 

sakes. An aggressive space program can
and knowledge for their own 

represent the national expression of that trend. All of us will be as
 
curious about the new knowledge gained from space exploration as.we
 
are today about the more dramatic elements of our current efforts:
 
moon walks, and splashdowns.
liftoffs, 

3. Successes of Space Technology. In another generation, space
 
exploration will become an established part of human experience and an
 
Space projects far more important than
accepted government activity. 

have been accom­the historic achievements of the past decade will 

plished. The technology required for daring and complex space missions
 
will have been perfected and these conventional missions will have be­
come a matter of routine. Only "far-out" missions will excite the in­
creasingly sophisticated and blase public.
 
At the same time, space exploration itself will become
 
cheaper, more-efficient, and saferas today's pr-imitive and expen­
sive propulsion, maneuvering, life support, and data processing
 
systems are replaced,by simpler and more reliable equipment. More­
over, major new discoveries and technological breakthroughs will
 
probably occur in the space sciences and many of the technologies
 
developed for space missions will be incorporated in production
 
technology and in consumer goods. These breakthroughs and applica­
tions will, over the next three decades, more than justify the 
re­
sources we have invested in space. And the space program will be
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able to take credit for a substantial contribution toward achieving
 
the economy of wealth-and the sodiety of affluence and ease projected
 
for the 21st Century.
 
0-f course, one can easily'list a number'of relatively unlikely
 
or catastrophic events, such as a worldwide economic depression, that
 
would fundamentally alter or slow down movement toward the promising
 
future outlined above. But one could just as easily suggest develop*­
ments that would-acce-lerate movement toward an'een'more hopeful future
 
than we m'ight otherwise expect. A great imponderable is international
 
relations. New agreemehts with the Soviet Union could create a new
 
climate for international cooperation- opening many new~opportunities
 
for joint or cooperatiVe space efforts. The-space programs of other
 
nati'ons--notably Japan, China, France, ard no doubt many others-­
are also -iHkel'y to be significant, whether for competition or coopera­
tion, as in world-wide communications, weather, and geographic satellite
 
systems.
 
4. Getting from Here to There. This view of American society
 
-in 2000 A.D., and- the variety of space projects that wi-li be techni'ca'lly,
 
economi'cally and politically feasible at that time, has implications
 
for the kind of preparations NASA must make now if it is to realize­
future potentials.
 
Examination of budget data suggests that it would cost about 
 -
$2 billion a year merely to maintain a NASA stand-by capability'and
 
planning operation that carries out few actual missions, if any. If
 
at some point the NASA budget were to approach this moth ball or
 
standby-minimum status, the amount in excess of the maintenance level
 
would-not permit any significant operational activity, and therefore,
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there would be few visible current benefits to justify continuation of
 
a significant international
the program. Various contingencies--such as 

crisis in which there might be general agreement that the U.S. should
 
play a major (and expensive) role, through aid or troop commitments-­
or Soviet downgrading or abandoning of their own space program, might
 
bring NASA close to the static--and politically unviable--mobilization
 
base.
 
an operating agency in
Therefore the Agency must function as 

the 70's and try to retain the level of skilled manpower that will be
 
NASA enters a period of new growth.)
critical in the 1980's as 

NASA work forithe 70's must give prominence to those programs
 
and emphases and assumptions that are not only worthwhile in them­
selves but also consistent with other national priorities: What programs
 
enable NASA to make its most significant contribution to environmental
 
management, economic growth, education, and other objectives that are cur­
.rently given great emphasis?
 
If NASA's role.in the 70's is to be an active--not a static-­
mobilization base for the space programs of the 1980 to 2000 period,
 
and if NASA is to remain active and relevant, NASA must place increased
 
emphasis on work that offers immediate tangible benefits and realistic
 
promises of tangible,benefits to a society that is keenly aware-of
 
problems here on earth.
 
What are some of these programs?
 
Aeronautics:
 
Projects consistent with trends toward increased value on safety,
 
economy, and responsible technology.
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'Illust-rative:''air ttaffi'c-control
 
fractional orbit transportation system
 
Ose of advanced propulsion systems in SST
 
to eliminate sonic boom
 
quiet air transport -
VSTOL
 
Government cooperation with private industry:
 
Projects consistent with GNP growth goals, full employment, and
 
return on investment for publically financed innovations developed
 
into profitable products by private industry.
 
Illustrative: SST return on investment planning 
encouragement of industry-financed'space R&D. ­
and more 
applications "piggybacks" on rema.ining Apollo 
missions 
Basic environmental research
 
Projects.consistent with trend toward increased value on ending
 
environmental pollution.
 
Predicting natural disasters, averting man-made environmental
 
catastrophes, and harnessing the environment for constructive ends.
 
Illustrative: 	 Necessary to the understanding of the composi­
tion of and dynamics of our own atmosphere is
 
knowledge of the atmospheres of our neighboring
 
planets. Mars and Venus both have atmospheres
 
different from that of our earth. Mars, in
 
particular,may have an atmospheric composition
 
similar to ours of several millenia.ago. In­
vestigation of alien planets will aid us in
 
understanding the basic laws of atmospheres,
 
necessary to our successful coping with potential
 
worldwide atmospheric pollution. Our knowledge
 
of the physics of extraterrestial atmospheres
 
can be augmented by unmanned or manned probes
 
and by space-mounted telescopes, as well as by
 
near space satellite observation of our own
 
atmosphere.
 
For the next decade NASA will best perform its public function
 
by addressing itself to "down-to-earth" problems with programs that
 
offer the promise of tangible short-and medium-term benefits to
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society. By giving increased priorities to these aspects of the space
 
well as maintain an active
 program, it can contribute to-society now as 

mobilization base for the more optimistic future which NASA's current
 
help to create. If current trends continue, the year
activities will 

our
2000 will bring conditions conducive to greatly enhanced pride in 

space program. Re-directed, balanced, vigorous and cumulative economic
 
growth will probably come close to-eliminating the major problems of
 
same time, increased
poverty, discrimination, and pollution; and at the 

affluence and education will change values and life styles so as to
 
in the space
enhance appreciation of the Renaissance virtues inherent 

program: the pride in intellect and competence, the sense of adventure
 
and striving, the vision of man as transcending hi-s past, overcoming
 
his limitations step by step, and growing in skills, knowledge, prowess,
 
This is the future social climate in which the space program
and wisdom. 

can be most productive; it is-also a culture which the space program can
 
now do its part to create.
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NASA'S POLICY GOALS
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I1. NASA'S POLICY.GOALS
 
WHY 	STUDY POLICY GOALS?
 
One 	central thesis of this study is that NASA's planning effort
 
should be directly related to the broad goals* the space program serves.
 
Thus, we begin with an enumeration of plausible and distinct space goals
 
grouped by categories. This enumeration will attempt to provide:
 
1. 	an over-all framework for this discussion;
 
2. 	a basis for attempts to answer specific questions
 
about NASA's past- present and future goals;
 
3. 	a guide for re-orienting emphasis should projected
 
future developments warrant such re-definition,
 
'We 	suggest,that identifying basic criteria, coupled with an analysis
 
of the degree to which individual programs meet these criteria should
 
facilitateAMCD'§ choices of future program alternatives for study,' and
 
-should aid planning for the short-run, medium-run and long-range future.
 
In short, more rigorous goal definition may greatly facilitate planning
 
efforts.
 
What are NASA's goals?
 
What have they been in the past? What are they now? What should they
-.

be in the future?
 
What goals have been dominant or insufficiently emphasized? ambiguous
 
or clear? mutually related and -supportive or mutually exclusive and divisive?
 
Who defines these goals?
 
"The intended meaning of the term "goals" 
in this report becomes
 
clear by reference to Table I, p. 2-9.
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SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON GOALS
 
NASA in Retrospect: Expectations and Achievements
 
The formative stages of NASA's history were "characterized more by
 
expectation than by accomplishment."* In the report of the American
 
Assembly's 1961 conference on outer space, Assembly President Dr. Henry
 
Wriston stated "Space technology promises to bring about revolutionary
 
changes in man's life on earth."
 
The effort to bring about that revolution and to translate expecta­
tions into accomplishments has absorbed an extraordinary amount of man­
power and resources. 
 In the first decade of its effort, NASA's research
 
and development work force totalled over 400,000 people. In 1968, 10,000
 
scientists, engineers, teachers and students were working under NASA
 
funding at some 200 universities.
 
This level of effort helped accomplish NASA's primary mission. There
 
is little doubt that centuries from now the year 1969 will be identified,
 
like 1492, primarily with a voyage of exploration and discovery. But what
 
current national purposes have been advanced? What has the nation gained,
 
economically, politically, militarily, socially, psychologically, from
 
the effort expended to land men on the moon? Do we, as a result, have
 
more prestige and morale than we otherwise would have had? Is there
 
still merit.in Dr. Wriston's 1961 assertion that our national space pro­
gram is "an intrinsically valid enterprise"? These questions will become
 
more acute after Apollo's success makes obsolete the priorities of the
 
1960's.
 
*Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Outer Space: Prospects for Man and Society
 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. Vii.
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According to James E.'Webb "We can now call on a well-established
 
and versati'le national-capability in aeronautical' and space-related
 
science, engiheeri'ng and administration." But, having built the capacit
 
for space exploration, have'we in the process exhausted many of the
 
original' rationa'les for its use? Does NASA now represent a capability ir
 
searchof a'mission? Is that necessarily an inappropriate reason for
 
existence?
 
Finally, is the style of commitment reTieczea in rne ApoiIo-program
 
appropriate for the future? Assuming renewed clarity'concerning goals
 
and programs, and assuming different socio-political contexts, what
 
public stance should NASA itself adopt: assertive, moderate/ieutral, or
 
defensive?
 
In public'debate, space program advocates have tended to adopt, to
 
some degree, a defensive posture that may be inimical to NASA's-own best
 
interests and to the most positive aspects-of man's venture away from'thE
 
earth.
 
They may do so because of what appears to be 6n Apollo "hangover."
 
President Kennedy's commitment to land Americans on-the moon in th&
 
1960's created many positive attitudes. -But the priority assigned to
 
the effort and the-momentum it achieved also resulted ih some negative
 
internal attitudes: the assumption that'NASA was'above critici'sm, that
 
its critics were fundamentally benighted and/or'irrelevant, and that
 
missionary zeal was an appropriate response that would overwhelm any
 
doubts concerning the space program.
 
C. P. Snow's concept of the conflict between the "two cultures" of
 
science and the humanities has been used most effectively by some of
 
NASA's supporters to challenge critics of the space program. As if to
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express some fundamental self-defeating instinct, NASA's critics have all
 
too often appeared to fulfill the stereotyped role projected on them.
 
They have seemed to be against science, progress, adventure, risk, bold­
ness and a commitment to expanding the frontiers of man',s experience.
 
Efforts to clarify goals may permit NASA planners to achieve such
 
new syntheses more acceptable within and outside the space agency, and
 
less likely to add to the trend toward the highly polarized discussion of
 
public issues. New planning emphases can contribute to defining and
 
legitimizing NASA's continuing role in its second decade; to removing
 
NASA from its present position as one focus of acrimonious public con­
troversy; and to dealing more seriously with the ideas of NASA's critics.
 
The Routinization of Mystery
 
Originally conceived as a -response.to the Soviet sputnik-, then charged
 
with the charismatic.mission to land men on the moon, NASA has-fulfilled
 
many of its short-term goals and may have exhausted its glamor and psycbo­
logical capital with the American public.
 
The space program seems to have lost much of its mystery. We have
 
completed the first great projects and found the results disappointing.
 
There does not appear to be other life between the Sun and Mars and from
 
what we know of Mercury, Venus, the Moon and Mars they lack the conditions
 
that would support human life without complex artificial environments that
 
men from earth would have to bring there.
 
Thus, the really critical surprise--the most tantalizing and literally
 
farfetched of possibilities--has not occurred for the time being: 
 we are
 
stil'l alone in the universe.
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But 'the basic point is that our space'efforts and NASA's achievements
 
'have i'ot their mystique. Even the second of the'tele\Ised lunar landi:ngs
 
had a routine quality that'will increase in landings from'now on. Network
 
television coverage intensified routinization. The style of TV coverage
 
makes 'a'luna'r landing and a political convention indistinguishable: the
 
same tired a'nchor men, intermi'nable'waiting, panel discussions by'experts,
 
remote pickups of human-interest tangents, the same predictable results
 
reported instantly to'remove any shred of s'spense, curiosityor fear. Of
 
course, we may "pr~fer such routine to the'excitement and near-disaster'of
 
Apollo 13.
 
Rationalizing'NASA
 
NASA needs' to engage ii a conscious review of its goals in the bioad­
est sense. To illustrate the importance of such analysis, let us consider
 
two themes that characterize much of the literature about NASA: analogies
 
wi'th 'previous major advances in man's technological development 'and the
 
concept of unlimited dhallenge. 'Both themes appear to be supportive,' yet
 
in fact may be d6trimntal to the'space program.
 
a. 	Previous Techholoqical -Advan'ces
 
One essay provides a typical'example of'the 6tgument from analogy.*
 
The authors assert 'th t'"there is a'str'iking parallel' between the-history
 
of the airplane and thd history of space flight to date."' They'sketch the
 
development of the concept of Powered flight and the growth of early tech­
nology. They point out that basic research scientists "generally ignored
 
the field or discounted it."
 
*H. Guyford Stevers and Ralph G. Schmitt, "The Technical Prospects,"
 
in Lincoln P. Bloomfield (ed.) Outer Space: Prospects for Man and Society
 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968, pp. 11-36.
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The airplane analogy stresses the vision of those involved in air­
plane development, the contrast between early predictions of speed, range
 
and cost and the realities today, and the commercial benefits of air
 
transportation.
 
In some respects; the analogy is inappropriate and misses the point.
 
Some of NASA's critical problems result from the contrasts between air and
 
space development, not the similarities.
 
First of all, the airplane really came into its own in World War I,
 
our collect­and associations with it as an instrument of war run deep in 

ive experience. Second, despite the growth of commercial air travel, air
 
travel is irrelevant to most Americans. The vast majority of Americans
 
rarely or never use airplanes. The use of airplanes as a symbol of progress
 
simply exacerbate the contrast between poverty and privilege inAmerica.
 
If NASA wishes to present itself as a symbol of luxury, the airplane analogy
 
is an effective device. If NASA needs support outside of upper-middle and
 
upper class America, the analogy should be revised radically or abandoned.
 
Further, in contrast to the media available when the airplane was
 
developed, modern communications have increased the number of people who
 
are aware of space development, and are, however indirectly,,involved in
 
political decisions about space programs. The democratizing force of a
 
national press, radio and television make technological development more
 
visible today and therefore more vulnerable to criticism and public opinion
 
"plebiscites."
 
b. Unlimited Challenge
 
The concept of unlimited challenge is effectively stated by Dr. Homer
 
Newell:
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A new generation of researchers who, during their forma­
tive years watched the Space Age unfold, are entering the
 
scene. They are caught up in'the excitement that space
 
represents. They will undoubtedly bring their enthusiasm
 
to bear not only upon space, but also upon the great chal­
lenges of today here on our planet earth, such as the prob­
lems of oceanography, earth resources, the cities, trans­
portation, population, pollution, and food. They are
 
likely to oppose efforts to delay or sidestep any of these
 
challenges."
 
In contrast to Dr. Newell's expectations, it has now become plausible
 
to suggest that under certain conditions the Vietnam war may produce a
 
long-term change inAmerican values: 
 a tendency to place conscious
 
limits on expectations; a questioning of the tendency to do anything that
 
presents itself, as an end in itself, without regard to costs or conse­
quences. Americans may become more interested in limited and realistic
 
challenges and suspicious of unlimited commitments. Consequently, a
 
new generation and some influential groups in American society may re­
ject Newell's optimistic characterization ofresearch objectives.
 
Both themes may be counter-productive. At minimum, we wish to sug­
gest that unanalyzed assertions about goals may harm our space program
 
and that seemingly self evident statements of space objectives may--in
 
fact--frustrate those very objeatives.
 
DEFINING NASA'S POLICY GOALS
 
Policy decisions of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
 
can be divided into three general categories:
 
Objectives or Goals 
(Why is NASA doing what it is doing?)
 
Operations or Missions (What should NASA do?)
 
Technology (How should NASA do it?)
 
*Quoted by Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Outer Space: Prospects for Man
 
and Society (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. viii.
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This part of the discussion concerns itself principally with "objec­
tives" with some relationship to "6perations."
 
Most of the time and manpower of NASA is devoted to making tech­
nology decisions, and it is clear to decision-makers that finding tech-

However,
nological solutions is a means 	of achiegifig operations goals. 

the similar relationship of operations goals to more general aeronautics
 
and space policy goals may not always be clearly perceived.
 
What are
This leads us to a fundamental 	question of NASA planning: 

What is NASA for? The National
the purposes of the space program? 

strong guidance on this point.
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 gives us 

NASA is to:
 
1. 	Expand human knowledge
 
2. 	Advance aeronautics and space technology
 
3. Develop and operate space 	vehicles
 
4. 	Carry out long-range studies of potential benefits
 
of aeronautics and space activities
 
5. 	Preserve U.S. space technology lead
 
6., Provide useful information 	to the military
 
7. 	Promote international cooperation
 
8. 	Study the utilization of space activities
 
for peaceful and scientific purposes
 
Such is NASA's legal, formal mandate. Nevertheless, many other in­
formal objectives for the space program have been suggested by NASA offi-

Table I attempts
cials, politicians, scientists, journalists, and critics. 

to list at a high level of abstraction all the objectives of the space pro­
gram, both formal and informal, explicit'and implied. (Note that the list
 
excludes all operations goals, such as the development of space vehicles.)
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TABLE I
 
NASA'S GOALS
 
A. 1. achievement per se
 
ABSTRACT 2. fulfilling commitment per se
 
3. man's conquest of 	space
 
B. 4. international cooperation
 
COSMOPOLITAN 	 5. moral equivalent of war--redirection of U.S.-U.S.S.R.
 
rivalry to peaceful competition
 
6' increasing or maintaining American prestige

C. 7. winning or not losing U.S.-S.U. prestige competition
 
NATIONALIST 8. winning or not losing U.S.-S.U. military competition
 
9. 	winning or not losing U.S.-S.U. economic and terri­
torial competition
 
D. lO satisfying curiosity (of some men, science, nation, world)
 
SCIENCE & I. Scientific advance
 
TECHNOLOGY 12. technological advance
 
E. 13. mobilization base for achieving other items
 
MOBILIZATION BASE
 
F. 14. potential economic benefits from space 	operations or tech-

ECONOMIC 	BENEFITS nology developments ("spin-Aff")
 
n
15. economic benefits 	from stimulati- ' +ko -l ;ona1 economy 
G.
 
ATTENTION-GET- 16.- entertainment of public
 
TING DEVICES 17. redirecting attention of society,.world, etp.
 
H. 18. advancing personal careers or status
 
NARROW SPACE 19. maintaining.or advancing personal or corporate organiza-

POLITICS tional interests (sometimes called "empire-building")
 
20. 	 maintaining current or prospective funding, i.e., re­
directing federal funds from other programs.
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Many classifications of alternative goals for NASA would be pos­
sible. Necessarily many goals are closely interrelated. Some obvious
 
goals are regularly mentioned in the press while others are not. With
 
these qualifications in mind, we suggest the following classification-as
 
one upon which we can begin to clarify the issues for NASA planning
 
requirements.
 
Abstract--"achievement per se," "fulfilling commitement per se."
 
Part of our space effort is based on a desire for pure achievement
 
similar to that which directs mountain climbers to climb mountains or
 
sailors to cross the Atlantic alone.
 
NASA's efforts are also the result of a commitment by President 
Kennedy to land men on the moon by 1970. Commitments can keep a program 
going that would otherwise falter. Once committed, a nation is dis- ­
honored by not fulfilling the commitment. To some extent, more program 
continuity and momentum may be achieved through a Presidential commitment 
than through rational program development. Commitment may also lead to 
rigidity, waste, and the narrow focusing of programs on what may eventu­
ally be seen to te blind alleys. 
Cosmopolitan--"man's conquest of space," "international coopera­
tion," "moral equivalent of war--redirection of U.S.-U.S.S.R. rivalry to
 
peaceful competition." Cosmopolitan goals are those that explicity bene­
fit all mankind rather than the U.S. alone. The conquest of space as a
 
worthy end in itself is an avowed goal of NASA officials and astronauts,
 
not to mention some substantial portions of the public. Often the goal
 
is expressed in terms of the glorification of man combined with words
 
like "destiny" and "inevitability."
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"International cooperation" is a goal required by the Space Act.
 
The last item in this category i'smore subtle. It der'ives from the­
belief that great power rivalry, conf'lict and competition is based on an
 
irrational Compulsion.' Thus, the space race is a relatively
seen as 

harmless, sublimated and therefore desirable, form of rivalry.
 
Nationalist--"increasing or maintaining American prestige," "win­
ning or not 'losing U.S.'-S.U. prestige competition," "winning or not
 
losing U.S.-S.'. military competitidn," "winniig or not Isitig U.S;-S.U.
 
economic and geographical competition." goals: dominate the
-National'ist 

thinking of many of those who support NASA programs.- The history of'our
 
space effort suggests that if nationalist goals were not present there
 
might be no significant space program. NASA occasionally appears to de­
emphasize or to'ignore nationalist goals, perhaps for public relations
 
reasons, or perhaps because'of the attitudes of 'some NASA scientists. A
 
Some NASA publ'ications suggest that Science and Technology, Mobilization
 
Base, and Economic Benefi ts are NASA's most important goals, but Dr. Paine
 
suggested in his speech of NoVember 20, 1968 that the cdmpetitive position
 
of the country vis-a-vis"the-Sovi-et'Union, and the'general' prest'ige and
 
attitude of the'nation .(Nationalist and Attention-Getting'Devices) are at
 
least equal-ly importaht'."
 
We have added to the obvious items under National ist goals an' Item 9
 
that is not often mentioned (Economic and Territorial Competition). If
 
we were England competing with France and Spain for the New World, it
 
would be obvious that economic and geographical competition was basic.
 
However, America's national leaders apparently don't really believe
 
enough in the economic value of the moon and planets, or are so enamored
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with internationalist hopes, that they seldom speak of planting the flag
 
On the other hand, the United States is in fact
in a possessive sense. 

spending the money and providing the show. If there are going to be eco­
nomic returns and colonies worth having, many will argue--as we indicate
 
below--that they should be ours. Our undersea effort has analogous
 
anomalies. Insofar as economic returns are predictable, one way to make
 
these new areas "ours" without the nationalist flavor this might produce
 
would be.to turn government programs into private programs at a very
 
early date. Private industry seems to be in a position to make claims
 
"for us" that we cannot or do not wish to make as a nation.
 
However we do it, many more people would see the point of space
 
activities if NASA were, in effect, planting the flag--for this would be
 
a more concrete.activity that goes quite beyond foreseeable economic
 
returns. Increasing national property is generally seen as a legitimate
 
national goal in itself.
 
The significance of U.S. space efforts for national prestige should
 
not be underrated, with or without the specific U.S.-U.S.S.R. competitive
 
aspects. People trust and are more attracted to competent nations. Stu­
dents are excited by space exploits, even in underdeveloped countries.
 
Consumers are apt to believe people who go around the moon can make reliable
 
refrigerators. None of these effects may be large in itself, but their
 
cumulative value could be considerable. At the same time it is important
 
to point out thac some evidence, in the form of surveys by USIA, indicates
 
that worldwide attitudes toward the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are not signifi­
cantly altered by their space achievements. People may be impressed by
 
Soviet accomplishments at the same time that they retain a basically
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negitiv6 view of the U.S.S.R., Conversely,'people'favorable to fhe U'S.
 
will remain so, despite marginal shifts resulting from specific U'S.
 
spac& achievements or disasters.
 
Science and Technology--"satisfying curiosity," "scientific advande,"
 
"technologi'cal advance." Science and Technology goals may have been over­
emphasized, except insofar as we are satisfying simple curiosity.
 
Scientists and technologists have considerable power'in NASA, and they
 
want to see their work as valuable'in terms of their specialties. How-­
ever, are basic scientific laws likely to be changed as a result of
 
interplanetary or lunar activities? It will be useful to know more of
 
the moon and other planets, but their histories will be so specific, and
 
the sample of extraterrestrial bodies will be so small, that the progtam
 
i'sunlikely to achieve more than the general expanding of detailed
 
knowledge. The question is not hether there will' be some scientific and
 
technological return, but rather whether more could not be a-ccomplished
 
on earth-for less cost. The answer is probably that NASA'is an expensive
 
way to do basic research. This argument applies less to technology, and,
 
of course, not at al- to research for atmospheric-:transportation.
 
Mobilization Base--"mobiliz'tion base f6r achieving'6ther items."-

The goadl of developing 'am6bilization base for space'activitles'might be
 
emphasized'more than it is. NASA is develop'ing a capability to-do things
 
in space for a variety of purposes among which it is-at'present hard to
 
establish priorities. There may'or may not be a serious competition of
 
one or another sort. There may or may not be-really significant scien-'
 
tific or economic payoffs; We',cannot tell now. But it is quite likely
 
that one or another of these goals will seem crucial in the next twenty
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years, and NASA will have developed the base--on "insurance" programs
 
the nation can use to achieve-the goals of that time.
 
Economic Benefits--"potential economic benefits from space operations
 
or technology development," "economic benefits from stimulation of the
 
national economy." In discussing short-term economic benefits a clear
 
distinction should be made between those activities (a) in the atmos­
phere and in earth orbital space that may have direct economic benefit
 
and those activities (b) in lunar or interplanetary space or preparatory
 
to entering these spheres. As suggested above,.if we or the Soviets
 
really believed in the economic significance of lunar or, interplanetary.
 
space activities, there would be more of a flag-planting effort. Talk­
ing of these activities in economic terms seems strained and remote, and
 
detracts the focus of the argument from the really significant-short-term
 
economic programs-for communication, weather prediction, and research and
 
development for aviation, even down to airports.. The role of NASA .in
 
helping to solve current transportation problems is probably the most
 
poorly known aspect of the whole effort. Popularly, NASA is seen-as re­
sponsible for space and.little else.. This image must be reversed ifthe
 
short-term economic argument is to be made.
 
Item 15 is an objective seen by.some economists and pol-iticians.
 
The space program is viewed by them as a pump-priming public works pro­
ject or a new pork-barrel.
 
Attention-Getting.Devices--"entertainment of public," "redirecting
 
attention of society, world, etc." AttentionrGetting Goals involve us
 
in some very subjective issues. Certainly space exploits are a part of
 
the national entertainment budget-7perhaps a good deal of NASA's budget
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could be justif'ied on this basis. Space'spectaculars may be no more ele­
vating than the average TV fare, but they are certainly more unusual.
 
There is a question as to whether the attractive factor iswhat is seen,
 
collected, photographed, etc., or whether it'is the presence of men doing
 
these things. (One possibility is that improving communications and
 
glamorizing robots will be the eventual directions of the effort, because
 
of the distances, times and environmental conditions involved. On the
 
other hand, it is interesting that while much of science fiction was an
 
early form of space entertainment; we know of no story inwhich enter­
taining the folks back home was seen as an important part of the space
 
adventure.)
 
Redirecting the attention of people could be seen as just another
 
form of opium; or as 6 new frontier in a more positive sense. Juse what
 
this means for the average citizen participating vicariously and through
 
his taxes in space efforts is a little hard to grasp. The other "age of
 
exploration""affected the literature and world view of some people, and
 
introduced potatoes ahd tobacco, but what it accomplished in itself is
 
harder to 3ather. The internal religious struggles in Europe were
 
launched independently after the beginning of that age, and ended
 
bloodily and independently toward its end (though supported by Spanish
 
gold from-the Americas). The significant scientific discoveries of the
 
age had little to do with the exploration. Both were manifestations of
 
the questioning spirit of the Renaissance. Today the more significant
 
scientific challenges may be laboratory challenges rather than the chal­
lenges of understanding large, uncontrollable systems, and the more sig­
nificant political challenges may be on earth--not in space.
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Narrow Space Politics--"advancing personal careers or status," "main­
taining or advancing personal or corporate organizational interests (some­
times called "empire building")," and "maintaining current or prospective
 
funding, i.e. redirecting federal funds from other programs." These cri-

This is the area of goals that many suspect
teria are a great unknown. 

exist but few discuss. It is certainly important to acknowledge that such
 
goals play some limited role in all organizations, in order to understand
 
over­the particular pressures behind specific programs, although cynical 

estimations of the role of "politics" are also widespread.
 
The very last item on the list--"maintaining current or prospective
 
funding"--is vitally important, for this represents the so-called "priori­
ties" issue. Typically, funding is gained in competition with other Fed­
eral programs drawing on a relatively fixed tax base, rather than in addi­
tion to other programs. To many vocal elements in our society NASA
 
operations achieve a goal which they see as pernicious--the diversion of
 
funds from their own favored projects. However, the issue as ordinarily
 
stated can be turned around. Some rightists believe the alternatesocial
 
programs are pernicious or.worthless,'so the diversion of funds to space
 
could be a positive benefit..
 
Of course, it is possible to interpret all "priorities" issues in
 
terms of self-interest. A cynic could claim that current disputes rep­
resent: physical scientists vs social scientists, the rural (military)
 
lower classes vs the urban (welfare) lower classes, Huntsville, Houston,
 
and Coca Beach vs Gary, Newark, and New Haven. Itwould be presumptous
 
to speculate-about the motives of politicians and journalists.
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NASA goals (or criteria for evaluation of NASA programs) could be
 
broken down in many different ways. Our list seems reasonably exhaustive
 
and convenient for present purposes. Conceivably other goals will be­
come apparent inthe future. Note that we make no attempt to indicate
 
which are the goals NASA should have, or what our own priorities among
 
them might be. On a practical level, itwould be impossib-le to reach
 
agreement.
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CHAPTER THREE
 
EVALUATING PROGRAMS IN RELATION TO GOALS
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Ill. EVALUATING PROGRAMS IN RELATION TO GOALS.
 
INTRODUCTION
 
Having made the point that goals are not necessarily self-evident
 
and self-justifying, the same may be said of specific programs--partic­
ularly in any large, modern bureaucratized government organization.
 
We emphasize the relati6nship between programs and goals not simply
 
for the'sake of efficient management. 'Rather, it is the idea of "account­
ability" that is important--partidularly in NASA. To the extent that
 
NASA'programs do not forward goals generally acknowledged to be in the
 
national interesi,'or desired by a sufficiently larger influential and
 
vocal group', NASA b~comes a focus of dispute.
 
Americans from many different groups within society share a common
 
skepticism about Federal government bureaucracy. 'Federal agencies are
 
particu'larly subject to outside scrutiny and vulnerable to charges of
 
waste, inefficiency or irresporisibility.' But NASA is more vulnerable to
 
public scrutiny and skepticism than many'other Federal agencies- It is*
 
large. 'Its activities are highly visible. It is a symbol of an extreme
 
in American'=ultdre and technology and therefore likely to provoke strong
 
emotions among the public.
 
The principle of public accountability--rather than public relations-­
is criti'cal' for NASA, and should be a major factor in its planning efforts.
 
The succe~s of the Space Agency's efforts depends on the degree to which
 
its prografs are linked to clear goals that reflect widely shared public
 
understandings concerning the national interest and social goals.
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The purposes of this report preclude an extensive and detailed
 
analysis of NASA's programs. In an effort to clarify the general re­
us examine some
lationships between goals and programs, however, let 

aspects of NASA programs in relation to the specific list of goals dis­
cussed in Section II of this report.
 
GENERAL COMMENTS ON GOALS, PROGRAMS AND PLANNING METHODOLOGY
 
Once NASA's goals have been defined--if not agreed upon--then one
 
can evaluate programs in terms of goals.
 
First the planner must assemble a catalogue of projects the space
 
agency can, could, or might undertake--a so-called "wish list." The
 
May 1969 Long-Range Plan is a good example of a catalogue of project ob­
jectives, and the reports of the Planning Panels to the PSG were "wish lists"
 
of more specific projects. A wish list might be collected from all the
 
divisions of the agency, from contractors, consultants, and the press. -Most
 
of the project proposals may be madeby persons of a technical bent, who dea
 
mostly with purely technical problems. But operations goals will be mixed
 
into or be inplicit in the technical proposals. -At this stage in planning,
 
the technological proposals are not useful in deciding what should be done,
 
but are a good indication of what might be done.
 
The next step is to-group the operations goals according to general
 
There is no set method of doing this. In most organizations a
types. 

certain pattern has already evolved, and is reflected in (or set by) the
 
structure of the organization. (In NASA, for example, there are separate
 
divisions for applications and for various space missions.) Great care
 
should be taken, however, not to permit administrative arrangements made
 
for operational purposes to set harmful limits on the scope of planning
 
ideas and to distort the setting of priorities.
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Programs can be grouped by function, by geographic target or by
 
method of operation. For example, three programs--Venus unmanned orbiter,
 
Venus unmanned landing, and Venus manned expedition--might have similar
 
equipment; so that they might be grouped together for many R&D purposes.
 
Since they also have a similar physical objective, Venus, the public would
 
associate them. The combined interests of technicians and the public might
 
therefore lead NASA to establish a Venus Task Force. In'spite of this
 
grouping, however, for the purposes of AMCD, it may be useful to analyze
 
the Venus programs in relation to the policy goals each one advances. One
 
Venus project might increase national prestige, another would stimulate
 
scientific advance, etc., 'and it is these considerations that might even­
tually take priority over other criteria. Through grouping, the analyst
 
can reorganize a "wish list" and reduce the alternatives to a workable
 
number.
 
Next,,the mission .analyst must evaluate each operation or type of
 
operation according to space objectives. He can construct a mission­
oriented table or a gbals-oriented table. A table of this type is neces­
sarily crude, but it has the advantage of putting the necessary material
 
before the analyst.
 
Table I on the next page is an example of a combined mission-oriented
 
and goal-oriented table for past programs. Itevaluates four past operations
 
programs: the manned moon mission (the most spectacular of NASA's
 
achievements), and the communications satellite program (selected as
 
typical of an unmanned program with immediate on-earth benefits and relatively
 
low cost compared with Apollo. The "spy-in-the sky'' satellite (DoD, not NASA)
 
is picked as an example of a strictly military venture.
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TABLE II
 
SAMPLE EVALUATION OF PAST PROGRAMS
 
-
0t 
4- - 0 0 
o0 - ­
-+ + ++. +
A. 1. Achievement Per se 

2. Meeting commitment per se 	 0 0 ++ 0
 
B 3. Man's conquest of space 	 0 0 ++ +
 
++ 	 .. . .
4. International cooperation 

5. Moral equivalent of war 	 0 -- ++ ++
 
C 6. Increasing U.S. prestige 	 + 0 ++ ++
 
7. 	Succeeding in U.S.-U.S.S.R. + o 77 + 
prestige competition' + -
B. 	Succeeding in U.S.-U.S.S.R. I 0 ++ 010
 
military competition
 
9. 	Succeeding in U.S.-U.S.S.R. economic + 0 ++
 
and geographic competition 0 10 0
 
0 0 ++ +
 D 10. Satisfying curiosity 

0 0
11. Scientific advance 

12. Technological advance 	 +i + + i 0 
E 13. Mobilization base for achieving ++ +
 
other items
 
F 14. Potential economic benefits from +
 
+ 0 -0 0
 space technology 

0 0 0 0
15. 	 Short-term economic benefits from 

stimulation of national economy] ,.
 
G 16. Entertainment of public 	 0 0 i++ +"
 
17. 	 Redirecting attention of society [0 0 + + 
01 0 '++ ++ 
H 18. Advancing personal careers 	 I
 
19. Advancing organizational 	 + ? ++ ++
 
-

" !
interests 

20. 	 Maintaining funding 0 0 ++ +
 
_ s y v l
 
++ strongly achieves this objective
 
+ achieves this objective
 
0 trivial, mixed, or no effect
 
- obstructs achievement of this objective
 
--	 strongly obstructs the achievement of 
this objective 
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We have entered Apollo 11 and Apollo -14 separately to illustratz the
 
great'differences possible between missions that are technically similar.
 
The eighteen months between the two moon expeditions have changed the
 
effect. More important, of course, is that Apollo 11 was first--as a
 
furtheh iteration, AJollo 14 necessarily had less impact, although this
 
impact was increased by the fa-ilure of Apollo 13.
 
The vertical columns of the table ask the question--what space-objec­
tives will this midsion achieve? -Will it increase national prestige? Will
 
it advance science,'etc.? Each mission is evaluated separately and the
 
results- are then compared­
The-objective-oriented horizontal lines reverse the question. They
 
ask--which missions will achieve this space objective? How can.we.stimu­
late international cooperation? How can we promote national charisma?
 
Some measureof the degree to which a program.achieves a goal is
 
also desirable.' One program might modestly achieve a goal while another
 
would make a major contribution toward that goal. It is a.temptation,
 
particularly among persons wi.th a scientific education, to attempt to
 
convert subjective values to objective precise measurements. One could
 
conjure up a system by which each space goal isweighted in some manner,
 
and each space program is measured according to some scale ii the degree
 
to which it meets a space goal. The two items could then be combined
 
into a formula that would produce a scale reading presumed to represent
 
the objective "goal value" of each mission." Unfortunately, it is
 
*Such 
a system is attempted in G.R. Woodcock's, "The Problem of
 
Space Flight Worth Analysis," NASA TM X-53174, which is ingenious, but
 
not convincing. The difficulty of assigning quantitative values to
 
essentially subjective goals is the-principal criticism that can be'
 
made of "relevance-tree" methods of analysis.
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necessary to resist this temptation. There is no way to assign commensur-

Table II employs
able values to prestige, scientific advance, fame, etc. 

a simple five-value scale, based on purely subjective evaluation. Such a
 
rating system can be useful, so long as it is remembered that the more
 
precise the rating appears to be, the more misleading it can be. Assign­
ing ratings, however rough and dubious, forces the analyst to consider
 
of each program.
seriously how much payoff in "goals" he will get out 

By checking his proposals -or groups of proposals against the goals
 
list, the analyst can reject many proposals on the grounds that they are
 
of little or no utility compared with other programs. If, for example,
 
then a project re­technological gains as such are a high-priority goal, 

quiring new systems might be preferred to the reuse or modification of
 
existing hardware.
 
However, the analyst must take care not to be naive in the assigning
 
of goals to programs. Frequently programs will be touted as achieving
 
goals which they actually thwart. To extend our illustrative discussion,
 
let us consider a relatively simple and clear NASA program.
 
COMMUNICATION SATELLITES
 
A widely-held notion is that it should be possible to use satellite
 
communication technology for nurturing goodwill, building cultural
 
bridges, and building potential alliances by providing access to American
 
culture over broad regions of the globe. The unintentional success of
 
American movies in accomplishing this aim during the 1930's may be an
 
unwarranted and inappropriate analogy today. Further, broadcasting is
 
*This portion is drawn from work in progress by Dr. A. George
 
Schillinger.
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not the inverse of data collection via satellites. While'the technical
 
processes may be analogous, the political'issues posed are quite
 
different.
 
Those who believe that the communications satellite program forwards,
 
the goal of increased international cooperation may be excessively
 
influenced by the old pacifist assumption that communication promotes
 
mutual understanding that inevitably creates goodwill and cooperation.
 
In fact, communication satellites might promote conflict and hostility
 
and the impression that'Americans are aggressively simplistic.
 
First of all large international satellite networks for communica­
tion, commerce, education and entertainment may be considerably less
 
practicable in the foreseeable future than their national counterparts.
 
In the foreseeable future nd enforceable world-widb copyright agree­
ments are'in prospect. As an increasing number of earth stations are
 
able to receive satellite signals, 'iOracy may become a problem. Already
 
the attitude prevails that once a program has been transmitted via satel­
lite, copyright protection is in effect lost. The premfum demanded by
 
ptoducers in return is pricing many events out of the market.
 
At present, in order to protect their government-owned land lines,
 
Europeans are reluctant to reduce rates for television transmission via
 
satellitesi This attitude may change as land facilities become satUrated
 
and expansion becomes necessary. Economic considerations will then dic­
tate the use of satellites.
 
But, even then direct broadcasts to individual sets or cluster of
 
sets are unlikely for both technical and political reasons. The political
 
control of communication will become an issue. Nations will insist on
 
retaining control over what is being beamed at their population. Even
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though satellites radiating at sufficiently high power levels to be
 
picked up by small receivers may be developed during the next decade,
 
likely to be used, for they would provide communications
they are not 

Programs will therefore enter
 access to the population by other nations. 

countries through one or more nationally controlled ground distribtion
 
centers on a commercial basis--not directly from internationally operated
 
satellites.
 
Developing countries, in the absence of major land facilities,
 
should welcome the prospect of communication satellite networks. Nations
 
with vast or impassable terrain, such as Brazil and Indonesia, cannot
 
hope to develop wide-ranging communication facilities except through
 
Even more than in the developed countries, control over
satellites. 

undoubtedly reside in the technological
access to the population will 

scheme adopted rather than in international agreements. Sources of trans­
mission and points of terrestrial distribution will surely stay within
 
national control.
 
desirable to attract developing countries
While it may be seen as 

into the U.S. sphere of cultural influence, this should not be an explicit
 
aim when establishing communications nets. The massive impact American
 
television has had on contemporary British culture is visible both in
 
England and in America. In light of the vast differences between modern
 
western culture and the cultures of the developing nations in Asia and
 
Africa, such cultural "confrontation" does not seem to be desirable for
 
anyone. Even governments friendly to the United States would want to
 
guard against a severe cultural shock.
 
Satellite nets may be more effective for purposes of U.S. foreign
 
policy if they were looked upon as technical aid, not unlike agricultural
 
3-9 HI-1272/3-RR 

equipment. While such systems are among the most advanced forms of modern
 
technology, from the point of view of internal development they would
 
respond to local subsistence needs. By far the largest part of such
 
systems consists of ground stations. Equipping large regions with
 
American modular communication installations would have long-term eco­
nomic, political and military advantages for the U.S., apart from those
 
that unavoidable cultural contacts would bring.
 
In any event, it is not at all clear that international satellites
 
automatically promise a new era of international cooperation
 
CONCLUSION
 
The analyst requires some preliminary criteria for assessing a very
 
large number of competing possibilities. This requires abstracting from
 
specific program goals, grouping together similar options, eliminating
 
proposals of lesser effectiveness, and attempting to clarify seemingly
 
self-evident relationships among programs and goals. For this purpose,
 
a checklist of goals or abstract criteria may be useful, provided it is
 
not applied too rigorously. (Like any other tool, it is a good servant
 
but a bad master.) The next steps are to consider how the relative
 
importance of the criteria may vary with respect to segement of the
 
population--and with respect to time.
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CHAPTER FOUR
 
ANALYZING PRESENT GOALS OF GROUPS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
 
AND EVALUATING PROGRAMS IN TERMS OF THESE GOALS
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4V. ANALYZING PRESENT GOALS OF GROUPS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
 
AND EVALUATING PROGRAMS IN TERMS OF THESE GOALS
 
AMERICAN-ATTITUDES-TOWARD THE SPAtE'PROGRAM AND NASA 
Up to this point, we have attempted to clarify NASAs goals and 
then to suggest a fresh emphasis -on relating proposed NASA programs to 
these goals. These are the first two stages in an integrated planning 
process. 
-
At this point,,one important step in the logical series connecting
 
the proposed:planning scheme must be developed: the connect'ion'between
 
NASA's goals and programs and the goals and attitudes of influential
 
groups in American society. The last sections of this study will then
 
describe and analyze'alternate futures and scenarios and indicate how
 
this methodology can be applied to NASA decision-making processes.
 
As we indicated in Chapter 3, because the United States is a democracy,
 
and NASA is 
a government agency, funded by taxation and ultimately-account­
able to the electorate, NASA's projects should in some reasonable way re­
flect the legitimate objectives of various groups in American society and
 
should have considerable support from significant elements of the public.
 
Obviously, this may be difficult to achieve because some objectives conflict
 
with others.
 
We have already asked these questions:
 
What are NASA's over-all goals?
 
What goals do particular NASA programs achieve?
 
We now ask:
 
What are the goals of groups inAmerican society?
 
Can we analyze their present goals to provide a base for analyzing

changes in goa'ls and values under varying conditions in the future?
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Ultimately, any study of public attitudes toward space programs and
 
NASA has these aims:
 
1) to remind planners of the political constraints that exist in
 
a democratic society;
 
2) to consider how new definitions of the national interest might
 
influence NASA's stated goals;
 
3) to consider whether important national interests are not under­
stood by various sectors of the public who may be imposing
 
pressures that are contrary to their own best interests and the
 
nation's in the long run;
 
4) to serve as a preliminary analytic exercise leading up to the
 
more basic questions of whether or not NASA's proposals and
 
programs are consistent with its goals.
 
What we have done is:
 
1) 	to select groups that are particularly relevant to NASA; after
 
reviewing their values and goals to provide a base line, to sug­
gest that these values and goals may change, and that values
 
shift from one group to another over a period of time.
 
2) to illustrate the fact that different groups within this society
 
have different attitudes toward the space program at any given
 
time; establishing this general understanding is more important
 
than achieving precise accuracy in all details.
 
Since America is a democracy, the space program must represent the
 
interests and values of substantial groups within our society. As we have
 
stressed, this is not a matter of public relations but a basic principle of
 
American government; the Soviet space planners have a much simpler problem
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at present, though:even their government is moving toward greater accounta­
bility' But interests and values of groups in American society are 
likely to
 
change in time. It is in NASA's long-term interest and in the public interest
 
to attempt to anticipate these changes in order to carry out its role.
 
DETERMINING AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD SPACE AND NASA:
 
SOME METHODOLOGICAL COMMENTS
 
Before discussing specifi groupings in American society, we must
 
ask: how does one obtain a reasonably accurate picture of public atti­
tudes on public issues? Although the answer may seem obvious to some, it
 
is important to elaborate it since so much of the effort to describe the
 
future depends on the degree to which one'is reasonably accurate about
 
the present,
 
The judicious use of opinion polls and attitude surveys is 
a basic
 
tool for planners. The following must be kept in mind:
 
a. 
Present attitudes are hard to chart accurately. Greater accuracy
 
is possible in regard to opinions held'two or more years ago.
 
b. 	While polls are usefu'l, planners must be aware of some-built-in
 
shortcomings due to personal attitudes of researches, improper
 
sampling, incorrect hypotheses, improper questions, and public
 
attitudes toward polls 
as such.
 
c. 	Several academic data banks are rich sources of information: the
 
National Opinion Research Center, at the University of Chicago;
 
the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan; and
 
the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University are
 
only the best-known of many institutes housing large opinion data
 
files.
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d. A private research firm, the Simulmatics Group, is a compara-.
 
tively expensive source used by some political candidates-­
including the 1960 Kennedy Presidential campaign. Simulmatics
 
has developed a computerized model of 480 groups within American
 
society and the basic attitudes (in the form of propositions)
 
held by these groups. Their model permits study of the way new
 
messages travel through the public and the effects of these
 
messages on attitudes.
 
e. 	As an example of the shortcomings suggested above in item b, it
 
is known that in determining public attitudes toward space and
 
NASA it is most important to determine attitudes toward a number
 
of different programs that cost money, and not simply to "survey
 
attitudes" in the most general sense. General attitudes change
 
once 	the public is confronted with clear choices among programs
 
that 	have different costs.
 
Although the planner must take care to identify the real goals of
 
space programs, he must also realize that substantial groups within-society
 
may favor a program for the "wrong" reasons. Group N may believe that pro­
gram X will achieve goals Y and Z. The planner may be convinced they are
 
mistaken, because X will not contribute to Y orZ. Nevertheless, if a
 
substantial group believes X is a route to some goal, the belief may be
 
self-validating, unless the belief is subject to change. Making judgments
 
about both the existence and the stability of such beliefs requires that
 
public opinion polls be not only consulted, but analyzed and interpreted.
 
Given the time lag in poll accuracy, the limited number of major
 
sources of relatively reliable data, the built-in problems and poll techniques,
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and the high-cost of the best available polling~services, the planner,
 
obviously cannot rely completely on pol.ls. He must supplement them with
 
more qualitative:methodsof studying social trends, e.g.,!the use of
 
representative periodicals; the,.identification of key spokesen, etc.
 
Here knowledgeability, breadth of.experience, and a rather elusive and
 
frequently unpersuasive capacity for."insight" may be crucial.
 
KEY SOCIAL-POLITICAL GROUPS IN AMERICA
 
General Characteristics
 
Our list of space goals-ranges' froi the idealist or abstract at the
 
tor'bf Table I (page 2-9, above) to the mundane or base at the bottom. ­
Clearly'2arious-groups and'interests will have different ideas about what
 
items on this lisi are'or are not desirable goals. Some NASA staff and
 
contractors might be interested in maintaihing or advancing personal or
 
corporate organizational interests--whether because of dedication to par­
ticular- programs or loyalty to groups or personal ambition. Con'ersely,
 
all of humankind might value the cosmoplitan goals in Category A.
 
NASA itself states its goals t6 be Categories B,'C, D,'and sometimes 
F--the'internatidnalist, nationalist, scientific, 'and economic potential' 
goals; and most'spokesmen would vigorously deny being influenced by Cate­
gories G and H--the goals attributed to it by some critics. Like all of us, 
NASA officials probably assume that their values are widely held. This is 
not the case. Various groups within our society have widely diverging Views 
regarding space goals. For our purposes we will divide society into social 
groups--each with characteristic life styles and corresponding attitudes- ­
towards the space program.* 
*These categories are drawn from work in progress at Hudson Institute 
by various researchers, notably Frank Armbruster and Herman Kahn. 
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The "correct" method of sub-dividing society for the purpose of
 
social and political. analysis has been under discussion among scholars,
 
commentators since the days of the ancient
sociologists, and political 

How one divides society for the purpose of analysis usually de-
Greeks. 

pends upon how one views that society personally, and where one stands
 
in its social and political structure.
 
SOCIETY AND POLITY--THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
 
Any discussion of the structure of our society and political system
 
must begin with consideration of the most widely held views of both--the
 
so-called "conventional wisdom," as commonly expressed in journalism and
 
our every day speech. Although we claim that America is a "democracy"
in 

with persons theoretically equal and presumably having equal opportunities
 
to achieve the material and status awards that our society offers, we also
 
recognize that those rewards are'unequally distributed. Most of us would
 
agree that they should be unequally distributed, as prizes for superior
 
performance.
 
Compared with Europe, particularly feudal Europe, America is an egal­
itarian society. Foreign observers, accustomed to a hierarchal society
 
based on a rigid class structure, are frequently misled into believing
 
that Americans have achieved their goal of social and political equality.
 
However, in our own lives we recognize that there are differences between
 
Americans, and that these differences are often based upon the family to
 
which an individual was born, and are reflected in values, customs, and
 
political behavior.
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Over the last few generations the techniques of systematic socio--­
logical analys'is have been applied to American society and have produced
 
a widely accepted.view of the class structure of America. 
Recognizing
 
that American class lines are not rigid as 
those of a caste society such
 
as India, nevertheless sociologists have found it useful 
to depict what
 
are in essence ideal types of social classes. Perhaps the most commonly
 
accepted is the organization of the sociologist W. Lloyd Warner and his
 
associates, which'i-s based upon studies of various sized cities in the
 
American Mid-West, New England, and the South. 
Warner and his associates
 
have found that these cities have a class, structure within them which is
 
generally recognized by the inhabitants. Warner sees an upper class or
 
elite of wealth, power and-status. Just-below them is an upperrmiddle
 
class of professional people of high income,, rather than wealth, and sub­
stantial status. Next on the ladderjs the lower-middle class of shop
 
keepers, white collar workers,- etc., who are the largest class. These
 
are followed by the upper-lower or working class, who are "respectable"
 
manual laborers. At the bottom is the lower-lower class of persons-of
 
erratic income, distasteful personal habits, and who are held in contempt
 
by-the rest of society. Sometimes, the upper class is divided into upper­
upper and lower-upper; the latter being the-new rich; the former, old
 
established money. In studies of a small Midwestern city and an, old New
 
England seaport city, Warner found the following-class distributions.
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CLASS DISTRIBUTION
 
"Jonesville" "Yankee City"
 
Upper 	 3% 3%
 
Upper-middle 11% 	 10%
 
28%
Lower-middle 31% 

Upper-lower 41% 33%
 
25%
Lower-lower 	 14% 

W.L. WARNER ET. AL.
 
DEMOCRACY IN JONESVILLE
 
NEW YORK, T 49 p. 24.
 
These studies were conducted just before and during the Second
 
World War. A similar survey done today would li'kely show that there
 
was a general shift in favor of the middle classes away from the lower
 
In both cities, Warner found that the upper and upper-middle
classes. 

classes were almost absolutely dominant. They had both political and
 
social power vastly exceeding their numerical importance. They were
 
the leaders, the others were the followers.
 
The second piece of our convential wisdom regarding the organization
 
of society and politics is that there is a relationship between class and
 
political opinion. More prosperous people generally vote Republican and
 
less prosperous vote Democratic." The Democratic party (and "liberal"
 
programs) are more likely to be supported by working people, particularly
 
trade union members, ethnic minorities, 	Irish, Italian, and slavic Cath­
olics, Jews, and Negroes. The Republican party is perceived as the party
 
of "conservative" principles, of business men large and smadl; and of
 
*L.A.Free and H. Cantril, The Political BeLiefs of Americans, (New
 
.Brunswick, New Jersey, 1968).
 
4-9 'H-1272/3-RR 

farmers. Regional distinctions beeween the parties, once very important,
 
are-seen'to be on the wane--even th6-one-time solid South can no longer
 
be counted surely in the Democratic column.. However; there remains 
an
 
urban--rural split--the cities Being-seen as Democratic, rural 
areas as-

Republican. The suburb,,the chosen residential 
area of executive and
 
white collar workers, is conventionally.seen as Republican territory..
 
As- noted before, this picture is'very familiar to us. This picture
 
was probably highly accurate as late as perhaps 1960, and has great val­
idity today.-'However, what are we to make of certain social 
and polit"
 
ical, phenomena; such as very wealthy "silk stocking" areas voting for
 
very liberal Democrats; millionaire-candidates offering themselves as
 
supporters of the interests of the very poor, blue-collar workers, in-'
 
cluding trade 'union members,- supporting"conservative"-candidates; big
 
business 'men supporting the Democratic candidate for president in 1964;­
and construction workers 'bearing-signs "we love the'establishment" and'
 
beating up college students, who are presumably the children of-the
 
establishment. Strange things are happening in American society. 
 Many
 
of the old rules no longer apply and many couiimentators and observers of
 
the American scene have leapt into the breech to attempt to explain what
 
is happening,-and what implications these events have for the.future of
 
the nation, and for future policy making.
 
RECENT ANALYSES
 
The Emerginj Republican Maiority
 
A'recentvery extraordinary analysis of the U.S. public which
 
has generated wide discussion' is Kevin P. Phillips' The Emerging Republican
 
Majority, (New Rochelle, 1969). 
 Phillips, a sometime Republican campaign
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Mitchell, takes the position
strategist and aide to Attorney General 

that U.S. voter patterns are most easily understood by considering the
 
ethnic composition of the electorate. ,According to Phillips, a voter's
 
status and his attitude toward other groups principally
ethnic and class 

Moreover, he believes that these
predetermines his voting pattern. 

ethnic patterns can be traced far back into our nation~s past, and that
 
today's voting was largely established by the conditions under which the
 
settled by New Englanders
country was settled. For example, those areas 

will have the same political tendencies as rural New England.
 
Phillips believes that the politics of the New Deal have broken down
 
and the time is ripe for a new coalition of forces which will inaugurate
 
a "new era" of American politics comparable to that of the New Deal;
 
be dominated by the Republican party--a conserva-
Phillips' new era will 

sees America as mosaic of ethnic groups,
tive Republican party. Phillips 

interacting in a complex pattern, but the key elements are shown in the
 
table below:
 
Liberal Establishment (i.e., White middle-class suburbanites
 
upper-middle class and upper
 
class WASPs and Jews) White.Southerners
 
Ethnic (i.e., Italian, Irish,
Negroes 
 Slavic, urban working men)
 
Other non-white minority 
groups
 
the table is the winning side and, in
Obviously, the right side of 

Phillips' view, only the Republican party can unite these elements into
 
is less candid about what will unite this disparate
one force. Phillips 

group who have historical conflicts of economic interests. In fact, the
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down-grading of economic interests is one of the most fascinating as­
pects of Phillips' analysis. It is clear that Phillips expects the
 
majority to be not so much united for anything as united against the
 
left group, the liberals and non-whites. Phillips' Republican majority
 
relies upon polarization as a permanent factor in American life. He ex­
pects the great mass of Americans will recoil from 4the research directors,
 
associate professors, social workers, educational consultants, urbanolog­
ists, development planners, journalists, brotherhood executives, found­
ation staffers, communications specialists, culture vendors, pornography
 
merchants, poverty theorists and so forth...the propagators of environ­
mentalism (as beneficiaries of resultant social remedial spending) and
 
archi-tects of the Permissive Society" who "benefiting from the expendi­
tures and activities of big government,.propagated an ideology which pro­
moted big government." The non-white minorities are perceived as the
 
clients of the "Liberal Establishment."
 
To win a majority in the future, Phillips believes-the Republicans
 
must assemble the forces which supported Nixon and Wallace in 1968. To­
gether thesewill give a clear majority. The Republican majority would
 
be'made up of the Midwestern and Plains states and the South- (hence, the
 
so-called "Southern Strategy") and the suburbs of the Far Western, Mid­
western and Middle Atlantic states. Phillips advises Republicans to write
 
off New England, NewYork, and Michigan. He points- out that the old, tra­
ditionally Democratic North Eastern, urban strongholds of the Democratic'
 
party are declining--economically and 'inpopulation--and that the wave of
 
the future is in the suburbs, particularly the suburbs of the South and
 
South West, and that these areas are conservative and Republican. Phillips
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does not advocate a "right wing" strategy but he does clearly imply that
 
should the Republicans find it necessary to bolster their moderate pos­
ition with either "left" or "right" support, they should pick the right.
 
Administrative spokesmen have publicly denied that Phillips' concept
 
of social and political structure has had any effect upon their strategy.
 
However, in the congressional campaign-of 1970, it is	clear that the
 
issues to the ex-
Republican party had sought to emphasize the "social" 

clusion of economic issues and by making a major play for "silent majority"
 
unity on the issues of "law and order" and' permissiveness, sought 
to unite
 
the elements of Phillips' projected coalition.
 
The Metroamericans
 
The historian, Eric Goldman, a White House staffer during the Adminis­
tration of President Johnson, attempted to explain the decline and fall of
 
(New York,
the Johnson Administration in his The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson. 

1969). According to Goldman, the failure of Johnson to mobilize the coun­
-try behind his program was caused by Johnson's lack of rapport with-the
 
group of people that Goldman calls "the Hetroamericans." 	Goldman describes
 
likely to have some
the Metroamerican as "youthful, educated, affluent, more 

His mind had been shaped by an environment
minority blood-in his veins. 

which had been good to him. Itwas no less formed by an American scene
 
of aggravating big organizations, brassy media and grinding social dislocations,
 
and by a world situation of wars and threats of still worse wars. His
 
thinking and his attitudes were a tangle of ambivalence. The Metroamerican
 
was avidly on the make, economically and socially, but he shied away from
 
the appearance of sheer money-making or sheer caste and preferred the manner
 
skeptical
of public-sp-iri-tedness and cultivation. He had ideals, but was 

HI-1272/3-RR 4-13
 
of bther people's --ad even,:; bit, of his own.. He was libera.l but without
 
ideology; tolerant, but intolerant-of do-goodism; flexible, pragmatic, and
 
a devotee of tHe ironic'edge."
 
'According to Goldman, Johnson failed to appeal to these people'because
 
of his provincial, Texas, vulgar style. The Metroamericans turned on him
 
and succeeded in eroding his credibility. Goldman does not claim that
 
Metroamericans are anything like a'majority of the American people, but they
 
were "abundantly 'numerous, articulate, and powerful, and they.were especially
 
important in determining national attitudes because of their dominance i
 
the world of books, magazines, radio and television." -

Goldman, hirself educated at Johns Hopkins and a professor of history
 
at Priticeton University, understandably places-great. importance on what he
 
perceives'td be the dbprived nature of'Lyndon Johnson's education-. 
A large 
part-of the blame of Johnson's-misreadihg of the dominant intellectual 
Metroanierican-element'presumably could be attributed to his attending South­
west Texas State Teachers' College. 
Goldman's "Metroamerican" clearly is practically identical to the ­
cohservative concept of the "liberal establishment,"-of upper class, educated 
Eastern dominant social and political elements. The recent attacks'by 
ViLe President Spiro Agnew on the "East&rn liberal press" were an attack 
on "Metroamerica,"'p&rhaps intehd'ing to destroy its own credibility before
 
it could-destroy Nixon as 'it-did Johnson. We may conjecture that Goldman
 
would disapprove of such a strategy.% The political implication' of'Goldman's
 
thesis is that-no national administration can succeed unless it has the
 
confidence and support of "Metroamerica" as John Kennedy did.
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It is most interesting to note that Goldman defines Metroamerica, not
 
in terms of economic interest, nor in ethnic origin, but in terms of education
 
and world outlook. His Metroamericans are cosmopolitan, liberal, pragmatic,
 
and more clearly perceive what are the "real needs" of the nation-. The bulk
 
of the country that isoutside of Metroamerica presumably suffers from a
 
lack of education. Goldman clearly identifies with Metroamerica, although
 
he was shocked by its crude snobbery and vicious invective against his former
 
boss. According to Goldman, this division between Metroamerica and the rest
 
of the nation caused the tragedy of Lyndon Johnson.
 
The New Populism
 
A comprehensive liberal Democratic answer to Phillips has not yet been
 
produced; however, the elements of such an approach appear in Fred R. Harris's
 
"The Making of a Majority," (Harper's, May, 1970)."' Senator Harris, a former
 
Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, denies that the country is
 
going conservative; rather, -he-believes that the bulk of the population
 
Harris does not believe that the Republicans
remains predominantly "liberal." 

can add the Wallace vote to their base strength to produce a conservative
 
majority. He perceives the Wallace voter as a "populist"--of low income,
 
to his economic interests.
anti-establishment and susceptible to an appeal 

In effect, Harris believes that the traditional politics of the New Deal era
 
still work in America, that the Democrats can win with a constituency
wi-il 

of the young, black, the poor, and the whiteworking classes (presumably
 
together with the liberals, although Harris does. not mention this in his
 
article). Harris's populist coalition would be arrayed against the privileged
 
elements, in our society,.which Harris perceives as being.predominantly
 
Republican.
 
-Since this was written, Harris has published a book on the subject.
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Th6 Real Majority -.-

A more recent study of political behavior is Richard C. Scammon and
 
Ben'J. Watienberg's The Real Maiori , which although purporting to be a
 
neutral'analysis, has been widely heralded'as a Democratic answer to Phillips.
 
(ThF authors were office holders under Johnson.) The authoris'argue that the
 
'real majority-in America is those vbters who are "liberal" on bread and'
 
butter economic issues (federal aid, medicare, etc.) but "conservative" on
 
soci'al issues (anti-crime, ri'oting,' porndgraphy, etc.)'. Liberal Democrats
 
can win' if they pay sufficient attention to the deep concerns of the elec­
to-rate on 'social issues. To Scammon and Wattenberg the winning position on
 
the political spectrum is neither right nor left, but center.
 
In reaching this conclusion the authors scrutinized a vast array of
 
voting data, public opinion sampling, and demographic mat&rial. In contrast
 
to Phil'lips-, they-attribute less import~nce to ethhic or social factors.
 
Indeed, they belie'e that on social issues "the striking fact is how similarly
 
Americans feel about these issues-regardless of age, region, sex, education,
 
occupation, religion; politics, unions'; 'commurity size, or almost,any other
 
cross-ihdex one might-come up with." They do address'theiselves to the
 
subject of'ethnoticity, but-believe that the ethnic groups 'are receding
 
in importance 6s immigrant'groups are'absorbed'in the melting pot. However,
 
in dlscussing local politics, they bring in ethnic matters more frequently.
 
Itwould appear that Scammon and Wattenberg are slaves of their data. Nation­
al public opinion sampling does not divide the population ethnically (except
 
black and white) but analysis of local ethnic voting patterns is common.
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Directly refuting Phillips' so-called "Southern Strategy", Scammon and
 
Wattenberg point out that the real seat of electoral power in the United States
 
is "Quadcali"--the quadrangle encompassing Massachusetts, Washington, D.C.,
 
Illinois, and Wisconsin, plus California. If a presidential candidate can
 
win in this area, the rest of the country doesn't matter. This area, of
 
course, is the most highly urbanized part of the United States. In contrast
 
to Phillips, Scammon and Wattenberg explicitly deny that the New Deal coalition
 
is breaking up. They point out that people have been saying it has been
 
breaking up for generations and still it remains substantially intact-­
except for the defection of the South. They point out that the major shifts
 
in American political behavior are really expressed only in a few percentage
 
points, and that things really have not changed so much. They are in
 
substantial agreement with. Phillips in that they recognize that the
 
Democrats have permitted themselves to be perceived as "soft" on social
 
issues, and they recommend as a strategy for Democrats that they make clear
 
that they share the concern of the electorate on these issues; having done
 
this, the social issue will be defused and then elections can be fought
 
out on the established basis of economic interests, under which terms of­
conflict the Democrats will probably win. This-book has been widely read
 
by Democratic politicians, and itwould seem that judging from the public
 
statements of many of them in the elections of 1970, they have taken it to
 
heart.
 
A PARADIGM OF AMERICAN SOCIETY
 
We attempt here to organize American society, circa 1971, in such a
 
way as to be useful to persons engaged in policy formulation. We have
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not broken down spciety by-economic, age, occupation,, geographic3-sex
 
or religious categortes at this point, though such variables are i-n­
cluded in,the discussions that follow. Rather, for present purposes
 
we have chosen to distinguish groups in society primarily in terms of
 
values, without exposing here,, except marginally, the origins and-cor­
relates-,of these values in terms of.age, sex, social 
and economic roles,
 
religions, educational, geographic, and ethnic differences, etcg Further,,
 
we have not attempted to achieve precise accuracy on all 
issues evenwith­
in the groups we are discussing, since this is meant to be an illustra­
tive and suggestive exercise. 
Still, we-feel that it is extremely use­
ful to the understanding of how our society and polity works to sub-divide
 
the entire nation into the eight primary groups shown-on the fol owing
 
chart. These groups will be described separately below but since they
 
are to a certain extent defined in relation to each other, we will begin
 
by a brief discussion of all of them.
 
"POWER GROU'PS"'
 
RESPONSIBLE DN 
ACADEMIC CENTER PRVNCA 
HUMANIST 
LEFT 
(ESTATE 
.-
LEADERS //RIGHT (:!NATIONALIST 
r ILOWER MIDDLE CLASS]­
~I~~N CLSST 
M1ASS 
- MIDDLE 
GROUPS" jLOWER CLASS 
 AMIER ICA" 
"IDEOLOG ICAL
 
GROUPS"
 
-
 -
----------- .
 .
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To reduce the scheme to its bare bones, we see America divided into
 
three groups defined in terms of the power they have in our society; three
 
mass groups comprising the bulk of the population; and two extreme ideo­
logical positions who define themselves in terms of their values. We have
 
attempted to give them value-free names, hoping by this means to limit
 
partisan dispute regarding the nature and composition of the various groups,
 
and the validity or relative merit of their views. The groups we choose to
 
identify are these:
 
Three Power Groups:
 
Three Mass Groups:
 
Two Ideological Groups:
 
Responsible Center
 
Intellectual Estate
 
Provincial Leaders
 
Lower Middle Class
 
Laboring Class
 
Lower Class
 
Humanist Left
 
Nationalist Right
 
To guide the discussion, we present the table on the following page
 
which relates the overall reactions,of the above groups to the objectives
 
of the space program. Note the category, "Middle America"--we believe
 
that for NASA policy planning purposes it is best to consider the provin­
cial leaders, the lower middle class, and the laboring class together be­
cause their differences are not as significant to NASA as their common
 
values, although those differences can be very important in shaping the
 
entire national environment in which NASA must function in the future.
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TABLE III
 
SPACE OBJECTIVES OF AMERICAN SOCIAL-POLITICAL GROUPS, 1969
 
U( 
0) M.., 	 04 
0.4-a) W =U- Z0L 0 *­
444-C.)Wu 84= ~ 40<Itrainl 	 oprto 
-. ++ +n,- 0 -

A 1. Achievement per-se 	 ++ + 0 0 + 
2. Meeting commitment perfse ++ + 0 
B 3. Man's conquest of space 	 ++ 0 + 6 0 + 
4. International cooperation 0 
 ++ 	 ++ .-- a ­
5. Moral equivalent of war 	 0 .++ 0 -- --
C 6. Increasing U.S. prestige ++ .. .. ++ ? ++
 
7. 	Succeeding in U.S.-U.S.S.R. -++ 
prestige competition ++ ? ++ 
8. 	Succeeding in U.S.-U.S.S;R. 
military competition ++ ++ ? ++ 
9. 	Succeeding in U.S.S.R. economic 
-+­
and geographic competition ++ 0 ++ 
D 	10. Satisfying curiosity 
- 0 0 0 
11. Scientific advahce 	 ++ ++ -- 0 0 0 
12. Technological advance 	 ++ + -- + 0 0 
E 13. Mobilization base for achieving + + 0 + 
other items. 
F 	14. Potential. economic benefits from 
 0 	 0 ++ 0 0 
space 	technology
 
15. Short-term economic benefits from 4+ 
 0 ++ 0
 
economy
stimulation of national 

G 	 16. Entertainment of public 0 -- 0 0 0 0 
17.- Redirecting attention of society ? -- -. - -- ++ 
H 	 18.- Advancing personal careers + r-, 0 0 0 
19. 	 Advancing organizational - ­
interests' + 0 0 0 
20. Maintaining funding .... 	 ++ 
++ strongly supports this objective
 
+ supports this objective
 
0 unaware, indifferent, or ambivalent
 
- opposes this objective
 
-- strongly opposes this objective
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THREE POWER GROUPS
 
"One way to look at American democracy is to see it not so
 
but rather a society with an unprecedentedly
much a democracy at all, 

large and varied assortment of elites."
 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan
 
our paradigm of American society, we see at the top three competing
In 

groups each of which has economic, social and political power far out of pro­
portion to its numbers. Although these groups together,comprise only a few
 
in many ways they dominate the whole life of our country. We
million families, 

do not say that they rule America, because they can maintain their position
 
only through the tacit approval of the masses, and they are at odds with one
 
another, vying for power and for support from below.
 
The Responsible Center
 
chart we find the
Appropriately, at the top and center of our 

and manage the great
Responsible Center--that is, those men who control 

We include in this group corporation executives,
institutions of America. 

high military and government officials, and many administrators of other
 
non-profit organizations, such as university presidents, church leaders,
 
and union officials. The Responsible Center is often called "the establish­
see, we have several establishments in
ment;" however, as we shall 

America, of which the Responsible Center is one, although certainly the
 
most important and powerful. The Responsible Center constitutes a ruling
 
Unlike most of the elites of the past,
group, but certainly not a ruling class. 

is, its power does not
the Responsible Center is not a hereditary elite, that 

through birth to upper class families. Nor does the power of the
 come 

Responsible Center come from its possession of personally owned private property.
 
-C. Wright Mill's "Power Elite" -isclose to our concept of the"Respon­
sible Center'. See The Power Elite, (New York, 1956)
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Though manylof its members are very ridh, their wealth comes not so Thuch
 
from the possession df prbperty as from the'p6ssession of high position,
 
and therefore high income. To be sure, it is useful to be born into the
 
right family in order to ga'in access to the'Redponsible Center and it 'is
 
also useful to have family-owned property, but these attributes only give
 
a-person an advantage in'gaining admission' to the group. They have little
 
to do with the individual's ability to rise to the top.
 
The Responsible Center does not consist only of the high officials
 
listed above. It also includes all those persons who aspire to achieve
 
those positions, as well as the people who serve those at the top. The
 
Responsible Center is perhaps best seen as a pyramid--in the military, for
 
example, the pyramid'comprises all members of-the officer class from the
 
chidf of staff down to- the West Point Cadet.- Positions-at'the top ate'
 
earned by-the junior hembers after a long period of struggle. Personal'
 
sacrifices made by individuals to achieve positions at the top ate often
 
incomprehensible to persons outside ofthe Responsible Center. -The fin­
ancial rewards are certainly large, but would,not appear to be worth the
 
sacrifice of family life, leisure-time, individuality, and sometimes per­
sonal self-respect. Itwould seem that members of the' Responsible Center 
..do..not primarily want money, or even fame (how many'people can name the' 
heads of great corporations or-military branches?), they seek power,'the9 
want to be on top. 
Because the leaders of the Responsible Center are a tiny group selected 
from'competition among a much larger'group, and because the nature of the 
- environment-in which they compete and the men they compete with imposes a 
standard upon the entire group, the type of man found at the top of the 
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Responsible Center is remarkably uniform in his personal character and
 
Success in infighting in large organizations requires a high
values. 

degree of expertise in the more subtle forms of diplomacy. It requires
 
a great degree of self-control, it requires men to be able to swallow
 
accept the standards
their pride on occasion, it requires men who will 

To gain admission to a self­of the organization and not rock the boat. 

perpetuating oligarchy, the candidate must rigidly adhere to the standards
 
The individual
of that oligarchy. Very little deviation is tolerated. 

member of the Responsible Center is extremely sceptical of deviant behav­
ior of all types, even deviant dress. Deviant ideas are considered to be
 
"crackpot" and unworthy of consideration. The factors that are looked
 
for in the Responsible Center are balance, moderation, and ability to
 
postpone immediate gratifications for long-term gains, respect for author­
ity, respect for existing institutions, loyalty, and the ability to per­
ceive the big picture. Little men addicted to details cannot manage the
 
life of the United
vast bureaucracies which control the economic and social 

States.
 
The Responsible Center is a meritocracy, drawn from a large body of
 
the population, but not the entire population. Members of the Responsible
 
Center are recruited almost entirely from three groups--from the children
 
)f the Responsible Center, from the children of the provincial elites, and
 
from the lower middle class.- Almost all members of the Responsible Center
 
re 
college graduates, particularly from schools of business administration
 
3nd engineering. There are many liberal arts graduates among them but few
 
)f them were very good students in the humanities. Although members of the
 
lesponsible Center feel the need from time to time to give lip service to
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the importance of the humanities and fine arts, in truth, they are not much
 
interested in them. Responsible Center people respect hard data and the
 
ability to make tough decisions. Vagueness and/or indecision are anathema
 
to them. Ideas are valuable only insofar as they are useful.
 
I 
'The Responsible Center has been with us for a good long time; however,
 
it was first identified as a major power group during the nineteen-thirties
 
when authors such as Berle and Burnham (and later Galbraith) pointed out
 
that American capitalism was no longer controlled by capitalists but by
 
the managers of the corporations. And that these managers were remarkably
 
similar in their style and values to the persons who controlled the theoret­
ically socialist and fascist Russian and German systems. It became clear
 
that constitutional, ideological and economic theories were not import­as 

ant as organization and control. James'Burnham, in particular, claimed that
 
the managers were the wave of the future and that soon-they would dominate
 
all aspects of life. This prediction has not been born& out, but over the
 
-past generation the Responsible Center has extended its'power relative to
 
that of the provincial elite. On the bther hand it cad no ldnger absolutely
 
,rely on the support of the Intellectual Estate.
 
Members of the Responsible Center are usually college graduates--often
 
with post-graduate degrees. Their backgrounds include engineering, business
 
administration, law, the physical -sciences and economics.
 
They value expertise, planning, practical accommodation, innovation,
 
success, power, prestige, social stability, continuity, and long-term
 
investments that produce a reasonable number-of periodic payoffs--either
 
.material or non-material. They see themselves as responsible for keeping
 
the country going, handling its day to day affairs, and "sustaining the
 
RR4-24ik11----/ 
enterprise" whatever else may happen in domestic or international affairs.
 
Their great sense of responsibility and duty is heightened by a receptiv­
ity to subjective and "atmospheric" goals0
 
The Responsible Center is strong for the space goals in Categories A,
 
B, C and D and is particularly inspired by item #3--Man's Conquest of Space.
 
The responsible centrists fancy themselves to be hard-headed pragmatists,
 
but they are the group most "turned on" by.abstract goals--Man's Conquest,
 
American prestige, and scientific advance.
 
The Intellectual Estate
 
The second most important power group in the United States is that
 
body of persons in institutions we call the Intellectual Estate.* This group
 
comprises the great bulk of college professors, administrators, upper-class
 
journalists, non-profit professionals of various types, as well as. a consid­
erable body of protestant clergymen (particularly in the Eastern states) and
 
school teachers together with a large block of the government bureaucracy.
 
Actually, the institutions where members of the Intellectual Estate work are
 
less important than they are for the Responsible Center. A member of the
 
intellectual Estate derives his influence not so much from the position he
 
occupies as from his possession of education. Most members of the Intellectual
 
Estate own very little personal or productive property (indeed, professors
 
with independent incomes commonly are "conservatives", that is, they identify
 
with the provincial elites described below). In some respects the Intellect­
ual Estate performs the same role in our society that the clergy performed
 
for Medieval Christian Europe. Like their medieval counterparts, the Intellect­
ual Estate controls the expertise necessary to operate the bureaucracies of
 
*Our concept of the Inteliectual Estate is very close to what J.K.
 
Galbraith called "The Educational and Scientific Estate" in The New Industrial
 
State, (Boston,1967)
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secular,government, as well as having the spiritual power (such as it is)
 
in
our society. Members of-the Intellectual Estate see-.themselves-.as
 
responsible for the public and national conscience, for the ideas that
 
make it possible for the Responsible Center to keep the country going, for
 
the analysis and criticism that make it.possible to understand "what is
 
really.happening" and to guide, assist, and perhaps eventually replace the
 
often misguided Responsible Center.
 
Frequently members of the Intellectual Estate are the children of
 
the ResponsibleCenter. Because the high positions in our society cannot
 
be inherited, members of the Responsible Center can only give their sons
 
a leg up in society by purchasing huge amounts of education for them, which
 
turns the children-into members of the Intellectual Estate.
 
Needless to say, they are almost without exception college graduates
 
with post-graduate degrees--frequently from elite universities. Their back­
grounds include the liberal arts, the physical and social sciences, and the
 
law. Politically, almost all members of the Intellectual 
Estate would ident­
ify themselves.as "liberals". They value intelligence, education, moderation
 
and individualism. They disclaim or oppose personal and national glory,
 
honor, and prestige; oppose differentiation by birth, race, sex, and anything
 
'other than-education or intelligence; they minimize the importance of physical
 
courage and strength as positive values. The view of the opponents and cri­
tics of the Intellectual Estate is characterized by George Wallace's famous
 
attack on "pointy-headed professors" who are seeking to take over the country
 
as some sort of new ruling elite. Whether justified or not,'there is cer­
tainly a good deal of deep distrust of the Intellectual Estate among the
 
public at large. For the most part, members of the Intellectual Estate
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travel only in their own circles and are generally unaware of the wide­
aware of it, attribute it to ignorance.
spread hostility to them, and if 

The Intellectual Estate is relatively small--perhaps a few hundred
 
its numbers. The Intel­thousand families--but its importance transcends 

lectual Estate controls most of the universities and colleges of the
 
United States, particularly the most prestigious and influential ones.
 
The Intellectual Estate also mans the middle and upper levels of federal,
 
state, and local welfare, education, and public health bureaucracy. Perhaps
 
most important of'all, the Intellectual Estate staffs almost all of our
 
central national media--television, the New York media establishment, the
 
national press, publishing, advertising, "educational television", as well
 
It is not too much of
as governmental and scholarly journals of all kinds. 

an exaggeration to say that the Intellectual Estate not only identifies the
 
issues in our society, but defines the terms for debating those-issues.
 
This gives it immense national-power.
 
The Intellectual Estate is strong on Categories B (with an important
 
exception) and D, very weak on Category C, and strongly opposed to Category
 
G.. This group's exception to Category B is its objection to. the item which
 
an astronaut would place at the top of his list--Man's Conquest oflSpace-­
which it sees as economically irresponsible. Hence, their vocal opposition,
 
to manned space flight.
 
Provincial Leaders
 
By this label we designate the people who dominate control of the
 
localities in the United States. They are the important men in our counties
 
and citibes, the local bankers and businessmen, lawyers and politicians. The
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key word in understanding their position is "local". Their importance
 
is limited to a small area; but within that area they are very poweful.
 
Outside of the locality they are individually inconsequential. Collect­
ively they can be very important, if they can be organized.
 
The institutions they control are tiny compared with national
 
organizations. But within their organization they have more individual
 
power than their equivalents in the Responsible Center. The President
 
of the Wabash Water Company has more power over his company than has the
 
President of General Motors over his. Many of the Provincial Leaders are
 
the owners-of their businesses. This delineates them from the Responsible
 
Center. They actually own productive property. They are capitalists in
 
the pure sense. Naturally, the Provincial Leaders are great enthusiasts
 
for private property, individual enterprise, and local autonomy. They
 
are suspicious of the metropolis. recognizing that their authority can
 
be eroded by scale. A lumber yard owner amounts to nothing in a large
 
city, but can be important man in a rural township. The city challenges
 
his status and threatens to proletarianize him.
 
Most of the provincial leaders are college graduates, but as might
 
be expected,from local colleges. Compared with the other power groups,
 
they have more non-college graduates. Most "new rich" belong to this
 
group.
 
Continual recruitment from below helps to keep them in tune with the
 
great mass of Americans. But even more -important, the provincial elites
 
live in small conmunities and are in constant contact with the masses.
 
The Intellectual Estate and Responsible Center normally'move in class
 
ghettos--corporations, universities and bureaucracies 

--and often get 6ut
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of touch with the broader society. The Provincial Elites tend to share
 
these
 
the standards and values of most Americans and they have excelled 
at 

arist­
standards, so they are recognized as very much like the "natural 

Most of them would
ocrats" that Jefferson hoped would rule the nation. 

describe themselves as "Jeffersonians."
 
Provincial leaders expect and generally receive the respect and
 
Unlike the other power
continuation of their values by their children. 

groups, they have concrete property and position to transmit to their
 
The family ranks high in their system of values. Geneology
children. 

flourishes in this group, accompanied by the more obvious forms of social
 
snobbery (especially among the women). Their children at college form
 
the backbone of campus conservative organizations. Certainly, this is
 
They are
understandable--these young people have something to conserve. 

somebody, and have little difficulty in establishing 
their identity.*
 
The country club is an excellent symbol of the social aspirations
 
of the provincial leadership--exclusive, yet comprehending "anybody who
 
is anybody". The Chambers of Commerce, the Rotary and other service clubs,
 
the NAM, and the so-called "Right Wing" of the Republican Party are con­
trolled by this group. (The "liberal republicans" are big business, that
 
is, Responsible Center.)
 
The Provincial leaders are generally satisfied with their personal
 
positions in their local communities, but are troubled by the direction
 
in which the nation as a whole is headed. They deeply resent the Intel­
lectual Estate meddling in their affairs via regulation "in the public
 
*VOf course, some of them defect, fleeing the "narrowness" of small
 
town life. Writers from this group have pilloried the type, as in the
 
novels of Sinclair Lewis. John O'Hara gave them more sympathetic treatment.
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interest". They are-envious of the power of the Responsible Center." And:
 
they are fearful of social reforms or value changes that would threaten
 
their exhaulted position vise a vise the lower classes in their communities.
 
THREE MASS GROUPS
 
We now move to the consideration of the groups which make up the
 
bulk of the populationa in our society. 
Perhaps' 90% of the population
 
should be considered in these groups and therefore, according to our
 
democratic'principles, they effectively are 
the nation. However, in'terms
 
of their ability to affect'national policies and to establish national
 
standards; despite their numbers,'they must be in some sense considered
 
as "minority groups."
 
The key difference between our mass groups and our power group
 
lies in the word "power." The mass groups lack individual power, and in
 
normal 'times lack collective power. Inour democratic society the limited
 
power of the masses is expressed in two ways: first, in elections-where
 
they are from time to time permitted to make dhoices between political
 
leaders and occasionally through referendums between programs. 
 Of course,
 
the candidates are normally from among the power groups and are usually
 
selected Ey'them; nevertheless, elected officials, 
even when their incli-"
 
nations are-toward the values and interests of the power groups are aware'
 
of the need to cater to the masses which el'ected them. In practice, those
 
officials which are least answerable to the electorate--judges and senators-­
are more "independent," that is power-group oriented rather than mass-group
 
oriented, than are officials elected regularly. The lower houses'of our
 
national and state legislatures more-accurately reflect the values of the
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masses, and, of course, are held in most contempt by power group journal-

The U.S. Constitution and most state constitutions
ists and commentators. 

have this combination of democracy and aristocracy deliberately built into
 
them.
 
use the conventional labeling
To designate our mass groups we will 

of sociologists--identifying these people as "the lower middle class,"
 
"the laborinq class." and "the lower class." Of course, these labels
 
are useful solely as a means of identifying very large aggregates of people;
 
many persons would be difficult to classify under this system; however,
 
many more could be easily categorized and for doubtful cases, it would
 
merely be a matter of choosing between which of the two groups they be­
long to.
 
The Lower Middle Class
 
Occupationally, most of these people are white-collar workers,
 
include many highly skilled blue collar workers, and even
although they 

school teachers and low-level bureaucrats
some professionals, such as 

who are not intellectually inclined. Today, most of the incomes of this
 
group are between $7,000-$15,000 per year. Many ofithem may have substan-

Educa­tial incomes, but they share the value system of the entire group. 

graduates.
tionally, the lower middle classes almost to a man, high school 

Many of them have gone to college, but typically the less fashionable and
 
less intellectually demanding schools. However, whether they have gone
 
to college or not,the parents in this group expect that their children will
 
go to college.
 
The lower middle class is a stronghold of the traditional American
 
virtues and values. They are patriotic and loyal to the symbols and
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institutions of the American republic. 
They identify wholly with the
 
nation. 
 Similarly, they retain their allegiance to their traditional
 
religibus denominations--whether Protestant, Roman Catholic, or Jewish.
 
They believe in and have respect for formal education. They support
 
the free-enterprise system. They are suspicious of and opposed to
 
what they consider to be deviant or 
radical behavior whether political
 
or social.
 
In family upbringing, the lower middle classes 
are extremely
 
child-centered. 
 They consider the children to be the center of family
 
life and 
it is expected that the parents will make the appropriate sacri­
fices for the children's benefit. 
 The lower middle classes are the typ­
ical home owners in America, and their pattern of life is the standard
 
for most of the new "ticky-tacky" (a patronizing, elite term) suburbs
 
that have sprung up since the Second World War. 
The lower middle classes
 
are heavily in debt, particularly for their home mortgages, but normally
 
carefully budget their funds to maintain a respectable standard of living.
 
They hope to be upward mobile and their ambition is to achieve entrance
 
to one of the elite groups. To the classes above them they are 
respect­
ful, 
to the classes below them they are contemptuous and fear the debase­
ment of their standards from contact with the laboring and lower class.
 
Many of the lower middle classes have recently climbed from the laboring
 
classes and fear slipping back.
 
The Laboring Class
 
These are the blue collar workers, wage workers in mostly semi­
skilled jobs, but also with many skilled jobs, some white collar jobs,
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and a few unskilled jobs. Typical incomes are in the range of $4,000­
$8,000. Most of the men in this group work in factories or shops; most
 
of the women are in various white collar or service jobs such as typists
 
or waitresses. Although formerly they dropped out of high school at the legal
 
age, today young working people normally graduate high school. Many of
 
them are unionized and this group,is the backbone of the trade union
 
movement in America. They are hourly wage workers and their jobs are
 
often insecure. They are subject to lay-offs, cut-backs and only dhe
 
unions save 'them from arbitrary action from the "bosses." 
Like the lower middle classes, this group is intensely patriotic.
 
It forms the backbone of the rank and file of our armed forces. However,
 
compared to the lower middle class, the laboring classes is a somewhat
 
less enthusiastic about the American way of life. Their typical attitude
 
toward American institutions is a healthy scepticism -they are well aware
 
that they do not occupy a favored position in our society, and that the
 
groups above them are acting in their own-interest, which clashes with
 
that of the working people. The laboring class claims a physical and
 
moral superiority over the upper classes--they look upon themselves as
 
having more "heart," and believe that the role that they play in the
 
economy and in society is indispensable, even though not properly recog­
nized by the classes above them.
 
The laboring class family is patriarchal, and reflects the European
 
tradition of the large recent immigrant population found in the working
 
class. The man is expected to run the family. The women are expected
 
to play traditional female roles, and the children are expected to adhere
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rigidly to adult standards." The laboring class does not expect its child-.
 
ren to go to &ollege,'nor in many cases does 'itdesire the children to go
 
to college, for fear they will learn upper class standards and reject the
 
values of their parents. Working people normally rent their housing-­
they normally lack the capital to purchase housing. If they own a house,
 
it is nohmally a row house in an unfashionable part of town.
 
The laboring class is deathly afraid of the lower class as the next'
 
group down in the social ladder. Lower class life and standards are a
 
constant threat to the working man. 
 He knows full well -that his economic
 
strvival and continued social position depends upon his maintaining strong
 
standards of personal discipline, cleanliness, and reliability which he
 
believes necessary for him to fulfill his role in the factory system.
 
Should he lose these he will sink down to the depths.
 
The Lower Class
 
The lower cl-ass is the group at the very bottom of our society.
 
These people work at the most unskilled and low paid jobs, such as
 
domestic servants, manual laborers, and adricul-ture workers. Many of
 
them are unemployed and unemployable. Their income ranges from nothing
 
to about $4,000 per annum. This is the'class that lives on welfare, and
 
is the recipient of most of the social-welfare benefits that are offered
 
by our society. "Many of the lower class are criminals of various types,'
 
whether welfare chiselers, prostitutes, petty thieves, or drug addicts.
 
- The typical member of the lower class got out of school as soon as
 
he was legally able to do so. He does not expect his children to go to
 
college, nor has he any favorable vision of the future, other than per­
haps making a sudden killing through some chance skill as a musician or
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Perhaps the most obvious character­athlete or a winning lottery ticket. 

istic of the lower class is its relative lack of any time sense, and there­
resources, to post-.
fore its inability to plan for the future, to hoard its 

pone immediate gratifications for future gains.
 
Ethnically, the lower class is over represented among the non-white
 
minority groups in the United States--Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Mexican-

Americans, and Indians--although a majority of its members are "white
 
trash" living in agricultural areas or recently arrived from them to urban
 
slums. The lower class is generally indifferent to the wider society and
 
in many ways unaware of its existence, except as a hostile, confusing, and
 
The lower classes seldom vote, they
oppressive milieu inwhich to live. 

pay little in taxes, they are for the most part ineligible for military
 
service, they commit the most crime, they do not supervise their own child­
ren, and generally have a whole battery of cultural attributes that make
 
them obnoxious to "middle class" standards of the rest of society.
 
The family life of the lower class is especially significant. Casual
 
sexual arrangements are commonplace, sexual promiscuity is rampant, illegit­
imacy is high, and family dissolution is an everyday occurence. Since the
 
come and go, the family is headed by the women, and is properly des­men 

cribed as matriarchal. The young men of the lower class raised i-n a pre­
dominantly female family inwhich the absent or wandering male is an ob­
ject of contempt, feel it necessary to express their personality by an
 
excessive degree of physical masculinity. The lower class youths have a
 
tendency toward sexual assault and physical.violence of all kinds. They
 
make slums very dangerous places to be in. Crime is an ordinary event among
 
the lower class and our prison population is largely drawn from this group.
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:
The lower class seldom vote. They rarely join any type of'polit *

ical organization and insofar-as they are politically motivated at all,
 
it is along purely economic lines. Recently, however, radical politi'cal
 
groups have succeeded in making some recruits among the black segments­
of this class. Although the lower class apparently lacks the organiza­
tional ability and discipline to conduct any type of concerted political'
 
or paramilitary movement, it has great potential for individual acts of
 
violence such as looting, burning, and even sniping. 

-
To the lower class, cosmopol'itan and scientific goals are absolutely
 
alien. The reaction to nationalist goals is'mixed, depending on the de­
gree of patriotism in the sub-group. Insofar s this group is aware and
 
articulate, the critical point is Item #20--priorities. They want the
 
money for themselves directly, not for spa6e adventures by privileged WASP
 
astronauts, for technological benefits to the society as'a whole, which
 
they do not expect will filter down to them.
 
TWO IDEOLOGICAL GROUPS
 
So far we have classified American society in terms of groups de­
fined by the amount and sort of power they hold and their economic pos­
i'tions. But we must recognize that there is a small but important group
 
of people in our society who are not motivated so much by family back­
ground or personal or class interest as 'by ideology. In every society.
 
there have been similar tiny groups of persons who are highly motivated
 
by "idealistic" values. In the Middle Ages such persons could find an
 
outlet by entering the Church. In foreign countries today they join
 
revolutionary movements. We must recognize these people because, even
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though they are a tiny minority, their passion for ideas makes them fan-

They are extremely ac­
atic workers in the furtherance of their ideas. 

tive in all forms of propaganda, and they are, one might say, inevitably
 
alienated from a society which consists of persons who couldn't care 
less
 
To better understand the ideological groups in
 about ideological purity. 

examine the two extremes--which we call "the humanist
 our society, we shall 

These two groups represent the extremes
 left" and "the nationalist right." 

of our political spectrum. Although both are thoroughly alienated from
 
the mainstream of American politics, they usually hate each other with
 
a passion that exceeds their contempt for the center.
 
Of particular interest regarding both of these ideological groups
 
is not thei strength in themselves but the influence they will have
 
upon larger society. Also important is that both of them offer a radical
 
critique of what is wrong with America and promise solutions to cure the
 
ills of the nation. Should America stumble,'both sides are more than
 
In effect, both right and
willing to step in to set things right again. 

left offer alternate principles of society and systems of government which
 
more and more Americans would find attractive if the existing system should
 
ana­fail to meet their needs or expectations. The appropriate historical 

logy is that of the German Republic of the Weimar period, which being un­
able to deal with its economic and political problems lost the allegiance
 
of more and more of its citizens both to the left--the Communists--and to
 
the right--the Nazis--and was destroyed. Perhaps it is no exaggeration to
 
note that both the humanist left and nationalist right would like to see
 
a Weimar America with themselves in the role of the Nazis to pick up the
 
pieces and to build a "new order."
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The Humanist Left­
What-we-call "the humanist left" is a group in our society which is
 
presently getting a good deal of p.lay in popular media. These,are persons
 
who are disaffected-from our society from the "left position." They believe
 
that America is a:very bad place, that it. is run by evil men who are doing
N
 
evil things-, with at least-the tacit approval, of the bulk of the popula­
tion. While they disagree on many specifics of analysis and policy, they
 
are in agreement on some fundamental points of belief: they are anti­
nationalists and internationalists, believing-that all men are brothers
 
and that all barriers between men should be broken down in order.to
 
achieve a milienium of peace,'-harmony, and love throughout the world.
 
Ex'isting institutions are the barriers to be broken toward this end. The
 
humanist, left notes that many persons in the world are suffering from op­
pression, exploitation and injustices of all kinds; .they see these con­
ditions as evidence of the rotteness of "the system" which must be des­
troyed to redress all grievances and right all-wrongs. Revolution is
 
imperative--peaceful hopefully, but violent if necessary.
 
-The humanist left rejects the traditional values that have been
 
accumulated over the ages. History is merely a record of the inhumanity
 
of-man fow~rd man; it must be ended, and a new future, a different future,
 
a better future built upon the ruins of the old order. Naturally, the
 
humanist left rejects most'of the values of the past as irrelevant, stupid,
 
or vicious; It is opposed to organized religion and traditional religious
 
systems of-thought and worship. All state forms it similarly rejects.
 
Capitalism; which it sees as predicated upon conflict and exploitation,
 
must be destroyed. Most of the humanist left would describe themselves
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as "socialists" by which they mean they favor a system that would allo-

In recent
 
cate resources without competition abundantly for everyone. 

of all that
 years the Humanist left has become increasingly skeptical 

most Americans (and civilized people everywhere) describe as. "progress",
 
improved techndlogy, economic advance, and efficient organization.
i.e., 

"Liberation" is
The Humanist Left sees these as chains that bind men. 

some
their catch word. In their contempt for the system as they see it, 

members of the Humanist Left-have been led to enthusiastic support 
for
 
Minh's North Vietnam.
anti-systems, such as Castro's Cuba or Ho Chi 

Since we have'defined the Humanist Left as an ideologi'cal position,
 
perhaps it is irrelevant to discuss their occupational and social origins.
 
certain

However, in examining them from a sociological point of view; 

Most of the members of the Humanist Left are drawn
 patterns are clear. 

from the same social elements as the Intellectual Estate; indeed, many
 
of the Humanist Leftists are the.children of Intellectual Estate members.
 
seems the parents themselves were
In a remarkably large number of cases it 

in their youth, Humanist-Leftists, but came to terms with the system and
 
took jobs in the uni-versities or bureaucracies and sublimated their real
 
in the world. But they passed their
views in the interest of getting on 

This accounts for the seemingly in­intact to their children.
values on 

consistent fact that the most radical young people seem to be drawn from
 
our current milieu, Humanist Leftism is
the most prosperous families. In 

most widespread among those people who have the most secure sinecures-­
that is, students, clergymen, graduate assistants, and low-grade bureau­
crats in-social welfare agencies. In many of these positions, the Human­
ist Left has influence that far outweighs its number--as graduate assistants
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they affect the educati6n of hundreds of thousands of students and as
 
social workers they often attempt to mobilize the poor into a.revolutionary
 
force against the larger society.
 
Although sometimes it appears that the humanist left is principally
 
an adolescent phenomenon with relatively few mature adult members, we must
 
realize that many of the humanist leftist who come to terms with society
 
do so with extreme misgivings and they surreptitiously attempt to promote
 
their principles and programs from within whatever organization they join.
 
The Humanist Left should be differentiated from the scientific com­
munity. The Humanist Left is a very articulate and extremely visible ele­
ment in society, with education and interests which are literaly rather
 
than scientific. The Humanist Left is remarkably pre-industrial in its
 
outlook, and is indifferent, even hostile to technological "advance" (it
 
would deny that it is advance).
 
The Humanist Left opposes many aspects of the space program. Like
 
the Intellectual Estate they have.a cosmopolitan orientation claiming
 
allegiance to."mankind'." or "humanity." The Humanist Left is anti-nation­
alist, even militantly anti-patriotic, so Category C goals are anathema
 
to it. The group Is engaged in-or identifies with various "social programs"
 
and is extremely sensitive to Category H, particularly item #20--the prior­
ities issue. The Humanist Left wants, space money for its own programs.
 
Leftist elements on the fringe of the Humanist Left will go so far as to
 
claim that the.space program is wholly-motivated by economic, attention­
getting, and narrow space goals. Younger members of this group, called.
 
the "New Left," share the values of their elders, who are often their
 
parents, being differentiated only by a more youthful vigor in opposition
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to "militarism," "racism," "imperialism" and the "dehumaniztng" effects
 
of technology.
 
The Nationalist Right
 
At the other extreme of the political spectrum is the group we call
 
"The Nationalist Right," sometimes called "The Radical Right," by i-ts
 
critics. In many ways the nationalist right is a mirror image of the
 
humanist left: what the left likes, the right hates, and vice versa.
 
Where the left is cosmopolitan, the right is intensely patriotic. Where
 
the left believes in the brotherhood of man, the right emphasizes differ­
ences between nations, sexes, and sometimes the races. Like the left,
 
the right is disaffected from the American system, but not because the
 
American system is too rightist, but because it is too leftist. The right
 
generally rejects the role of freedom and the ideal of social and personal
 
harmony as a valued pattern for social affairs. A rightist believes that
 
life is and should be conflict, that competition and even violence is nat­
ural and that only rigid social institutions and norms can prevent society
 
from tearing itself asunder. The right respects and even glorifies its
 
ideal of traditional institutions--it can be expected to respond vigor­
ously to any real or imagined attacks on American institutions and symbols
 
or religious institutions and symbols. Both are seen by the right as
 
objects of loyalty, rather than as repositories of certain ethical values.
 
The right wing wishes to maintain its traditional relationships be­
tween sexes. They hold that men should be men and women women, emphasizing
 
the traditi'onal importance of the family and of the woman as wife and mother.
 
Children, of course, should be rigorously controlled, through corporal pun­
ishment if necessary,, and should be expected to adhere to adult standards
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as soon as possible. 
The American right wing are great enthusiasts for
 
what they believe to be the traditional economic system, that 
is, the free
 
enterprise system. The nationalist right is normally opposed to anything
 
which might mitigate an uninhibited economic struggle between individuals,
 
that is, social welfare legislation, trade unions, and government regula­
tions.
 
The right also supports the traditional relationship between groups
 
in our society. Generally, most rightists would be willing to tolerate
 
a classed society, as well as not 
to intervene to upset the.traditional
 
depressed condition of minority groups 
in our society--indians and Negroes.
 
Racism is an undercurrent in many right wing groups. 
 Anti-Semitism is
 
also rampant amoung the nationalist right, partially because of the tra­
ditional struggle between Jew and Christian, but also because the nation­
alist right sees in the liberated secular Jew the archetype of the pro­
mulgator of secular humanist values in this country, and therefore as a
 
fundamentally corrupting force.
 
The nationalist right is drawn from a large strata of population.
 
The nationalist right draws its strength from the-white working and lower
 
middle classes as well 
as from the children of the provincial elites. This
 
last group is easy to understand in the nationalist right, because the
 
right wing ideology of free enterprise and the maintenance of their trad-o
 
tional 
society tends to serve the interests of the provincial elites. The
 
recruitment from the lower middle classes and working classes reflects the
 
fact that the nationalist right ideologies represent an 
intensified version
 
of the standard ideologies prevalent in those classes. 
 The nationalist
 
right can appeal 
to the patriotic and religious sentiments of the lower
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middle class, and to the masculine and military sentiments of the labor­
ing class. Some nationalist right groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan,
 
are almost entirely drawn from workers.
 
Although the nationalist right may outnumber the Humanist Left, its
 
national importance is probably less significant because the right is
 
extremely fragmented and because its strength is drawn from areas far
 
from national centers of power, urban working class neighborhoods and
 
rural areas. The Nationalist Right cannot get a favorable hearing in the
 
national press because that press is controlled by the Responsible Center
 
and the Intellectual Estate who generally find their views more compatible
 
with those of the Humanist Left. However, in areas under the control of
 
the provincial elites, the Nationalist Right can find a more sympethetic ear.
 
It is more respectable in Dallas than in Boston.
 
Needless to say, the Nationalist Right is very strong for patriotic
 
and military space goals, and extremely hostile to pacific or cosmopolitan
 
goals. On the question of scientific and technological advance, the Right
 
is generally favorable because of a social Darwinist belief in "progress"
 
as well as a desire for America to excell in all fields of endeavor. Un­
like other groups, members of the Nationalist Right may be will'ing to sup­
port a space program if only to prevent the funds from being used for
 
social programs which they perceive of as pernicious.
 
HOW LARGE ARE THESE GROUPS?
 
It is not possible to do a systematic analysis of the actual size
 
of these groups in American society, but a rough estimate can be made
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on the basis of such key indicators as occupation, income, ethni'c back-'
 
ground, voting patterns, education, and organizational membership. On
 
the basis of these, we feel the followTng table gives a good sense fo-the
 
relative size of thes groups in our society.
 
INTELLECTUAL ESTATE 3 x 106
 
RESPONSIBLE CENTER 5 x 106
 
PROVINCIAL LEADERS .10 x 106
 
LOWER MIDDLE CLASS, 50 x 106
 
WORKING CLASS 40 x 106
 
LOWER'CLASS 20 x 106
 
HUMANIST LEFT I x 106
 
NATIONALIST RIGHT 1 x 106
 
130 x 106 (ADULTS)
 
However,'the importance of these groups is not to be measured in
 
terms of pure numbers. The elite groups have,' through their positions
 
in society, and the ideological groups'have, through their continuous
 
agitation, a great deal more strength than mere numbers would indicate.
 
For example, what is most significant about the Humanist Left is not 
so
 
much what it believes'or accomplished as the extent to which i'ts-ideas ''
 
are transmitted to the rest of society.
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MIDDLE AMERICA
 
We believe that another very useful concept in understanding the
 
American social and political scene is the term, "Middle America." Middle
 
America is defined not in terms of social class groupings, but in values.
 
The Middle American is in the mu;ddle of the country in three ways: First,
 
he is often geographically in the middle, being concentrated most strongly
 
in the Mid-West and Plains states. Nevertheless, he is found throughout
 
the nation. Socially and economically he is also in the middle, between
 
the very rich and powerful and the poor and deprived. In terms of values
 
he is also in the middle, eschewing both the Left and the Right. The
 
values are most important to the delineation of the Middle American, for
 
he can be very rich or very poor and live on Cape Cod or a Waikiki beach.
 
Simply stated, the Middle American has the values of traditional American
 
society. He values hard work, social mobility, patriotism, law and order,
 
democracy, the family, the church, the flag, and the United States of America.
 
He believes that social change should be directed toward the better achieve­
ment of his values and standards of.society, and that social change should
 
be promoted through constitutional, legal, and non-violent methods. He
 
despises socialism, violent protest, blatant racism, pornography, promis­
cuity, sexual deviation, political violence, and foreign ideologies.
 
In our construction of groups in society, Middle America includes the
 
Provincial Elite, the lower middle class, and large sections of the laboring
 
class. Middle America despises the Humanist Left which returns the sent­
iment with equal venom. The Intellectual Estate is suspect, and returns the
 
feeling. Middle America also despises the more pathological excesses of the
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Nationalist Right. The lower class is held in very low regard by
 
Middle America. It considers that these are people who lack character
 
to hold Middle American values, and this lack of character explains
 
their low position--their will-deserved low position (by traditional
 
standards) in American Society, although the Middle American often is
 
sympathetic to their plight if he perceives it as the result of mis­
fortune.
 
The average American working man or small businessman has ambiv­
alent attitudes toward the objectives of the space program. He is gen­
erally indifferent to cosmopolitan and scientific goals except for the
 
appeal of the astronauts as heroes (avariety of super athletes) and his
 
mild interest in technological gains. He believes himself to be a prac­
tical man. But he is enthusiastic about the nationalist goals of Category
 
C, including the military item(#8) which NASA sometimes downgrades.
 
Since the Middle American constitutes perhaps 70% of the electorate, his
 
current and future attitudes are discussed in more detail later in this
 
study.
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CHAPTER FIVE
 
FUTURES AND SCENARIOS
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V. FUTURES AND SCENARIOS'
 
WHY STUDY THE FUTURE?
 
In the struggle for public funds, a public agency must offer pro­
grams that achieve the goals of some group or groups in the polity. It
 
must convince the legislature and the public that the goals it can achieve
 
are more desirable than the goals offered by other agencies or that its
 
potential to achieve a goal is greater than that of its competitors.
 
The success of any public agency in this competition will vary with
 
the economic, social, and political milieu inwhich the agency is obliged
 
to operate.
 
In acomplex society like ours, thik milieu is in constant flux. Ary
 
agency engaged in expensive, long-term projects must consider the future
 
milieu. The agency must try to estimate what people will support in the
 
future.- This is one of the functions of futures studies.
 
Considerations of the future are also closely related to other aspects,
 
of planning. For example, goal #20 (the amount of funds diverted from
 
other programs) can be assigned a numerical value, namely the estimated
 
costs of the alternate programs. In the tables, we have given goals rela­
tive values, but NASA can also assign an estimated dollar cost to each
 
program. When this is done, the planner is moving toward cost-effectiveness
 
analysis, and is able to evaluate each program in terms of both cost and
 
objective achievement.
 
But there are two snares: First, the other objectives are not simi­
larly measurable. We can say that Program A costing N dollars will buy us
 
some international cooperation and some national prestige, but how much?
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And how can we compare that with Program B also costing us N dollars which
 
willbuy-a lot of.Man's Conquest of Space with a little entertainment.
 
The second snare is less obvious: the cost is not really measurable
 
either. We can say Program B will cost N dollars, but we do not know how
 
much N dollars is. This is not a question of the purchasing power of the
 
dollar, but rather the political cost of the dollar. How much N dollars
 
is worth in political terms depends upon how much that money is desired
 
by other competitors for government money. This is the priorities issue,
 
and it is-because of this issue that we have described goals i'n item #20
 
as "diverting federal funds from other programs" rather than as "cost."
 
is the extent to which the national
Most important for NASA's purposes 

importance it
priorities issue gains, loses or maintains roughly the same 

has today. Changes in American values--often in response to domestic and
 
events that have no direct relation to the space program-­international 

will play an Important role in the future weight of the priorities argu­
ment. The priorities issue is only one of many such subjective matters
 
that can be explored usefully through studies of the future.
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SOME 	ALTERNATIVE U.S. FUTURES RELEVANT TO 1975-1985
 
1. 	Introduction
 
We will now offer a number of alternative views of the future and
 
scenarios based on varying assumptions about changes in values and in
 
the international and domestic scene.
 
These views fall into three broad categories­
1. 	Five broad views or "prognoses" of American society between
 
1975-1985;
 
2. 	Three views of American society with special emphasis on
 
Middle America;
 
3. 	A brief summary of current attitudes hostile to and favorable
 
to science.
 
These broad views of the future and scenarios are presented in full at
 
first.
 
Following that presentation is an analysis that selects critical
 
"branch points" and certain key scenarios. Thus there is some deliberate
 
repetition in the pages that follow. For the reader's benefit, this
 
repetition occurs because we wish to accomplish two objectives:
 
1. 	To present rounded, full-context views of the future, as
 
an illustrative device for NASA;
 
2. 	To extrapolate key issues and to analyze them in progressively
 
more direct relation to specific NASA decisions.
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In considering how the United States might develop from 1975-1985, a
 
large range of possibilities must be taken into account. The standard case
 
and some principal variations have been described in The Year 2000. Here
 
we consider some additional possibilities.
 
ex-
One possibility, for example, a rather grim one, arises from an 

trapolation of the accelerating tendencies of the last five years of vio­
lent civil dissent and demonstration. This was at a relatively low level
 
in the mid-sixties but has rapidly built up by the end of the sixties to
 
a quite high level, and as far as simple trend analysis is concerned could
 
continue to build at an accelerating rate. If these trends did in fact
 
continue into the future, with increasing numbers of Americans repudiating
 
the democratic process itself, by 1975 the country might be for all prac­
tical purposes ungovernable. Even if these tendencies increased at the
 
current rate, without acceleration, their intensity and scope might still
 
reach a level which made governing exceedingly difficult. But this naive
 
projection ignores both the countervailing trends in American society and
 
the development of the issues which lie behind contemporary unrest. Many
 
processes beginning to operate already suggest a topping-out phenomena,
 
or even a reversal of these particular trends. In 1970-1, a reversal seems
 
much more likely than in 1968-9. Taking this into account, we consider the
 
alternatives below to be of particular interest in considering the range
 
of possible U.S. futures.
 
a. A neutral prognosis
 
"b. A modestly pessimistic prognosis
 
c. A modestly optimistic prognosis
 
"We have selected in this section from a repertoire of scenarios under
 
development at Hudson, notably by Herman Kahn, with contributions from
 
William Pfaff, Paul Collins, Frank Armbruster, Anthony J. Wiener, and others.
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d. Vietnam debacle and vicious post mortem 
1) but '!liberal-progressive" forces continue in ascendancy 
2) a conservative or "ideological renewal" group takes over 
e. A dynamic and competent responsible (or humanistic) center 
re-establishes itself. 
2. The Neutral Prognosis
 
(1) Vietnam has been settled. The domestic effects were unfavorable,
 
but not disastrous, and have largely vanished or been absorbed by 1975.
 
(2) A further extension of a "sensate"* technological and affluent
 
society--perhaps with some development of what we call a "mosaic cultare."**
 
(3) Partly as a result of a parallel development of a "late sensate"*
 
society, vice, dissent, anarchism and nihilism become very visible but are
 
concentrated among relatively small groups, but the growth of these tenden­
cies is stopped or slowed, and they areconsidered a normal part of the
 
political and cultural landscape and create little or no intense concern.
 
But disaffected elements turn to."dropping out" or sullen conformity rather
 
than radical activism. However, because these "late sensate".tendencies are
 
concentrated in large metropolitan centers, some of the faculties of prestige
 
universities, and various artistic and political movements, they have a visibili
 
and impact out of proportion to their numbers.
 
*The term "sensate" describes empirical, this-worldly, secular, hu­
manistic, pragmatic, utilitarian, contractual, epicurean and/or hedonistic
 
cultures. This means secular humanist criteria for innovation and social
 
norms, as opposed to traditional or religiously absolute criteria. The
 
term "late sensate" implies a breakdown of sensate values--see The Year
 
2000, pages 39-64 for further discussion.
 
*The term "mosaic culture" implies that there are a number of rather
 
differeat life styles in the United States and that these different life
 
styles are often expressed-in a diversity of clothes, manners, values, etc.,
 
so that it is often relatively easy to distinguish an individual who has
 
chosen one life style or another. This could be a creative diversity
 
though it may have many schismatic, divisive, and anarchist tendencies.
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(4) While life is extremely good for the overwhelmihg majority of
 
American people by almost any of the classical materialistic, cultural,
 
or political standards, and to some degree even from the moral and morale
 
points of view, both the upper classes and the various kinds of dropouts
 
place great emphasis on the defects of American civilization.
 
(5) Domestically, this 1975-1985 period sees the alleviation of many
 
"great society" problems, particularly those which are susceptible to
 
money and physical engineering.
 
(6) There is less success with the problems which correspond to
 
"social engineering." Indeed there is regression as well as progress in
 
this area. Nevertheless, by most objective standards, poverty, racism,
 
etc., have been greatly reduced.
 
(7) Despite great technical advances, physics, mathematics and engi­
neering steadily decline in prestige and charisma, but there is sufficient
 
quality and quantity of technical manpower to man our system. On the other
 
hand life sciences, psychology, and sociology flourish.
 
(8) Despite its enormous productivity and effective financial suc­
cess, business also loses in prestige and charisma.
 
(9) Business attempts to recoup its prestige by trying to be a "good
 
citizen" and participating much more fully in community life as a patron
 
of the arts and culture and as a very serious innovator in various areas.
 
But this does not enable it to recover fully the ground lost though it
 
does prevent precipitous erosion.
 
(10) The GNP (in 1967 dollars) reaches 1.1 trillions by 1975, 1.6
 
trillions by 1985. Unemployment fluctuates between 3-5%. Most additional
 
jobs are provided by government, particularly state government, or by
 
private organizations with government 'contracts.
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(11) Labor force participation rates by women continue to increase
 
By the late '70's, for the first time in history, more married women are
 
working than are just housewives. Married women with grown children are
 
the backbone of the suburban "white collar" labor force, but even women
 
with minor children are more and more employed. Employers prefer to hire
 
these women rather than their traditional urban source of single working
 
girls who are increasingly from minority groups and increasingly less
 
competent (of course, with millions of exceptions.)
 
(12) Continued moderate inflation, increasing real wages and
 
standard of living.
 
(13) Gradual leveling of income and advancement opportunities between
 
big cities, smaller cities and rural areas. Big city residence will remain
 
necessity for top positions in certain industries--e.g., finance, advertising.
 
(14) Some erosion of work effort. Absenteeism, turn-over climb.
 
Life is centered around weekends, vacations.
 
(15) "High culture" lags. Spectator sports and individual sports
 
more important.
 
"(16) Expanded government services are principaJly funded by the "fiscal
 
dividend" created by increased productivity-and inflation. At first,
 
working people are angered by their increased taxes; but gradually accept
 
middle class resignation.
 
(17) The spreading out of cities, particularly in the South and West,
 
continues, together with population decline in older areas. The free­
standing, owner-occupied single-family house remains the predominant
 
American ideal, but small and growing minorities prefer rural or high-density
 
urban residential styles.
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(18) 	 Continued social and economic gains by minority groups.
 
'rosperous Negroes move out to the suburbs, but there is little residential
 
Several large U.S. cities are Negro dominated and controlled,
integration. 

and economic gains of most black Americans,
(19) 	 Despite the social 

remain a hard-core block of black urban poor, highly represented
Lhere will 

)y fatherless families, which will be recognized as a major social problem.
 
(20) As it becomes.clear that blacks are not especially interested
 
in social and residential integration, white liberals press less for it.
 
The large numbers of prosperous blacks relieve white guilt. Radicals,
 
ihite and black, curse the "black bourgeoisie" which is more concerned
 
nith black crime than with white repression.
 
(21). Cops, courts, prosecutors, public opinion gets tougher on
 
criminals within present legal framework. People accustomed to lower
 
levels of security. Less toleration of extremists.
 
(22) 	 Pollution control begins to pay off.
 
(23) Gradual extention of regulation of business,,personal activity.
 
Private property, individual freedom -remain ideals.
 
(24) 	Pornography, promiscuity, drug abuse, continue to spread slowly,
 
but 	public at large becomes more tolerant. Marijuana, homosexuality,
 
More contraception, abortion, divorce.
fornication, blue laws rarely enforced. 

(25) Fewer children, but nuclear family remain dominant form, 
(26) More recognition of variant life styles for youth, aged. 
(27) Somewhat less sex, race segregation. More age, class segregation. 
(28) More, but still limited concern is created by the growing mutual 
On the one hand,
alienation between the U.S. and the rest of the world. 

the tund of good will which the U.S. built before, during, and after World
 
War II is gradually exhausted and/or forgotten--in part because of a
 
HI-1272/3-RR
 
relatively bad press plus many "necessary" and "unnecessary" 
U.S. actjons 
in various ways irritating, immoral, unwarranted, which strike foreigners as 

Much foreign and domestic comment focuses on and emphasizes
and outrageous. 

these acts and their actual and imputed consequences. Also, 
"puritan"
 
On the other hand,
Third World countries see the U.S. as a corrupt society. 

a-growing frustration and indifference--even hostility--in 
the U.S. because
 
of foreign ingratitude, envy, misinterpretations, intrasigence, 
and
 
as because of a failure
 
seemingly generally unreasonable hostility as well 

(or at least seeming failure) of many made-in-America foreign aid 
and
 
intervention programs, increase internal U.S. alienation from 
the world.
 
(29) The military establishment is supported adequately at about
 
6-7% of the GNP (or about 2/3 of the current rate and about half of 
the
 
This would be about 90 billion dollars in 1980
 rate of the late fifties). 

(in 1967 dollars). Despite cancellation of the draft, it 
also manages to
 
ranks. However, it has only mini­find enough competent recruits for all 

political support among the intellectuals, "respectable press," 
uni­
mal 

versitles, and even the upper middle class in general.
 
NATO conifnues but with a continually decreasing esprit, 
elan
 
(30) 

and charisma. And it become relatively clear that the active, 
in being,
 
defense of Europe against a land attack by the Soviets is basically 
fur­
nished by a US.-West German working alliance (possibly with significant
 
a
 
British participation) which is legally and politically imbedded 
in 

However, various fringe activities
 loose cooperative effort of nations. 

Par­
of NATO, such as information exchanges, continue to be important. 

ticipation in them is greatly prized by the smaller nations.
 
(31) There is increased polycentrism and diversification in the 
inter-

The U.S. retains a position of leadership, but in part by
national arena. 
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largely emphasizing a "responsible" low-keyed diplomacy (despite the irri­
tations, etc., mentioned earlier)--even occasionally adopting a "low
 
posture" that is perilously close to neo-isolationism. In effect, it pre­
serves a veneer of hegemony by not trying to exercise it too often and too
 
This "hegemony" is very loose and allows for much independence,
heavily. 

dissent, and even outright opposition by its members.
 
area of responsibility" rather
(32) Gradually, the concept of "an 

than "an area of influence"or "world policeman" becomes widely under-

Under this concept the United
stood--both domestically and abroad. 

States feels more or less obligated to defend nations which are in the
 
if these nations are
 area of responsibility from external attack, even 

relatively hostile and unfriendly to the United States.
 
creation of Special Drawing
(33) Despite some modest reforms (such as 

Rights), international monetary .and internal inflationary problems con­
tinue but at a relatively low level. Thus no international monetary cr.isis
 
one 	in the offing, and
 occurs but many continue to think that there is 

they may be right.
 
(34) 	U.S. gradually eroding productivity advantages over other industrial
 
Losing foreign (and some domestic) markets to competitors,
nations. 

particularly Japanese. Less favorable balance of payments condition
 
partially relieved by reduction of overseas garrisons, but increasing agitation
 
among affected industries, especially unions for more protectionism.
 
Bitterly fought by finance community and international corporations.
 
Hidden protectionism imposed by safety and pollution requirements for U.S.
 
market.
 
(35) U.S. foreign aid rises over current absolute levels but is less
 
than 	one-half per cent of the GNP or about 5 to 8 billion dollars per year
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during the 1975-1985 period '(as opposed to the one per cent attained dur­
ing the late fifties) .
 A good deal of this, aid is given through multi­
late-al 
bodies (especfal-ly U.N.-regional and technical assistance-agencies).
 
While this aid is'not successful in-largely dissipating the demands of
 
some of the "poor" nations, the fact remains that-while the developed
 
nations are no longer "li'stening guiltily" they are still 
listening. This
 
does not, however, diminish the volume of cri&ticism'enough to keep-down
 
general feelings of guilt and alienation among most U.S. critics of the
 
adequacy of the aid program. But there is no widespread food deficit and
 
massive starvation, largely because of improved agricultural technology
 
promoted by the U.S.
 
(36) The international north/south problem (rich versus poor or white
 
versus colored) is gradually being perceived as 
far more serious than east­
west tensions--but 
even this problem is seen without hysteria or intensity.
 
(37) 
A partial "failure of nerve" occurs, particularly among the
 
philosophers, intellectuals, thelogians, and so forth. 
This is very
 
similar to the failure of nerve which occurred in Athens and Hellenistic
 
Greece generally in the fourth and thi-rd centuries, B.C. Among these people,
 
various "fin de siecle". ideologies such as anarchism,- syndical-ism, neo-racism,
 
and crypto-facism proliferate.
 
(38) However, this failure of nerve does not affect the great mass of­
people,who participate relatively fully and heartily in the three major
 
lestablishment"-life styles which we label 
"neo-materialistic," "neo­
epicurean," and "neo-gentleman." 
 Another important and promi'nent life
 
style from the point of view of the masses and the establishment is the
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or oppose
There are also many small groups which "drop out,"
neo-stoic.* 

a rather passive and pro-forma
the establishment (though sometimes only in 

become hippies, New Left "revolutionaries," investigators
manner), i.e., 

space," participants in esoteric religions, participants in
 of "inner 

various kinds of neo-classical religious movements, and the like.
 
(40) There is some loss of national vigor and a vague sense of
 
to "get the country moving

malaise with the potential to respond to call 

again".
 
3. A Modestly Optimistic Prognosis
 
(1) The neo-materialist, neo-epicurean, neo-gentleman and neo-stoic
 
Many more people
life styles prove to be unexpectedly attractive. 

participate enthusiastically in them than one would have expected in the
 
neutral scenario, and the morale and self-confidence of these participants
 
is high.
 
an erosion of the traditional
(2) In addition there is much less of 

U.S. work-oriented, achievement-oriented, advancement-oriented values
 
*These terms are defined as follows: a neo-materialist is simply an
 
individual who is very advancement-oriented because he is very interested
 
in gaining and spending a rather large income. Alternatively, he might be
 
income to enjoy
an extremely consumption-oriented individual who uses his 

life in various ways. The neo-epicurean might bear some resemblance to the
 
epicurean of Greek philosophy in that he isoriented towards home, towards
 
family, towards friends, towards a decent and humane life, but he does not
 
have the same kind of discipline and asceticism. Inmany ways the current
 
Southern California barbecue culture exemplifies this neo-epicurean life
 
Rome who
style. The neo-stoic is'quite similar to the stoics of imperial 

in fact tended to staff the civil service in the first two or three cen­
turies. These again have American characteristics and possibly are some­
what more interested both in personal success and in success in their ef­
forts than their classical prototypes. (The neo-stoic analogy might be
 
more that of an ambitious soldier doing his duty rather than the actor in
 
the play--the analogy of the Roman stoic.) A neo-gentleman would have a
 
rather large number of diversified skills and pursuits, all of which would
 
require great effort. On all of these he would achieve a very high level
 
of performance, but none of these skills would be put 'to any economic use.
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than is envisaged in the neutral prognosis, so that the American society
 
and economy are more vital and dynamic than might have been expected.
 
The society has~little difficulty in withstanding the criticism and
 
attacks of the cynics, the alienated, and other critics and "dropouts."
 
Indeed, these American life styles are obviously fairly full and satisfying,
 
and thus it is the morale and confidence of critics which have a tendency
 
to erode.
 
(3) Poverty and student di5sidence are substantially overcome, in
 
part because of intelligent and well-run reforms by government which
 
produce useful short-, medium-, and long-term impacts.
 
(4) Inparticular, various "reverse discrimination polities" prove
 
quite successful. Tens of thousands of Negroes either get to the top
 
levels of U.S. society or are clearly on their way up. Everywhere--in
 
both personal contacts and in the media--there is visible proof to the
 
Negro that he can "make it" (and even more visible proof to the white man).
 
This spectacular increase in the status of "upper class" Negroes reduces
 
tolerance, both within and without the Negro community, of illegal or
 
unreasonable acts by destructive and extremist protest groups. In
 
particular there is little or no implicit (much less explicit) encouragement
 
-of such demands or behavior. There are, of course, many hard-core problems
 
and much alienation and revolt among the poor, the Negroes, the students
 
and some of the other "drop-outs," but the problems are now regarded as
 
.soluble and the protests mainly "rhetorical." Increasingly, successful
 
Negroes--despite their protestations of solidarity with Black Nationalist
 
sentiments--are coopted into the "establishment" and suburbia and find
 
that their major concerns, satisfactions and psychic income come from much
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the same kind of rewards as those of the whites they work and live with.
 
In addition, there is a burst of creativity among Negroes which shows up
 
areas of political, business,
in almost all aspects of culture and many 

life. This also gives Negroes
commercial, technical and governmental 

self-confidence and a feeling of pride and participation in "the system."
 
forced into the system--
When combined with the fact that they do not feel 

they all know they have the opportunity to opt out--their allegiance is to
 
the liberal system.
 
Attempts to
(5) 	Non-white, non-black minorities also advance. 

as the ethnics, for radical action fail.
mobilize them, as 	well 

(6) Community control agitation has the effect of making decision­
makers, public and private, a great deal more sensitive to local public
 
opinion in policy-making.
 
(7) Americans of 	recent European (and Asian) ancestory are more
 
closely assimilated to conventional U.S. family and economic patterns, but
 
"ethnic"
 
many of them find satisfaction in maintaining various superficial 

holidays, foods, and traditional religious
customs, such as national 

observances.
 
(8) 	There is something of a return to religion, but motivated by a
 
In

need for continuity and values, rather than deepfelt regilious faith. 

Jewish terms, the revival is "conservative" rather than "orthodox" or "reform".
 
"Orthodox" sects continue to lose communicants, but their rate of slippage
 
slows. Some "reform" sects stand pat (e.g. Unitarians) and others continue
 
religious forms, but most of them, and particularly
to experiment with radical 

their "with it" clergy move toward "conservative."
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(9) Upper-middle-class youth--white and black--also participate actively
 
in society, regaining interest in governmental and private programs, par­
ticularly "action-oriented" social welfare programs. They therefore per­
ceive-a heavy stake both in society and in reforming it. Inmost cases,
 
after a burst of energy into pursuing altruistic and/or public service
 
objectives, they end up by putting most of their energy into living well
 
and in succeeding in their careers (i.e., being "good citizens," "neo­
epicureans," and "neo-gentlemen"). There are, moreover, sufficient
 
competent and motivated leaders produced to sustain strong and innovative
 
government.
 
(10) With GNP reaching 1.1 trillion (in 1967 dollars) before 1975
 
and 1.9 trillion by 1985, there is sufficient investment in new housing and
 
urban redevelopment to maintain historical rates of improvement in housing
 
quality and lowering of density. However, poverty pockets remain in old
 
cities and rural areas, and municipal finances remain a problem, though
 
the predominantly suburban electorate and legislatures are less sympathetic
 
to them.
 
(11) Multi-channel cable television and cheap transmitting equipment
 
permits a full spectrum of cultural, educational, political, and entertain­
ment programs, mostly commerically sponsored. Public television continues
 
to appeal to the "lowest common denominator" but competitive pressures.push
 
its rates and its number of commercials down. Children demand and get
 
their own TV. The great variety of TV offerings will promote "mosaic"
 
cultures and will gradually replace live performances. Live audiences at
 
public events will be present primarily to improve the TV show.
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leading
(12) Excesses by environmentalists to provoke a "backlash" 

to a more balanced approach to pollution. Severe environmental 
contamination
 
its way to being cleaned up. Pollution control has become just
is well on 

another parameter in the design of systems.
 
While the most important single recreational activity is-the
 (13) 

hedonism of lying near-naked on the beach, the overrunning of
 cheerful 

the shore by the lower classes drives the upper classes more and more 
to
 
inland, more active leisure. Ski resorts proliferate wherever the 
climate
 
permits, and artificial snow-making equipment drives that climate 
south.
 
(But restrictive regulations
Ice skating and hockey may also spread south. 

limit the use of snowmobiles.) Mountain climbing and hiking are also very
 
are increasingly found as far
 important. Ditto camping--American campers 

afield as Alaska and Central America. Hunting remains for rural and small
 
more urban people find it distasteful; in
 town people, but more and 

conflicts over the use of recreational areas, hunters begin to lose.
 
and business decision­(14) The American presidency and the political 

are largely in the 40-to-50 age bracket but with enough 30-year­makers 

that one can argue it really is not a "middle aged system." The
olds so 

most prized political and business characteristics are: "style," pragma-

The most successful
tism, optimism, moderation, innovation, expertise. 

politicians are, in effect, members of what can be called the Technocratic
 
and/or Responsible Center.
 
4. A Modestly Pessimistic Prognosis
 
(I) We assume here a degree of stagnation within at least the non­
technical and "square" sectors of intellectual life, and, in general,
 
diminishing satisfactions and elan in most elite.occupations. While
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nominal particlpatibn in U.S. "square society" and- its goals, aspirations,
 
and acti-vities is still high, there is diminished pride and non-monetary
 
reward in such participation.
 
(2) Tkeprestige of physics, mathematics, engineering, and the
 
life sciences erodes more rapidly than was suggested in the neutral progno­
sis. Polit'ical acti-vism by social scientists and psychologists has given
 
them very low credibillity among the public. The failures of economic
 
theory to reflect the real economy has discredited economists. There is'
 
a widespread'belief that science ard reason'have failed, and even educated
 
people feel free to admiting to being "'unreasonable" and-advocating moral
 
nihilism and/or raw dogma.
 
(3) Much of the population is susp'icious of and hostile to the
 
"military-industrial complex," "big businessi and "'big government." (In this
 
scenario the military-ndustrial complex does in fact exist as an important
 
and relatively unified political and economic pressure group, and plays
 
an increasing role in American political life, though still not as much as
 
has often been typical in continental Europe.) While the U.S. is, generally
 
speaking; a low-morale country, many of it elites and pressure groups
 
are,'at' least in some cases and on some issue , relatively touchy. Thus,
 
while they lack confidence and assurance, they cad still act" resolutely
 
on occasion, even provocatively. In particular, they may in many cases be
 
unlikely to consider it important to observe the kind of constraints,
 
precedents, and various unilateral limitations which now function in
 
American society.
 
(4) The GNP fails to reach 1.1 trillion' (in 1967 dollars) by 1975
 
and falls short of 1.6 trillirofi by 1985. Unemployment'is at least 5% on
 
the average.
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(5) There are bitter fights over pollution vs. production and
 
power.
pollution vs. 

(6) A striking feature of the society is the spread of a "gang"
 
mentality wherein groups responsive to only their own self-interest,
 
compete for economic and political advantage.
 
(7) Increasingly militant trade unions, particularly in govern­
ment. Mostly in self-defense, white collar workers (perhaps even
 
executives?) organize.
 
(8) 	Labor indiscipline makes it advantageous for employers to retain
 
There is agitation
older workers. Forced retirement rules are relaxed. 

to change social security employment regulations.
 
(9) Despite economic gains, Negroes remain alienated. Successful
 
Negroes accept their rewards as partial payment for sins of whites.
 
Militants move away from Marxist-Leninist and African Nationalist ideologies
 
toward affinity with radical black movements in the West Indies.
 
(10) Increasing militancy among Indians, Mexicans. Early 1960's
 
style activism by "the ethnics".
 
(11) Spread of black nationalism to the South. 	Confrontation with
 
white militants. Klan revival. Three-party politics in South--Negroes
 
and progressives-National Democrats; Urban traditionalist and business
 
interests-Republicans; Rural traditionalist and lower whites-Wallace style
 
demogogues. 	 4
 
(12) Nationally, polarization is seen as the prime issue. In the
 
industrial states, three (and even four) party politics becomes the
 
norm rather than the exception.
 
(13) The estrangement of America from the rest of the world, and most
 
important, from the liberal democracies in Europe, is much greater than in
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the neutral, scenario. 
-Increasingly America's actions are perceived as uni­
lateral 
(orarbitrary) definiti.ons of the international as well as the
 
national interest, as unnecessary or provocative violence (or threats of
 
violence), the U;S. condemns or threatens from a~posture essentially
 
that of a beleaguered "Fortress America." 
 But America, justly or unjustly,
 
iswidely believed to have become a major destabilizing factor in inter­
national affairs, and perhaps a dangerously unpredictable one. Many
 
Americans share this perception; This reinforces the American sense of
 
isolation, contributing to the low morale of American elites and to the
 
intensity of domestic political dissent.
 
(14) One would assume that existing American alliances, and certainly
 
NATO and the Japanese alliance, would either have been ended or would have los
 
their significance; and probably there would have been a growth in economic
 
protectionism, paralleling the breakdown of political cooperation in the
 
Free World. 
There may be economic crisis and a severe drop in world-trade.
 
One would certainly assume some falling off of world economic growth and
 
a realignment of trade patterns., 
If.there were economic crisis, America's
 
domestic problems well may have found echoes in other countries as well as
 
being reinforced here. 
Or the crisis might produce a political reaction
 
in the United States sharp enough to revise many or most of the tendencies we
 
have been describing. But the stagnation scenario envisages a very
 
important change inAmerica's relationship to the world community. The
 
general high regard for America in much of the world, historically a
 
matter of respect for America's domestic poli-tical and economic accomplish­
ments, will be in-considerable measure supplanted by hostility or distrust,
 
and this inevitably will be an important factor in the American popular self
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a continuation and predominance of
image. Thus this prognosis envisages 

tendencies of domestic division and controversy, of international isola­
tionism as well as American isolationism, and possibly of arbitrary or
 
elites within the United States.
authoritarian action by political 

5. A Vietnam "Debacle"
 
Now let us turn to a specific version of the pessimistic prognosis,
 
one of interest not only in itself but representative of a class of sce­
narios in which some major failure of foreign policy produces a harsh
 
public reaction against the administration held responsible and also to
 
some extent agaifst the established apparatus of government--the political
 
"establishment."
 
The obvious example is a Vietnam "debacle." We assume that the ad­
ministration's present efforts to develop an honorable negotiated settle­
ment and/or form of American disengagement take a dramatic and discrediting
 
turn. A settlement is negotiated--perhaps over the objections of the Sai­
gon authorities--which is overturned by the Communists as soon as American
 
power iswithdrawn. Extensive reprisals against non-Communists or a clearly
 
terrorist program against the population ensues. Or Communist aggression
 
in Thailand or Cambodia quickly and provocatively follows what was supposed
 
to have been a neutralization of the area. The American government then is
 
judged by the American public--and perhaps by many abroad, even including
 
many who had been critical of the original American intervention--to be
 
incompetent, and unreliable--even immoral. The alleged folly or crime of
 
Vietnam intervention -isseen as compounded by folly or failure.in ending
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that intervention. The 'generation of policy makers who.have.dominated the
 
Republican as well as the Democratic administrations of the last twenty
 
years--internationalists, generally liberal in terms of the American po­
litical.spectrum--are then repudiated by an angry American voting popula­
tion. The reaction could be to both left and right: on the left a con­
demnation of this leadership as immoral and incompetent even by its own
 
standards, and on the right, either a rise in aggressively interventionist
 
attitudes (possibly including a heightened willingness to make use of nu­
clear weapons) or a developing Fortress America outlook.
 
If the "liberal establishment" leadership nonetheless continues in
 
office, it would function within wholly new constraints and in an atmos­
phere of radicalized controversy. If they were ousted, the successor
 
administration might represent a coalition not only of politically con­
servative forces largely denied national office in recent years, but
 
possibly of populist reactionary groups, or groups alienated by the cos­
mopolitanism and sensate qualities of much of modern culture and devoted
 
to an "ideological renewal" of this country. One can obviously imagine
 
these last forces assuming a politically repressive stance, although it
 
may be less easy to see them overcoming the resistance of those major
 
population groups which have been in the ascendance in American society
 
(and in the Western nations generally) over recent decades.
 
Whether the reaction were to the left or to the right, one would
 
expect an America which is reacting against a foreign policy debacle to
 
be much more bitter in its divisions and inner struggles than at any
 
period since the Civil War. The consequences for government and for the
 
health of the social organism could be crippling.
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6. 	A Dynamic and Competent Responsible (or Humanistic) Center
 
Reestablishes Itself
 
The Neutral Prognosis assumes a continuing prominence in political
 
leadership and influence of intellectuals and, more generally, of the
 
highly educated upper middle classes. However, internal or external de­
velopments may operate to discredit the values and methods of this cultu­
ral stratum before or during the decade under consideration.
 
So, too,
A "shameful'' settlement in Vietnam could have this effect. 

&ould a protracted period of negotiations, during which American mtlitary
 
In the former case, popular discontent
casualties continued to mount. 

might be intensified by increased militancy and arrogance on the part of
 
"New Left" students and black separatists, and also by the "Populist
 
In the latter, the malaise and unrest born of governmental am-
Right." 

bivalence and vacillation could be fortified by the persistent problem
 
of inflation.
 
Even a satisfactory settlement in Southeast Asia does not, however,
 
preclude the possibility that "the middle Americans" will become an in­
creasingly important and possibly decisive force in our politics and cul­
ture. Among the domestic factors making for instability in our present
 
(1) rising
apportionment of political power and cultural influence are: 

violent-crime rates; (2) rising tax rates, afflicting especially the urban
 
middle class; (3) school-district problems, including soaring costs, crowd­
ing, integration issues, and curricular reforms; (4) campus violence;
 
(5) the confusing and perturbing results of the anti-poverty programs;
 
(6) the breakdown of traditional barriers regarding sexual behavior, dress,
 
drug use, the arts, etc., and the erosion of "establishment" support for
 
religion, patriotism, and private business; (7) the penchant of parts of
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the liberal press for gratuitous denigration of the values and behavior
 
of the "lower middle classes"; and (8)c6mparative governmental indiffer­
ence to the middle American's "side" of the racial problem, as well 
as
 
to such problems (including'psychologi6al ones) as are'peculiar to him in
 
a period of rapid change.
 
A prognosis which stresses the potential of these factors would en­
tail rhetorical (and some legal) reassertion of "official" support for
 
traditional religious, patriotic, sexual, and privat6-business values
 
and practices. Among political candidates, and administrative appointees,
 
practical men would have a clear edge ovet academicians. While govern­
mental social welfare programs would be designed and administered'with a
 
different--possibly more effective--set of attitudes and approaches than
 
today's fashions permit, it is not unlikely that programs specifically
 
designed to reduce inequities of opportunity and to stimulate enterprise
 
would be encouraged. Support for tax reforms and for meeting the nutri­
tional, medical, and educational needs of the children of the poor could
 
be stronger and more effective than today. Education in general,-as our
 
traditional 
means for class mobility--and class definition--could receive
 
increased attention, although one would suppose that todays'educational
 
philosophy would undergo modification in the direction of stressing com­
petition and (possible) vocational and moral training.1
 
A reestablished responsible-center government would be compelled by
 
the reasons for its ascent to power to devote considerable attention to
 
the "law and order" issue both directly--monetary and advisory aid to
 
police, expediting court procedures, prison and parole system reforms;
 
and indirectly by the personal example its functionaries would be expected
 
to set of commitment and resolution to protect the constitutional system
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of orderly conflict and dissent; and by the conditions set for receipt of
 
federal grants or loans by universities, anti-poverty groups, etc.
 
In foreign affairs, this type of government might tend toward inter­
"ventionism or a fastidious (holier-than-thou) policy of disengagement,
 
depending upon circumstances and the mood of its constituents. Itmight,
 
of course, follow these "opposite" policies simultaneously, since both
 
express the middle American's preference for unilateral actions--reducing
 
international cooperation.
 
Variants on the theme of a responsible-center resurgence derive from
 
the variable strength of its opponents. In addition, it is possible that
 
what appears, from a present-day perspective, a "reestablishment" may seem.
 
something quite different in hindsight. One possibility is a prelude to
 
authoritarianism. A second possibility is that emphasis on the middle
 
Americans may serve to stimulate the development of a new and militant
 
"populist" movement in much the way that attention to the American Negro
 
has born- unexpected fruit in the sixties. Such a movement of the "people"
 
could play as seminal a role in restructuring our social philosophy re­
sponsively to "post-industrial" conditions as the populism of the 1890's
 
played in catalyzing public response to industrialization and urbanization.
 
One must, finally, take into account the vigor of existing American
 
political leadership elites well within the established "center'' of Ameri­
can politics. A satisfactory Vietnam outcome and new successes in domestic
 
policy by the Nixon Administration could, for example, produce a reconsti­
in the recent
tuted "establishment" of somewhat more conservative cast than 

past. Or the Democratic Party might bid successfully for the presidency
 
on the basis of new domestic reform proposals andwith new leaders, again
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within the "responsible center" range and drawingon the'same "establish­
ment' sectors of :big business, the academic-world, and the professions as
 
the other administration of modern times. 

-in either case the present
 
alienation of significant minorities in American soc-iety-from a leader­
ship constrained by the imperatives of America's world position and the
 
social, demands-of technocratic society would by definition be substantially
 
reduced--possibly with a new degree of powef decentralization, of "partici­
pationU'through new political or economic mechanisms. With international
 
stresses 
lessened through Vietnam sett'lement, and possibly by a general
 
international trend toward "inward-looking" or neo-isolationist policies,
 
domestic controversy could lose some of its present intensity and the major
 
domestic issues of racial 
relations and poverty become more susceptible
 
to remedy.
 
Certainly the most reasonable (and historically warranted) progn6sis
 
for America lies on this scale of moderate, incremental change, ac~oipanied
 
by intense creative controversy, rather than the'starker alternatives dis.
 
cussed earlier. But the earlier prognoses must, at this point, be taken
 
seriously as:possibilities.
 
SOME RELEVANT SCENARIOS FOR MIDDLE AMERICA"
 
Earlier in this report, we discussed Middle America's view of NASA
 
and reviewed public opinion surveys leading to the conclusion that public
 
support for America's space program is decreasing and assuming a lower
 
*These are based on work by Frank Armbruster.
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priority within the over-all hierarchy of Federal programs citizens are
 
prepared to spport. What changes may occur in this trend in the fore­
seeable future? What action could NASA take to improve its position or
 
to respond to such changes as they occur?
 
As we noted earlier, the fact that public support for NASA spending is
 
lower under a $4 billion budget and an impressive record of success than it
 
was under a $7 billion NASA budget and little more than promises, indicates
 
that other things besides NASA's performance are involved. We have outlined
 
some of these factors, but there are many others that will be analyzed below
 
in scenarios. One scenario is normally inadequate to give a broad enough
 
coverage of political probabilities over the next two decades, but several
 
scenarios can sometimes give a feeling for the "band" or "spectrum" of the
 
political milieu in which one may have to function.
 
The big problem is that of predicting morale. As in the stock market,
 
psychological factors can be dominant in technological programs, particu­
larly those that depend on Congressional appropriations. For example, the
 
drive currently under way in this country by many academicians, journalists,
 
and some politicians to reduce the what they perceive to be "chauvinism"
 
and "bellicosity" of this nation could have far-reaching effects. Just
 
as those who supported the civil rights drive did not foresee the violence
 
which would accompany it, current believers of the benefits to the United
 
States of "getting a bloody nose" may not foresee the deeper problems this
 
could bring.
 
The question of whether or not such counsel dominates our policy
 
decisions in the future obviously is critical to any political scenario.
 
Nor is this the only factor of significance to NASA, although it may be
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the most critical one for the nation as a whole. Economic factors are ­
also involved. Runaway inflation could-chbnge everything, creating, 
among other things, n6w Iabor problems. No scenario could completely 
cover all the possible combinations and permutations of these and many
 
other critical inputs. The three following scenarios, therefore, are
 
far from conclusive. But they do indicate the "surprise-free" spectrum
 
of political milieux in which NASA must operate in the next two decades.
 
The Straight-Line Projection
 
The central scenario which NASA should consider is that, under the
 
current program, the amount of public support for NASA does not increase.
 
This could mean that planning groups, at NASA will have to sharpen their
 
pencils and increase efficiency so that their highest priority programs
 
go forward under a stable or even a slightly decreasing budget.
 
The first big program choice--manned versus unmanned programs--comes
 
up quickly, however. From a purely scientific point of view, one way to
 
obtain most of the data for the program "on the cheap" is to use instru­
mented space vehicles instead of manned spacecraft. This may be likely,
 
however, to reduce public support even further. One cannot send sensors
 
and computers on good-will trips around the world, nor can the average
 
television viewer empathize with the micro-miniaturized solid-state
 
components of an unmanned vehicle. The'question is whether this program,
 
without its "live takeoff spectaculars" and the "human side" of the news,
 
will be reduced sufficiently in cost so that even with a further drop in
 
popularity (and possibly reduced Congressional appropriations) there will
 
be adequate funds to meet the minimal goals of the program.
 
On the other hand, assuming the straight-line projection scenario
 
from today's political and budgetary environment, one can hedge against
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the most obvious pitfalls. Let us assume that the manned solar system
 
exploration program appears to be just too expensive, even under the most
 
optimistic projections of future budgets. It might pay NASA to try to
 
make some estimates as to what the trade-off will be between the loss of
 
public interest and the saving on th6 unmanned program. There is another
 
important choice to be made immediately after the above estimates have
 
been made. This is the question of how "glamorous" the unmanned projects
 
can be made. Let us assume for the moment that very clear television
 
pictures can be made and samples returned from the most distant planets.
 
The probability of any spectacular discovery is likely to be small. If
 
all we get is some lava and confirmation of already "known" factors, people
 
are likely to say: "So Mars is an uninhabited pile of rock--what else is
 
new?; for that we paid X billion dollars?" But at least they won't say:
 
"Wow! if we only had had a man on that trip--look what he could have
 
learned from that obviously fascinating place!" NASA's approach -inany
 
case must be full coverage with much explanation.
 
Let us assume that we get exceptionally good pictures of Jupiter
 
with some background as to why the things they show are important to the
 
solar system and the earth. The average television viewer and newspaper
 
reader in the United States is not stupid, but he has very little back­
ground on the reasons for the NASA program. Perhaps his interest can be
 
turned a little in the direction of these NASA programs. This is a rela­
tively low-probability effort and the payoff may be small, but it has to
 
be tried if NASA goes the unmanned route. The unmanned program could
 
also be used as a "forerunner" to determine which areas in the solar
 
system are worth sending a man to, and it should-be explained as such.
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Of course, the unmanned shots which are directly related to earth
 
uses--TV relays, communications satellites, navigational aids, etc.--will
 
not need fanfare, but the amount of the NASA budget spent on them, under
 
this scenario, would be clearly indicated as such. Normally, cis-lunar
 
vehicles of all sorts may be easy to explain.
 
The manned space station might be an exception. In fact, if it were
 
not for the already publicized Russian program in this area, it might be
 
almost as hard to get public support for it as for the deeper, manned,
 
space probes. Being that close to earth, the chances are that, under
 
this scenario, many people will also see the platform as having significant
 
military as well as scientific and perhaps economic benefits--no matter
 
what NASA says about it. But under this scenario, the costs of this pro­
gram may be considered to be prohibitive by the people and Congress, un­
less we seem to be in a "race with Russia."
 
The other leg of the program choice (emphasis on manned or un­
manned space programs) could, under this scenario, be different from what
 
one might expect it to be. It could, for example, emphasize a "mobiliza­
tion base" for manned flight. This might be nothing more than a slowed
 
down Apollo program with heavy emphasis on the instrumentation and train­
ing phases. This may not be feasible but, if NASA wishes to keep the
 
option of going back into a manned program--because, for instance, of a
 
change in direction of the Russian program--we must have some capability
 
available. This change could also take place because of a change in empha­
sis in the opinions of the public or Congress. Perhaps some day they
 
really will want to go to Mars. Also, if one were to push the space­
platform program there would be obviously a good deal of experience and
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training for manned flight involved. In this scenario, however, the proba­
bility of a large, continued, manned space program may be somewhat lower
 
than other alternatives.
 
The alternative is, of course, to continue with the manned space
 
program at its present rate until all the Apollo shots have been completed.
 
There are many reasons which seem to indicate that this is not a wise path
 
to follow, even under the straight-line projection scenario. The most ob­
vious reason is that we cannot be sure that we will have a straight-line
 
projection. It may change, and at that point we may need the manned capa­
bility to proceed in a new direction. Barring disastrous accidents, this
 
program will of course produce more TV spectaculars than an instrumented
 
program is likely to do. Because of its expense, however, the instru­
mented program will probably suffer disproportionately if this manned
 
program is pushed under a reduced budget. Here again the trade-off be­
tween popular support, actual danger to human life, and the benefits of
 
the programs will have to be considered. To get TV spectaculars and
 
generate public support for the program is not a good enough reason to
 
risk the lives of astronauts, even if they wish to go. There must be
 
a functional reason for having a man on board. For example, when the LEM
 
"Eagle" landed onthe moon, there would have been danger of a crash or mis­
sion abort had there not been an astronaut aboard to take over manually in
 
the last few seconds. All the issues must be considered in going in the di­
rection of a large manned program, but if one hedges against the requirement
 
to have a manned program later and slows down the Apollo program, it is con­
ceivable that it might even mean more safety for the men on board and more
 
data gathered when they do go into space. As mentioned above, the empha­
sis is on improved instrumentation and training.
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Under this straight-line projection, the probability of NASA being
 
able to branch out into other'areas of research, oceanography, geology,
 
etc. (except insofa'ras satellites ate used for this purpose), would de­
pend on how big the cuts in the budgets of the agencies already involved
 
in such projects would' be and whether the money thus saved would be trans­
ferred to NASA. The chances are that'the cuts would be about the same
 
across the board and no one's budget would be increased. This means that
 
NASA could only take up these new fields (and hire personnel in them) by
 
further reducing their own projects. The chances are that NASA would get
 
only second-rate people if it depended on staffing its own programs by
 
depending on the "attrition" of the other agencies. They will hold on
 
to their better people at all costs. NASA could "raid" the other agencies
 
and this would cause "political" trouble, but if NASA looked like "the
 
wave of the future" in these new areas, "raiding" could be easier. De­
spite the manning and "political" problems, it might still be worth the
 
trouble for NASA under this scenario. It is certainly easier to explain
 
"exploitation of untapped resources" here on earth as the end goal of a
 
program than to explain the professor's reason to go out into space look­
ing at "chunks of barren rock." But breaking up teams and then reassembling
 
parts of them under strange administrators to form a new team is not condu­
cive to progress, especially in technical areas, as NASA well knows. Even
 
if NASA as an agency profited, the nation would probably suffer.
 
An Optimistic Proiection
 
A scenario for NASA on the optimistic or upper side of the spectrum
 
from the "straight-line," central scenario might be assumed to be as fol­
lows: The U.S.S.R. might put up a sophisticated, manned space platform
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with regular live TV shows beamed to the earth, or they may succeed spec­
tacularly in some manned or unmanned deep space probes. Linked to this
 
situation one must assume the return of American elan to a point where
 
all segments of society have some sense of pride in our nation and are
 
concerned when opponents surpass her, Under these circumstances, it would
 
be natural to expect a significant American reaction to the Soviet success.
 
One could hardly expect the return of American morale in the 1970's
 
and 1980's to that of the 1940's and 1950's. But with just a fraction
 
of such feeling and our predicted gross national product and trained
 
government and private industrial space teams, we would probably make
 
great strides. Ten billion dollars is not very significant in light of
 
well over a trillion dollar gross national product, and with a NASA bud­
get of ten billion, many new opportunities might arise. A milieu inwhich
 
such a budget would be voted by Congress would require some drastic changes
 
in our government's policy and national outlook in other areas. This sce­
nario assumes that the President or someone else of prominence stands up
 
and speaks out in defense of the values which a large portion of the now
 
anti-NASA "lower middle class" section of the population holds dear. Such
 
a switch in tactics is assumed to put us back in the running in all areas,
 
perhaps even providing the means to defeat aggressive Communist "wars of
 
national liberation" in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.
 
A revival of national purpose (perhaps through a new President)
 
should put the prestige of the United States higher on the list of pri­
orities in all areas, including space exploration and exploitation. At
 
this point, NASA planners should have a dossier of both short- and long­
range programs ready to present to Congress. These programs would, how­
ever, have to be feasible and meaningful, for, in this mood, the nation
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will be'demanding results on all fronts. A key point about the nation in
 
this scenario is that it will not readily accept excuses. ('In the 1940's
 
lame excuses were out. Results were demanded.) In this scenario, it is as­
sumed that the nation has returned to a "can-do" mode in large part because
 
it is fe d up with excuses for failure. This means that heads will roll if
 
things go wrong. Interestingly enough--as far as personal careers are
 
concerned--this is a more dangerous milieu than the one inwhich all the
 
'in"' people are defeatist and docile.
 
It is difficult to conceive of such a situation today, but what we
 
are assuming here is that the better newspapers and that group of intel­
lectuals who are anti-NASA today will pitch in to support programs that
 
bring the United States back into line as the leader in space and other
 
ventures. NASA certainly should not shy away from this renewed interest
 
but the plans that are put forward would have to be those in which the
 
NASA people really had faith. The piecemeal approach to planning of some
 
of the programs today would have to be reviewed very carefully under this
 
scenario. It is quite likely that with this kind of pressure there might
 
be a great deal more publicity about NASA than we now experience. The
 
newspapers could get very interested and probe more deeply into NASA plan­
ning than they are doing at present. Here again, one would assume that
 
the NASA people would be perfectly adequate to handle this kind of scru­
tiny and, indeed, should welcome it. With such publicity, the National
 
Aeronautics and Space Agency might find it very easy to get key people.
 
In fact, under these circumstances, NASA will probably be one of the most
 
attractive places for scientists to work. There may be a bit of the
 
"forced-draft" approach involved under these conditions, but there cer­
tainly would not be the money problems one experiences today. Under the
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assumptions of this scenario, there should be a friendlier public atti­
tude toward NASA and a better relationship with Congress.
 
As mentioned earlier, a budget of 10 billion constant dollars for NASA
 
under this scenario does not seem outrageous. Of course, by this time per­
iod, because of changes in price structure, ten billion constant dollars
 
will not buy as much in skilled manpower as it will today, but it may buy
 
considerably more of some kinds of technological production, and one can
 
assume that it will be, on balance, for NASA's purpose, at least the equiva­
lent of 7.5 or 8 billion of the same dollars today. This is significantly
 
more than the peak budgets of NASA a few years ago.
 
A Pessimistic Side of the Spectrum
 
In this scenario, one assumes that many of the trends which are
 
apparent today continue. If this does occur there is a natural slope to
 
the pessimistic side of the spectrum. The obvious drop in morale fostered
 
by foreign policies which seem to be popular among the Humanist Left
 
would tend to lead to isolationism. This again should cause a drop in
 
morale among the Middle Americans, the very people who oppose the NASA
 
program. If this group should become more selfish than it has been
 
in the past, the demands will be for cuts all the way down the line. A
 
bitter reaction by this vast bloc of voters could be one of the results
 
of the general feeling of helplessness expressed by so many of the "in"
 
people today. If, as mentioned earlier, the only successes we have are
 
in NASA, perhaps these "in" people can transfer the attention of that
 
vast center of the voting bloc to the successful NASA program and in this
 
way divert attention from failures in foreign policy. But this reaction
 
will more likely cause them to turn increasingly towards thinking about
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IoEt 'i'ssues and their own economic well-being and steering away from
 
federal government programs altogether.. In this case, all federal pro7
 
grams-might bbcome suspect. It is extremely'difficult to discred-it one
 
branIt: 6f-the-goverhment involved in over-all "internafionallt programs
 
withbut discrediting others in thesame general area.
 
-Even in the domestic program area-there will be problems. There may
 
be a big dry for solving the' air- or water-pollution problems, but the
 
cry may be for- these to be solved under local jurisdiction. Even if they
 
are placed under federal jurisdiction, there is a-good possibility-that
 
the average taxpayer will want -ederal help only in those areas that he
 
specifies.
 
There is also the problem of the type.of political personalities
 
that may'emerge in this- country under the "defeatist" milieu of this sce­
nario. -These 'could be from those who would be seen as far left, anti-defense
 
and isolationists, to-populists who want to throw the rascals out in Washing­
ton andwho very well may do-so.
 
If the "low-morale," anti-defense isolationists achieve power, the
 
resulting drop in morale and interest of the average man in "unselfishY
 
programs may be somewhat analogous to that of the West Germans. Once the
 
German government had convinced the average German that reunification of
 
Germany andother such high-minded goals were-impossible to achieve, ex­
cept underMoscow's terms, he turned to more selfish things. He
 
bought a cat, a new suit, a house; he now frequently goes on vacation
 
abroad. He lives it-up and refuses to support his government in programs
 
other than those that allow him to live Ft up more. He doesn't think much
 
about East Germany and he won't even support unpleasant programs-to defend
 
his homeland. He will not raise the West German draft quota for a larger
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army, but he expects the United States to keep a quarter of a million men
 
not pay taxes to compete; he bitterly
there to protect him. He will 

blames everyone else (including
accepts the role of a second-class power; 

Bonn and Washington) for it; and at the encouragement of his government,
 
becomes more and more obsessed with material welfare for himself. Some­
thing like this could occur in the United States. If so, NASA's budget
 
A bitter, selfish American citizen would not
would most likely be cut. 

be about to sacrifice any significant fraction of his own well-being for
 
"one giant step for mankind."
 
ifwe
 
If Congress should go populist to any large extent, or 
even 

get a President who feels and thinks this way, then 
we may have difficulty
 
getting funds for NASA or anything else. Very much 
will depend on whether
 
involve the federal government, in big
the President thinks he can again 

programs and demand foreign policies and make them work; 
or whether he
 
is to take care of the local tax­feels that what he really ought to do 

This could even lead to further
 payers and forget the big federal programs. 

cuts intaxes, which could reduce the federal budget--one of 
the worst
 
things that could happen to NASA.
 
im­budget goes down and there are demands for local 
If the federal 

All the points mentioned
indeed be in trouble.
provements, then NASA could 

that lead to the conclusion that NASA would get money by
earlier (i.e., 

If the
 
default if other programs were failures) assumed a stable budget. 

budget goes down or remains level while inflation eats it up, then 
NASA
 
This
 
may find itself with a relatively lower budget than it has today. 

Even if a populist president did not
along the line.
would mean cuts all 

get in--or assuming that a left-wing president is elected--NASA's 
budget
 
could also be in danger, because one would assume that the funds 
would
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then be funneled into the welfare and poverty programs. And if the'd­
fense'ib~dge .i-s cut significantly, it might be'difficdlt for NASA to keep
 
the budget it has today. Policies "nrmallyhavea general thrust. If the
 
thrust of the left-wing groups is to try to appeal.to the large block of
 
middle-class and lower-middle-class voters while at the same time counting
 
the favor of the poor, the natural thing to do is to cut NASA,: because
 
this is.where-the opposition can be mollified and the welfare programs
 
funded.
 
,One can see that this pessimistic-scenario actually has a branch
 
point that might make it less pessimistic. As mentioned above, the atten­
tion of the public might be diverted to a'successful NASA program because
 
of anunsuccessful foreign policy and urban program. But it is not~a
 
highly likely branch. It ismore likely that if there is a low-morale
 
situation and a group of people in power who are interested in social
 
legislation, NASA will be hurt rather than helped. For this reason,
 
NASA should have a dossier of programs which fits a much rdduced budget,
 
and itshould be ready to defend these programs in a language and mode
 
that will be meaningful to the large, central bloc of voters. This.is
 
essentially the same problem that NASA has today, except that itwill be
 
considerably magnified.
 
CURRENT ATTITUDES TOWARDSCIENCE
 
Having examined some of the broadest public attitudes toward NASA,
 
let us consider a more specific area where attitudes influence public
 
policy: attitudes toward science and science policy investment.
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Towards Anti-Science
 
Responsible public opinion against science has tended to follow and
 
draw upon some of the following attitudes:
 
1. Science fuels and lubricates the military machine. It is part
 
of the military-industrial complex, and therefore by assumption anti­
human and evil.
 
2. Science and technology manipulate society, our personal lives,
 
and can no longer be controiled.
 
3. Other projects and priorities are more important than the luxury
 
of basic research, and/or enlarging research and development. Repairing
 
the human environment, strengthening social welfare, reducing poverty,
 
enriching our life, are needs deserving prominent roles in our structure.
 
4. Science seems to threaten the individual's command over his own
 
life, perhaps making visible his own impotence.
 
5. The momentum of science and the enthusiasm of its advocates
 
carries it toward its own abstract, non-humanistic goals.
 
6. Any increase in productivity due to science and technology comes
 
at the cost of exhausting natural resources, contaminating our environment,
 
causing social ills, and economic inequities such as the coexistence of a
 
large GNP per capita with extreme poverty.
 
7. Synchetic desires are created rather than satisfied by increased
 
productivity.
 
8. Even scientific priorities are inverted to the point where study
 
and research in reducing infant mortality has slipped, but study and re­
search on glamorous, high publicity projects, like heart transplants, has
 
gained.
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9. Science has lost its revolutionary flavor. In the Middle Ages,
 
science was an underground, clandestine activity, engaged in surrepti­
tiously by intellectual adventurers. Science is now "establishment," a
 
target, not an agent, of revolution.
 
10. Science is not exciting any more for scientists, or students,
 
who seek relevance elsewhere. The field is overcrowded, the "need for
 
scientists has been exaggerated across the board,"* discoveries are very
 
difficult and expensive to make. 
 (There are few elegant, inexpensive,
 
rewarding, and dramatic theories like relativity these days, awaiting
 
our discovery--at least, so far as we know.)
 
11. The United States cannot afford to lead the world in every sphere
 
of activity, and/or all 
fields of science and technology.
 
12. "Science illuminates part of our experience with such glaring
 
intensity that the rest remains 
in even deeper darkness. The part in
 
darkness has to do with the irrational and the affective in human
 
behavior, the realm of the emotional, the instinctive world." ,
 
Towards Science
 
Arguments favoring increased commitment for research and development
 
constitute a list harder to draw up than the-preceding one. And this is
 
an important measure of the problem.
 
Arguments in support of science., basic and applied research and
 
development are:
 
*Bryce Nelson, "A Surplus of Scientists? The Job Market isTighten­
ing," Science 165, 31 October 1969, p. 592. 
*,Victor F. Weisskopf, "The Privilege of Being a Physicist," Physics 
Today, August 1969, p. 39. 
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1. Research and development assists productivity, economic growth
 
and welfare.
 
2. 	Basic science, research and development provide a talent pool,
 
ideas and leaders, also thereby constituting
a natural national resource of 

a mobilization base and insurance fortdefense.
 
3. 	Science and research and development improve the mental, con­
as a side effect of the
ceptual, philosophical climate of our times, 

continuous accumulation and ordering of new knowledge.*
 
National morale and pride are at stake in the competition in
4. 

arena of science and technology.
the international 

a vast scale
5. Research and development provides employment on 

for scientists and engineers, whose skills might otherwise be unused or
 
surplus.
 
is a major exporter 	of advanced technology products...
6. "The U.S. 

Over half of U.S. exports are involved in industries which have a high
 
' ' 
technology compenent.""	 This helps the balance of trade, and the
 
balance of payments.
 
7. 	The European technological gap is probably due in large part to
 
in scientific research and development.
its lag behind the U.S. 

8, Research and development and pure science are the seed, tech­
nology and growth are the harvest, for the sustenance of future generations.
 
9. Research and development in pursuit of defense-oriented goals
 
yields special side-benefits such as feeding commercial and technological
 
advances, and "colonizing" areas of basic and pure scientific research by
 
accelerating scientific activity in specialized areas.
 
*Economic Aspects of Research & Development are the subject of on­
going Hudson work by Dr. William Schneider, Jr.
 
"William J. Price and Lawrence W. Bass, "Scientific Research and the
 
Innovative Process," Science 164, 16 May 1969, p. 802.
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10. The defense community requires research and development to 'btain
 
and improve intelligence estimates, needed for example, for monitoring arms
 
control agreements.
 
11. Accomplishing the extraordinary makes the difficult easy. It
 
is much simpler to orbit a satellite, after developing the technology for
 
a lunar landing, rather than before. Similarly, for a Mars landing and
 
lunar landing.
 
12. Research, development, and technology actually improve personal,
 
national, and global communications and potentially improve interpersonal
 
exchange.
 
BRANCH POINTS
 
Within the context of the scenarios and alternate futures, we identify
 
"branch points" or possible crucial events we know would profoundly affect
 
those futures, even though we don't know precisely how those events would
 
come about. A branch point that would affect the entire society would be
 
a Vietnam debacle, which was described above. The branch point is a
 
question mark located in time, or a fork in the road of history.
 
We can roughly categorize branch points under three headings:
 
I. domestic
 
2. foreign
 
3. NASA
 
As shall be demonstrated, the importance of any branch point depends
 
upon the overall milieu in which the key event occurs. While we have
 
incorporated discussion of key branch points in the above futures and
 
scenarios, it is often useful to consider special cases of branch points
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separately. From a substantive standpoint, some cases may best be viewed
 
in detail if they are taken out of context of a particular scenario
 
designed to develop one or two key assumptions effectively. Overloading
 
From a methodological stand­a scenario may simply confuse the reader. 

point, no analyst can be expected to anticipate or understand the full
 
range of important events that can have a significant influence on a
 
particular period under study. Thus, we have abstracted the following
 
series of branch points to expand the framework in which major scenarios
 
are considered and to illustrate the importance of independent branch
 
points as a methodological device.
 
DOMESTIC BRANCH POINTS
 
Great Society Outcome
 
The "Great Society" social programs initiated in the mid-1960's
 
will eventually be judged to be successes or failures.
 
A negative Great Society outcome would give us a situation as
 
described in the Modestly Pessimistic Prognosis. The Modestly Pessimistic
 
Prognosis is very pessimistic for NASA. It could lead to the Middle
 
America Revolt described below. The society depicted greatly resembles
 
France before de Gaulle, with chronic disaffection on all sides. Obvi­
ously, a rejection of "square" values and hostility to the "military­
industrial complex" would hurt the space program. Funds might be cut,
 
or more likely not augmented and NASA could be seriously hurt. Morale
 
might be adversely affected, and there could be a perceptible decay in
 
the competence of administrators and scientists. Still, the nation
 
should be able to recruit enough good men to man NASA and other technical
 
agencies.
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Under such conditions the Agency would be well advised to undertake
 
only low-posture programs.
 
Depression
 
Another major event which would have massive impact on the entire
 
society, as well as NASA, would be a severe economic depression. Given
 
the values and expectations of our people, such an occurrence would likely
 
have an impact far greater than the Great Depression of 1930-39. At the
 
very least, there would be greIat direct government intervention in the
 
economy. At first glance, one would think that a depression would vastly
 
exaserbate the "priorities" issue, and might cripple or kill "luxury"
 
ventures such as NASA. However; the converse is more likely to be true.
 
The crutial characteristic of a severe depression is the spread of
 
unemployment beyond unskilled and semi-skilled workers to technicians
 
and professionals. Very likely there would be a demand to provide mean­
ingful work for all sorts of highly skilled workers. Under such circum­
stances, NASA would be an ideal agency to stimulate employment among
 
physical scientists, engineers, and technical workers--a sort of aerospace
 
''WPA'.
 
A more radical effect of widespread disaffection is described in the
 
following scenario:
 
The New Class
 
Humanist, hedonist, and anti-science values spread from the Humanist
 
Left and capture the youth of the Responsible Center and Intellectual Estate.
 
In the humanities and social sciences the college curriculum is "unstructured"
 
to the point of anarchy. The physical sciences and engineering departments
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try to resist the trend, only to learn that students resist the discipline
 
and organization necessary to master technological fields. Scientific
 
recruitment sources dry up.
 
no one rejects the material products of industrial
Needless to say, 

society, so the demand for technicians continues. Denied the university
 
a source, the great private and public organizations (including NASA)
as 

begin to expand their internal training facilities. Very soon they find
 
themselves operating full-fleged technical institutes. For human mate­
sons of Middle America. The curriculum is
rial, they resort to the 

A new breed comes to man America's technical and
strictly vocational. 

industrial apparatus. The new men greatly resemble the "new Soviet man"
 
of the 1930's. He is technically competent, aggressive, loyal, and
 
Faced with the sneers of the upper-class youth,
indifferent to culture. 

the new men become hostile to the values of the established elites. They
 
are arrogantly populist, nationalist, philistine, and class-conscious.
 
The new men displace aging establishment types, and take over
 
leadership of the industrial complex. They view themselves as the
 
creators of national wealth and fail to see why they should share that
 
wealth with the degenerate college graduates who fill sinecures in the
 
universities, the social welfare bureaucracies, and other non-productive
 
cause with their kins­organizations. The new men make common political 

men, Middle America, against the old elite groups. The new men come to
 
power. National resources are redirected toward production, technology,
 
and the physical sciences. NASA prospers. High prestige, high cost
 
programs go forward.
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New Liberalism
 
A reasonably successful outcome of the Great Society programs leads
 
to a liberal revival, generally along the lines suggested by the Modestly
 
Optimistic Prognosis. The impact on the space program would largely
 
depend on whether the New Liberalism ismore influenced by the cool,
 
rational style of the Academic or the hot, turned-on values of the
 
Humanist Left.
 
A New Liberalism along rationalist lines would lead America in the
 
direction of the welfare state of the European social democracies.
 
Social programs would proliferate, and the governing liberals would have
 
little sympathy for "irrational" goals such as glory, prestige, enter­
tainment. They would also be hostile to the "military-industrial complex,"
 
especially the aerospace industry. Massive government social welfare
 
programs would leave little money for space adventures. Space exploration
 
proqrams would be scrubbed. Other manned programs would -be funded
 
just sufficiently to keep them barely alive. Military programs would be
 
throttled. Emphasis would be on unmanned scientific programs in support
 
of "down-to-earth" objectives. The space budget would be cut to less
 
than a billion dollars per annum. NASA officials would talk in terms of
 
"America's contribution to the international space effort." The Russians
 
would land on Mars, but parity being considered desirable, this would
 
be accepted as compensation for the U.S. moon landing, and no one would
 
be bothered.
 
The Transfiguration of NASA
 
An alternate outcome is that NASA successfully adapts to the new po­
litical milieu. As the country moves toward secular humanist values,
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NASA places more and more emphasis on its down-to-earth programs, stressing
 
direct practical-benefits to mankind. Nevertheless, a major national
 
debate occurs over the issue of the manned space program.. Since it is clear
 
that the manned program will be scrapped in any-event, the Agency decides
 
to quit without a fight, offering to use its expertise to the advantage
 
of all mankind by presenting a comprehensive program for the application
 
of science and technology to the world-wide material problems of man.
 
NASA continues its aeronautical. and near-space activities, but only when
 
such programs can be justified on a cost-effectiveness basis compared with
 
non-space means. The Agency and its contractors address themselves to
 
problems of land transportation, power generation, environmental pollu-

NASA becomes the National Applied Sciences Administration and
tion, etc. 

is magnificently funded by an enthusiastic Congress and Nation.
 
Tomorrow, the Stars
 
An alternate New Liberalism might see a substantial increase in the
 
life styles now associated with the Humanist Left, as suggested in the
 
following scenario:
 
The drift toward secular humanist values continues, but there is 
a
 
shift from the improvement of necessities toward improving the quality of
 
The sporting values of Middle America are assimilated to the con­life. 

cept of the gentleman-adventurer. NASA stimulates the trend by recruit-

Social programs
ing younger, flashier astronauts--Joe Namath in space. 

have been successful in alleviating most poverty and integrating minority
 
groups. With its complaints blunted, the humanist left becomes irrele­
itwithers away, but not before transferring some of its vigor to
vant. 

the Intellectual Estate.
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U.S ,ZU.S.S.R.relations improve. As
-.  a gesture toward disarmament
 
both countries agree to divert a certain percentage of military spending
 
to peaceful space.ventures. Russia. remains a formidable adversary in
 
space. NASA's budget creeps up to ten billion dollars per annum.
 
Although a crew is lost, public mourning takes the form of a renewed
 
dedication to the conquest of space. By 1990, the astronauts include
 
a married couple who set up housekeeping, for a time, at the lunar base;
 
but-it is.not until 2009 that a human child is born on the moon.
 
Middle America Revolt
 
A plausible result of a Vietnam debacle, a failure of the Great
 
Society, or a depression might be a populist revolt, which could develop
 
like this:
 
Repeated government failures have thoroughly discredited the estab­
lishment. Left and right opposition gets out of hand. Society becomes
 
polarized. "The center cannot hold." Public violence becomes endemic.
 
Terrorism spreads. Paramilitary organizations. Vigilantes. A populist
 
President comes to power supported by Middle America and frightened ele­
ments of the responsible center. He is elected on a platform of nationalism,
 
law-and-order, and the end of social engineering. The Administration
 
institutes an aggressive foreign policy, repression of the left-wing,
 
and savage cuts in spending for social programs. The economy falters.,
 
Looking for a public works program that will stimulate the economy, yet
 
not offend his populist constituency, and also seeking a positive program
 
that will divert, unify, and glorify the nation, the President concludes
 
that only the space program is big enough and ambitious enough.
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The new space program has purely populist and nationalist objectives.
 
No words are wasted about international cooperation and scientific 
advance.
 
The program is blatantly directed toward American prestige and 
national
 
The moon is claimed by
defense. The Mars project goes into high gear. 
the U.S. Manned, armed satellites are put into orbit. The Russians 
counter. Skirmishing in outer space. The space program becomes 
predomi-
Believing the civilian leadership of NASA to be insuf­nantly military. 

ficiently aggressive and military minded, the President places the 
entire
 
space program under the command of the U.S. Air Force.
 
A variant could be a "Jeffersonian" administration dedicated to
 
This would eliminate the
 limited government and to fiscal parsimony. 

manned space program.
 
A Re-Establishment
 
a

Also conceivable is that the populist revolt would fail and 

described in the alternate
Responsible Center Revival would develop as 

The establishment would be re-established with restored morale
futures. 

and power, assume a resurgence of establishment values of organization,
 
power and prestige, together with a general acceptance (or toleration)
 
of vast national projects. Since an establishmentarian revival would
 
it is unlikely to be in­be based upon traditional American virtues, 

The government would be manned by technicians (in the broad
novative. 

An ambitious

sense) who would be sympjathetic to the space program. 

a symbol of national unity and
Mars expedition would be exploited as 

achievement, very much like the political exploitation of the moon shot.
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FOREIGN BRANCH POINTS
 
Vietnam Outcome
 
The outcome of the Vietnam war is such an important branch point that
 
it was described in considerable detail above. A favorable outcome-con­
ceivably might favor NASA by alleviating the pressure for federal funds,
 
but so many-political debts have been left unpaid pending the end of the
 
war, that the scramble for money is more likely to get worse.
 
A Vietnam debacle is a most dangerous prognosis for NASA, as well as
 
for the nation at large. A near-revolutionary situation could develop.,
 
An enfeebled establishment government could only survive by making repeated
 
concessions to opposition pressure. Any program which wasn't absolutely
 
necessary for the establishment to retain power would be expendable. NASA
 
might be among such programs. In such a political environment, a Middle
 
American revolt 'isa distinct possibility.
 
Soviet Challenge
 
The space policies of the Soviet Union are the great imponderable
 
to NASA. American space policy 1958-69 was in great measure a direct
 
response to Russian Sputnik successes. Assuming there is no significant
 
alleviation of the more general U.S.-U.S.S.R. rivalry, further U.S.
 
responses to U.S.S.R. challenges may be expected (and vice versa). Three
 
alternates are available: (1) continued Soviet challenge, (2) heightened
 
Soviet challenge, (3) reduced Soviet challenge.
 
NASA has excellent historical precedents from which to estimate
 
heightened and continued Soviet challenges. We know that the U.S. space
 
program was ignited by a heightened challenge (Sputnik) and promoted by
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a continued challenge (the race for the moon). The possible effects of
 
a reduced challenge remain conjectural. In the following scenario we
 
follow this path, and describe a possible NASA response.
 
Machiavelli in Space
 
The international cooperation values of the Intellectual Estate and Humanist
 
Left become stronger and have more impact on the Responsible Center. But
 
Middle America is untouched by this trend, remaining fiercely nationalist.
 
The space race goes on with success after American success. The Russians
 
appear to be falling hopelessly behind, and rumors circulate in Eastern
 
European capitals that the Kremlin is contemplating abandoning their space
 
program to prevent further humiliation.
 
Space administration leaders, recognizing that a Soviet default
 
would eliminate the competitive and nationalist objectives of the space
 
program and therefore imperil its very existence, declare a new policy
 
of international cooperation in space. The cooperation policy consists
 
of feeding information to the Russians, permitting them to skip over
 
several necessary mobilization programs and achieve a series of space
 
spectacul ars.
 
Public outcry. The "space gap" issue is revived. A new adminis­
tration comes to power with a space superiority plank in its platform.
 
The NASA Administrator is designated the scapegoat and discharged. The
 
American space program forges ahead. Cooperation with the Russians con­
tinues surreptitiously. In the meantime, the Intellectual Estate has
 
been temporarily placated.
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Departing from Precedent
 
While heightened Soviet challenges in the past have spurred the
 
space program, past precedents might not necessarily prevail in the
 
future. At least two conditions might prompt a new U.S. response:
 
1. A new era of detente, reflected in strategic arms limitations
 
and settlements in the Middle East and Central Europe;
 
2. 	In response to external events and in extension of existing
 
domestic trends, the values of the Intellectual Estate and
 
Humanist Left achieve increasing influence on the Responsible
 
Center and on Middle America.
 
Under such conditions, unless a new Soviet space achievement was
 
unmistakably one of primarily military value, the Intellectual Estate would
 
not view it as cause for more vigorous American efforts to catch up.
 
Rather, the Intellectual Estate would favor a response that was
 
magnanimous, charitable, understanding, stoic ("we could have done it,
 
but chose not to bother"), patronizing, consciously abnegating,.and
 
eschewing vulgarity. It might hail the Soviet actions as an advance for
 
all mankind and as evidence that increased international cooperation
 
would advance world-wide interests more quickly, more efficiently and
 
more cheaply--since nationalistic duplication would presumably be reduced.
 
Basically, the Intellectual Estate would not view the Soviet success
 
in nationalistic or military terms. Middle America would be annoyed and
 
disappointed at an American failure and irritated at those responsible
 
for it. But it would not view the Soviet advances as a catastrophe. The
 
Responsible Center would be amenable to a two- to five-year moratorium
 
on space efforts specifically reactive to Soviet advances.
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The original drama and dynamics of our space effort came in the wake
 
of the sputnik shot. It was universally held by an overwhelming majority
 
of Americans and, indeed, of the entire world that the United States had
 
suffered a grievous political and scientific defeat, a loss of prestige
 
and "face". It was a correct impression. The U.S. decision to go t6 the
 
the elements and intention of
moon within the decade of the '60's had all 

introducing a fierce competition between two highly and equally endowed
 
opponents. This competition may very well disappear in the 1970's and
 
substantial public interest and support for space activities may slacken.
 
Among the arguments against a recurrence of direct United States-

Soviet competition in the decade of the '70's are the following:
 
(a) Despite the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, a state of de­
tente seems likely to characterize bilateral relations between
 
United States and the Soviet Union for the foreseeable future.
 
(b) European security questions as advanced currently by the Soviet
 
Union and East European powers have attracted some interest in
 
Western Europe and although a relatively major irritant in bi­
lateral U.S. Soviet relations, they do not seem to be destined
 
to seriously affect these relations.
 
(c) Detente will probably be reinforced by a resolution of the Viet­
nam War during the '70's.
 
(d) Barring absolute intransigence on either side--which admittedly
 
is a possibility--the SALT talks may very well achieve substan­
tial results in the next decade. There are already agreements
 
limiting the use of outer space for military purposes, although
 
the superpowers are prepared to tolerate the use of outer space
 
for reconnaissance purposes.
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(e) The United States is clearly leading the-space competitidn.
 
It stated its purpose, it stated its program, it declared
 
the stages of implementation and it reached,the moon, ahead,
 
indeed far ahead, of the Soviet Union. The victory in the Moon race
 
was clear-cut. It removed the drama from the competition.
 
(f) Thus, it would seem that as far as outer-space is concerned,
 
this sort of "potlatch" relationship between the-Soviet Union
 
and the United States will no longer be characteristic. On the
 
contrary, there may be in the next five years and certainly
 
toward the end of this decade, barring unpleasant surprises,
 
some significant collaboration between. the two powers as regards
 
a scientifically desirable objective in space. The recent ex­
change of astronauts is merely indicative of the general trend
 
Japanese or Nth Power Challenges
 
Here we try to anticipate the effects of a space challenge to the
 
U.S. by some power other than the U.S.S.R. As far as one can now judge,
 
on the basis of current capabilities in relevant fields, within the next
 
fifteen years only the following nations are likely to have significant
 
space capabilities:
 
(1) Japan
 
(2) Communist China
 
(3) France
 
(4) Britain
 
(5) West Germany
 
(6) Some combination of any of the above with each other
 
and/or lesser powers
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At the time of writing, we believe that Japan is the nation most likely
 
to make a serious space effort. The Japanese are achieving and seem likely
 
to continue an extraordinary rate of economic growth, which might bring
 
them a GNP almost equal to that of the U.S. by 1985. This seems to be the
 
Japan wishes to succeed in
result of an intense sense of national purpose. 

its own eyes and in the eyes of the world. How might this affect NASA?
 
Having attained economic domination of the Pacific and Indian Ocean
 
areas, and having achieved a large number of scientific and technological
 
triumphs as evidenced by many Nobel and other prize winners and commercial
 
penetration of significant industrial markets with superior, highly sophis­
ticated devices of all types, by 1985 the Japanese seek new fields to conque
 
The Japanese go for space. They begin with a large program of earth re­
sources investigation to help exploit their economic domination of the
 
East, and move inevitably toward a manned program.
 
The American reaction would depend on the road taken from one of the
 
domestic branch points considered above. Assuming that the Middle America
 
revolt fails to materialize or fizzles, perhaps because the Great Society
 
programs are a reasonable success, then during the first phase of our pro­
posed Japanese space effort--the earth resources program--critics of the
 
NASA manned program can say, "While we are playing games in space, the
 
Japanese are using space for really beneficial purposes." Under the con­
ditions assumed, this might be just enough to kill the American manned
 
space program. When the Japanese go on the manned program, America is
 
unprepared to compete. Japanese space victories, together with their
 
other national achievements, lead the Japanese, the world, and even the
 
as the number
Americans to believe that Japan has truly replaced the U.S. 

one power.
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A variant scenario would presume that a lower Middie Amneri,' revolt
 
is dormant or under way. 
Japanese triumphs and assertions , independdnce
 
have exasperated many Americans, particularly those thro't out of work by
 
real or imagined Japanese competition, which is bla-ri increasfngly for
 
all forms of technological unemployment. Anti-Jranese remarks are wide­
spread. The national government, seeking to j event this sentiment from
 
getting out of hand, promotes the manned spn.e program. Thus the Japanese-

American rivalry is diverted from economic and potentially military grounds
 
to the harmless arena of space.
 
However, a challenge need not iecessarily bring about a conflict;
 
frequently a challenge can create opportunities for cooperation. In
 
the following two extended scenarios" the interrelationships between'
 
domestic and foreign events and U.S.-Japanese cooperation are explored
 
in depth.
 
U.S.-Japanese Manned Flight to Mars
 
Along the lines of a more or less "surprise-free", moderately optimistic
 
projection, the international climate has remained relatively peaceful; some
 
areas of friction such as the war in Vietnam, have cooled off, some areas
 
remain tense--notably the Near East--but major outbreaks of military
 
conflicts have been averted. There is a continued decrease in East-West
 
tension in Europe--partly as a result of German-Soviet settlement of the
 
Berlin question; as East-West trade in Europe has picked up, 
so issues relating
 
to NATO and European defense have lost their urgency. Soviet satellites,
 
while restive, have benefited from this European detente economically,
 
and while they have been largely unsuccessful in emancipating themselves
 
*By Ivan Schidloff
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from Soviet domination--especially in the area of foreign policy--their
 
internal-political situation has become at least tolerable, along the
 
Sino-Soviet settlement, but
 current Hungarian model. There has been no 

neither has the conflict intensified. China has stepped up its hostile
 
propaganda vis-a-vis Japan, but has Made no serious threatening moves.
 
Japan, after a long and hotly contested internal debate, has
 
decided to postpone entry into the nuclear defense club while substantially
 
bolstering its conventional forces. U.S. defense commitments in Asia as
 
well as 
in Europe have decreased. Some bases in Japan have been closed
 
As
down, and the U.S. NATO contingent has been further reduced in size. 

a result of continued inflationary and protectionist trends in the U.S.,
 
Japan has diversified its foreign trade, mainly by massively increasing
 
its European trade, and, to a lesser degree, trade with Communist countries.
 
But the Japanese clearly understand that their increasing economic role in
 
S.E. Asia is bound to run into Chinese opposition. Japan realizes, too,
 
that the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee on which it must
 
-continue to rely can only be maintained in a climate of continued, and
 
highly visible, good relations with the U.S.
 
The SALT teams have
On the U.S.-U.S.S.R. front, the detente continues. 

come to an "agreement in principle" on the limitation of ABM deployment.
 
Having achieved what is perceived as parity with the U.S. in strategic
 
capability, the Soviet Union's strategic build-up has slowed down
 
to upgrade its nuclear
noticeably, while the U.S. has made no major moves 

There exists a de facto state of strategic freeze, though
striking force. 

it is very difficult to formulate specific agreements that would convert
 
Difficulties with its
the freeze into an international treaty obligati.on. 
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Arab cjients have also made the S.U. more cautious in the Mediterranean,
 
and less expansionist elsewhere. Europe, in the face of continuing
 
detente, is more interested in solving Common Market problems that have
 
arisen,as a result of Britain's (and the Outer Seven's) entry into the
 
club. in short, Europe enjoys its prosperity, and rests content with
 
"tending her garden." The Concorde has entered trans-Atlantic service,
 
but proves an economic failure. As a result, the Europeans have become
 
wary of such prestige-oriented ventures, and are content in expanding and
 
upgrading more practical areas of their technology; unlike the Japanese,
 
who are now beginning to thirst for some prestigious -technological feat
 
to crown a half-decade of continued rapid economic growth and to
 
demonstrate to the world that they have clearly become the world's "Number
 
Three" nation. Increasingly, a space feat appears more and more attractive
 
to them, especially since it would allow them, by implication, to
 
demonstrate their ability to deter any-future Chinese threat. As the,
 
world has become blase about unmanned satellites and space probes of all
 
kinds, and as some dormant remnants of the Samurai tradition have again
 
been stirred, the Japanese are more interested in P manned space program.
 
But they realize that they would have to start from scratch, and the-cost
 
of a manned space program that. would have a real impact appears to them
 
prohibitive. Having created their own NASA, they are now both in search
 
of a mission as well as of some means that would allow them to rapidly
 
expand their space capability.
 
With the gradual becalming of the war in Vietnam and the general
 
decrease in international tension, the U.S. turns increasingly inward.
 
The Vietnamization program.having been largely successful, there is
no
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rankling sense of defeat, and with the decline in protests and student
 
unrest, the so-called social issues have lost some of their edge. While
 
many of the "Great Society" programs have proved, by most measurable
 
criteria, to have been successful, a slowed-down rate of economic growth,
 
combined with a continued high rate of unemployment and inflation have
 
created a climate of caution and disillusionment wi-th the national
 
in the mind of most
government. The priorities issue remains central 

Americans, and there is little inclination to embark on any high-risk
 
venture, be it foreign or domestic, civilian or military. Protectionist
 
tendencies have gained ascendancy, with resultant bad blood both vis-a-vis 
Japan and Europe. Attitudes toward science and technology, while not 
out and out hostile, are marked by a "withdrawal of affect" from both 
technology and, to a lesser extent, the entrepreneurial system in general. 
By 1975, there has been a decline in foreign trade, which is now ­
recognized as one of the major causes of the general slow-down in the
 
economy. Two Republican administrations have defused many divisive
 
issues, but the country stands in great need of a lift in morale. The
 
Soviet Union having adopted a low posture, there are few cold war issues
 
of sufficient importance to arouse the population's anxiety or idealism.
 
An unmanned Soviet'probe to Mars creates a minimum of stir. Even the
 
launching of a Soviet orbital manned space-platform has been greeted with a
 
calm verging on indifference. its military implications are discounted,
 
and the high vulnerability of such a system in the event of war--even with
 
existing ABM systems--keeps a competitive U.S. response grounded. 1975 is
 
marked by a liberal revival of modest proportions, with a major emphasis
 
on getting the economy into high gear. Democrats fully exploit issues
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connected with the chronic mild recession, an.d-are careful to avoid- all
 
issues which would make them vulnerable-to the.charge of being the "war
 
party". Gradually,. many of the fears associated with polluting the
 
environment have been assuaged, and modern -technology is~no'longer seen~as
 
the-villain it was thought to be,at the beginning of-the decade. Foreign
 
SSTs are in regular service and have proven the SST to be, 'just another
 
airplane," only faster. This has somewhat discredited ant.i-technologists.
 
The hew Democratic administration is most anxious to reverse the protec­
tionist tendencies, preferring to see America concentrate on, hightechnology
 
input industries and on agriculture, areas in which America still retains
 
a commanding lead. .
 
R&D funds become more-freely available,.including funding for certain
 
NASA activities associated with earth applications, as well as for the.
 
space shuttle. But, after the successful, completion of the Apollo program-­
successful in the sense that the missions have gone as planned, without
 
startling surprises but also without.catastrophies--there appears little
 
support for the continuation of the manned space program. The latest Soviet
 
space.probe to Mars has telemetered some interesting bits of evidence
 
suggesting the presence of some life-forms, but the evidence is inconclusive,
 
though tantalizing. There is a lively:debate in the scientific community
 
about thes findings, and there is general agreement that nothing short of
 
a manned expedition to Mars could settle many of the outstanding issues.
 
But when a price-tag is put on the undertaking--of the order of 60 to
 
100 billion dollars--the issue of priorities invariably makes the Mars
 
expedition take the back seat. Everybody is aware of the waste involved
 
in having to abandon the Apollo capability, but it becomes extremely
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difficult to justify expenditures of the order of 10 billion dollars 

year over at least a decade to continue the manned program. At this point,
 
the Japanese become very interested. Informal feelers are put out to
 
ascertain whether the U.S. would be prepared to consider a joint venture
 
funded on a I to I basis. The new U.S. President orders the creation of
 
a standing committee for a manned journey to Mars, and the Japanese
 
A joint
quickly present a formal proposal offering to foot half the bill. 

Task Force Mars is created, with all of NASA's manned space program
 
assigned to it, and endowed with sufficient R&D funds to explore the
 
technical and financial requirements of a Mars landing.
 
The President invites other European nations to join in, provided they
 
are willing, jointly or singly, to finance one-third of the program. The
 
European governments, while interested, are not prepared to make a
 
financial sacrifice of that order of magnitude. But Japanese eagerness to
 
participate makes it easier to justify a Mars landing in Congress, even
 
though U.S. prestige would be diluted by Japanese participation. Anti­
protectionist forces are rallied to the issue, as the Japanese make it
 
clear that they would be willing to make many concessions to U.S. business
 
interests in Japan in order to get the program underway. Besides, in the
 
initial stages, the Japanese seem quite willing to take a back seat to
 
the Americans, recognizing superior U.S. capabilities and technical know­
how in space travel. By 1976, the Japanese Diet votes an initial appropria­
tion of 3 billion dollars earmarked for Task Force Mars. The program goes
 
into high gear, with a target date set for the late 1980's. By 1976,
 
Japanese ground crews and astronauts train alongside their U.S. counter­
parts. The Japanese suggest many ingenious improvements in the life
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systems, communications, and other hardware, and soon become near-eqdal
 
partners on the Task Force. 
Spurred by continued Japanese enthusiasm
 
and support,, the Mars program becomes a high-morale cooperative program,
 
with elements of healthybut friendly rivalry. In 1984, the first mixed
 
crew circumnavigates Mars, and returns safely to Earth. 
Mars 4 finally
 
achieves a safe landing on Mars, but on the return trip, 
a meteorite
 
shower punctures the space-craft, and the entire crew is lost. The
 
fact that there were two Japanese and two Americans on the expedition,
 
far from spelling the end of the program, gives it new impetus, and the
 
next crew makes the round-trip safely and, after having staged a­
spectacular TV space-cast, they bring many valuable samples of Mars
 
dust back to Earth. The Japanese-American program is hailed as a model
 
of friendly Jnternational cooperation, and the program iswidely supported
 
to the conclusion of the planned series. The surface of Mars having been
 
found to be less hostile than- the Moon's, a permanent manned Mars base is
 
being considered. 
A study group is created to explore the possibility of
 
further manned exploration of the solar system.
 
In the above scenario, we have made what might be called a "best
 
possible case" for international cooperation in space within the limits
 
of plausibility. The scenario attempts, in the main, 
to provide an answer
 
to the question "What can we do in space jointly, that we might not under­
take singly?" 
 It might be of interest to note that a space catastrophe on a
 
joint project with mixed crews (so as to avoid recriminations of the sort
 
"whose integrated circuit failed and killed our boys?") might not necessarily
 
be fatal to the continuation of the program, whereas it is generally assumed
 
that a similar catastrophe, should it occur in the Apollo series, would
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almost certainly result in a cancellation of further manned space missions.
 
We have also assumed that the dilution of U.S. prestige by the inclusion of
 
Japan would not automatically undermine the support of Middle Americans, who
 
are generally described as favoring unilateral, self-reliant action, and
 
suspicious of foreign participation in programs that have real, or fancied,
 
But it should be noted that while the scenario is a
millitary significance. 

cooperative one, an element of rivalry is introduced so that a U.S. with­
drawal from the program wouid involve a considerable "loss of face," A
 
further conclusion might be drawn, namely, that whatever the merits of
 
-the continuation of a manned program might be, its clear advantage lies in
 
making a more dramatic and less flexible commitment which, once it is made,
 
does not allow for too much "shrinkage." In the following short scenarios,
 
we wi-ll examine some less ambitious-'and therefore perhaps more probable-­
space partnerships, based on essenti-ally identical assumptions concerning
 
the international, and domestic projections (with some changes in empahsis,
 
as noted below).
 
A Joint U.S.-Japanese-European Space-Station
 
The international and domestic context is essentially similar to
 
the one described in the previous scenario, with the exception that our
 
relations with the Soviet Union grow somewhat more tense than previously
 
described. SALT is still ongoing, but no tangible progress is being made.
 
Every proposal by one side is rejected, and is followed by an equally
 
unacceptable counter-proposal. While the Soviet Union continues to adopt
 
a low posture toward Europe in particular, and to some extent in the Near
 
East, her strategic build-up continues, especially in the area of Yankee­
class ballistic submarines and a new class of very modern hunter-killer
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subs. The US-SU submarine fleets are playing cat-and-mouse games
 
across the seven seas, but as 
there have been no reportable incidents of
 
any consequence, defense-hostile Congressmen are under no great pressure
 
to authorize substantial increases in the strategic budget. But increased
 
R&D funds are available in the strategic field, including the authorization
 
of two B-I bomber prototypes and the continuation of the MIRVing program
 
of the Minuteman 3-Poseidon type. By 1975, the Soviet Union remains
 
active in space. 
Toward the end of the-year, they begin assembling a man­
ned space station in earth orbit, ostensibly for purely peaceful,
 
scientific research purposes, but 
in the minds of many U.S. experts there ar
 
some clear possibilities of military applications. As there has been a
 
slowdown in ABM advanced research and testing, and no deployment of an
 
operational ABM system, the public--and Congress-become sehsitized to
 
potential threats from orbital satellites in general. Accordingly, when
 
the new President takes office in 1976, he is
more receptive to •NASA
 
proposals for both a U.S. space platform and a shuttle. 
The objection of
 
defense-hostile members of Congress is stilled when the Presidentsuggests
 
that the U.S. space platform be made available to our European allies and
 
to Japan, provided they are willing to foot the bill for space shuttle
 
launches carrying their crews and/or payloads to the platform for such
 
scientific experiments as they would wish to carry out.
 
The Japanese, eager to upgrade their space-capabilities, are quick
 
to authorize and to fund a series of space experiments designed to train
 
their own space-crews, as well as 
for a variety of earth applications.
 
The Europeans, reluctant at first, soon realize that they too wish to
 
strengthen in
some highly visible way their friendly ties with the U.S.,
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even at the cost of arousing a measure of Soviet antagonism Now that
 
Britain is getting more thoroughly integrated into the Common Market, some
 
of the problems that formerly stood in the way of any project involving
 
joint financing and organization have been removed, A European Space
 
Authority is created, and the Europeans agree on a joint series of
 
experiments they wish to carry out in space taking advantage of the U.S.
 
offer. Thus in the late seventies, despite some delays in getting the
 
U.S. shuttle to meet its design specifications, an effective working
 
partnership.has been forged and the schedule of space experiments and
 
missions assigned to the shuttle and the space platform assures a high
 
rate of utilization--at an acdeptable cost to the U.S. The Japanese not only
 
stick to their commitments, but when the Europeans are slow in raising the
 
funds for the launches to which they had committed themselved in principle,
 
the Japanese offer to take up the slack. Not wishing to take the back
 
seat to the Japanese, the European nations promptly resolve their
 
differences and eventually meet their obligations on schedule. Thus the
 
foundations are laid for continued allied cooperation in space, and future,
 
more ambitious joint space missions are in the planning stage. By 1980,
 
even though NASA's funding continues at a relatively low level of 4-5
 
billion dollars per annum, NASA is able, with the help of U.S. allies, to
 
carry out a fairly ambitious space program, with additional uses being found
 
for the space shuttle. As Soviet attitudes have taken a distinctly
 
unfriendly cast toward European participation in particular, the Germans
 
prevail on the U.S. and their other space partners to exchange medical
 
and selected scientific space data with the U.S.S.R. This puts the
 
Russians on the spot. They must either agree to -ooperate, or by refusing,
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underscore the essentially military nature of their own space program.
 
Our second scenario poses a distinctly more hostile international
 
climate. In such circumstances, it might be argued, cooperation with
 
other nations in space undertakings, especially with further dilution
 
of U.S. prestige by the inclusion of a greater number of nations, might­
arouse greater antagonism toward NASA from middle Americans and defense­
friendly legislators. On the other hand, if the defense-hostile (and
 
priorities-conscious) Congressmen are faced with a purely national space
 
shuttle-cum platform proposal with hidden military implications, they
 
might effectively veto any expansion of the U.S. space program bn the
 
grounds that if the Soviet space challenge is perceived as being
 
essentially military in nature, then this should be made explicit, and
 
if substantiated, then the proper response would be an overt military
 
one, not a covert.one channeled through NASA. From the standpoint of
 
U.S. interests, the form of international space cooperation outlined in
 
the scenario would have several advantages: the same reversal of
 
protectionish tendencies as in the Japanese scenario, but extending to
 
Europe as well. the visible consolidation of alliances without the
 
necessity of revitilizing NATO by increasing U.S. contingents stationed
 
on the Continent. And last but not least, the opportunity of increasing
 
U.S. space capabilities at relatively low levels of funding, thus finessing
 
the priorities issue. For the Japanese, the advantages would be essentially
 
the same, but less apparent, than in the previous scenario, but their
 
share of the financial burden would be proportionately less. Thus they
 
might still feel that they are getting a bargain. And the Europeans might
 
find that the slight risk of increasing Soviet antagonism might be worth
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taking, as they might feel decreasing confidence that the continued Soviet
 
strategic build-up might not eventually throw the European detente into
 
Moreover, it would allow the Europeans to keep abreast of
 reverse. 

modern technologies, and to blur the distinction between powers and super-

We have not stressed space
powers (especially vis-a-vis Japan). 

as

serendipities, the merits of science-per se, or earth applications, 

are not absolutely essential
these constitute in this case a bonus, and 

to the unfolding of the scenario as outlined. Last, we would like to point
 
out that the inter-allied space cooperation would not necessarily stand
 
in the way of detente with the U.S.S.R., and might, under certain
 
circumstances, even facilitate it (if the Soviet Union,decides to accede
 
to the proposal of information exchange).
 
NASA BRANCH POINTS
 
So far we have concentrated our attention on-the influence of
 
outside forces on NASA, because we see very few opportunities for NASA
 
itself to have a direct influence on its own future, as opposed to reacting
 
We see only two events that could
intelligently to outside influences. 

occur within NASA itself which could have a decisive effect on NASA's
 
own future.
 
Space Catastrophe
 
a heightened sense of
A corollary of the secular humanist values is 

the value of human life. In contrast to romanticism, which extolled courage,
 
other standards have
sacrifice, le beau geste, it is held that since all 

Since life
been demolished, the maintenance of life is all that counts. 

is worth the risk of life. In recent
is the ultimate standard, no goal 

HI-1272/3-RR 5-67
 
years, this value has spread throughout society. Witness, the anti­
smoking crusade, anti-fireworks legislation, the auto safety.campaign,
 
and the anti-capital punishment agitation. Increasingly it is believed
 
that society has the duty to protect the individual by prohibiting
 
activities in which he might harm himself.
 
Let us assume a long-term expansion of this life-preserving value
 
until some time in the distant future when the U.S. launches a new and
 
risky manned mission. The expedition has been dispatched despite wide­
spread expectations of disaster. The landing is unsuccessful. The space­
craft is damaged and cannot take off again. Communications are intact and
 
mission control is in contact with the astronauts. They go about their
 
business intending to perform their duties as long as their oxygen lasts.
 
NASA high command, realizing the adverse effects on the public of this
 
long-drawn-out farewell, has "technical difficulties" in making the
 
astronauts' transmissions available to the media. But a British receiving
 
station, controlled by persons hostile to the manned space program, picks
 
up the interplanetary transmissions and makes them available to the TV
 
audience (ironically, via communications satellite). The whole world
 
watches and listens in horror as the astronauts prepare for the end. In
 
a fit of understandable pique, one of the crew complains bitterly about
 
the quality of the equipment and preparations for the expedition. After
 
farewells to their families, their oxygen exhausted, the astronauts don
 
their spacesuits and go out to die on the extra-tavestrial surface.
 
A wave of revulsion sweeps the world. Outcry in the media. Astro­
nauts' widows weeping at the White House. Congressional investigations.
 
Rumors of impending impeachments of NASA officials. The President appears
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on television to announce the abolition of the manned space program and
 
the breakup of NASA with the assignment of its residual functions to
 
other agencies.
 
The Unanswered Question
 
Space advocates have long maintained that we don't know what
 
The most favorable
potential opportunities are available in space. 

circumstance would be for NASA to discover something in space that would
 
raise some basic and fascinating question that only further space exploration
 
could answer. The most striking example would be for the last Apollo
 
artifact or some other suggestion of extra-terrestrial
expedition to find an 

a find would arouse the public to great
life on the moon. Obviously, such 

interest in space exploration.
 
The scientific community or some segment of it could be similarly
 
stimulated by the discovery of some pehnomenon that would suggest that
 
a commonly accepted "universal" law of science is earth limited.
 
Clearly, NASA cannot count on opening an unanswered question.
 
However, it must be recognized that the possibilities of an unexpected
 
windfall have been basic to the ideology of the space program. The
 
Agency should be prepared to exploit such an opportunity if it arises.
 
SUMMARY OF ALTERNATE FUTURES AND IMPORTANT SCENARIOS
 
The table following illustrates a summary of how we believe the relative
 
importance of space objectives would be affected under selected future
 
conditions, by comparing alternate futures and important outcomes of
 
branch points with the current NASA situation. Needless to say, our
 
Most of the table is self explanatory;
evaluation is purely subjective. 
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however, a few comments might be made; 'inthe neutral and pessimistic'
 
prognoses, we believe that a slackening of public moral and morality
 
would generally devalue most space objectives, except those toward the
 
bottom of the table which are somewhat self-seeking. To some extent
 
under the neutral prognosis and to a large extent under the pessimistic
 
prognosis we see somewhat of a falling off of public morality, and
 
therefore, more cynical approach to space goals.
 
Under conditions of successful Middle-American revolt against the
 
establishment we believe that it is reasonable to assume that Middle-

American values on space objectives would be more favorably received 'by
 
the society as a whole. A successful liberal revival, on the other hand,
 
would more reflect the values of the Intellectual Estate. A cold war revival,
 
of course, would lead to a increased valuation of the competitive aspects
 
of the U.S. space program relative to the Soviet Union, and a commensurate
 
devaluation of other objectives. But the objectives are not mutually
 
exclusive, we must always be conscious of dialectal effects--for example,
 
a heightened cold war would also lead society to more value international
 
cooperation, if ohly to gain allies, as well as an increased sense of the
 
need for a moral equivalent to war. This cautions us to be subtle in
 
our analysis of the effects of future events upon the values of society.
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RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF SPACE OBJECTIVES IN
 
SELECTED ALTERNATE FUTURES
 
UW 
I 0 > 
0 0 0 L > 
0 0 0) + 
A 1. Achievement per se2. Meeting commitment per se 0 - - + 0 
B 3. Man's conquest of space4. International cooperation 
5. Moral equivalent of war 
+0 
++ 
0 
-
0 
-
0 
-­
-
++ 
++ 
+ 
+ 
C 6. increasing U.S. prestige 0 - ++ + 
7. Succeeding in US-SU prestige 
competition 
8. Succeedinq in US-SU militarycompetition 
0 
0 
-- +-
++ 
++ 
4 
9. Succeeding in SU economicand geographic competition 0 -
0. Satisfying curiosity 
51.Scientific advance 
12. Technological advance 
+ 
++ 
+ 0 
0 
-
-- + 
++ 
0 
+ 
0 
+ 
+ 
E 13. Mobilization base for achieving
other items + 0 + 
F 14. 
15. 
Potential economic benefits 
from space technology 
Short-term economic benefits 
from stimulation of national 
economy 0 + + 
++ 
++ 0 
G 
H 
16. Entertainment of public 
17. Redirecting attention of society 
18. Advancing personal careers 
19. Advancing organizational 
interests 
20. Maintainsng funding 
-
0 
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
--
++ 
++ 
++ 
--
+ 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
-
-­
++ 
++ much more strongly supported than today
 
+ more strongly supported than today
 
0 basically same as today
 
- less supported than today
 
-much less supported than today
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
In the interim since we prepared the "Workbook" a year ago, our further
 
evaluation of U.S. futures has not substantially revised our major conclusion
 
that NASA's planning for the next decade must take place within the economic
 
and political constraints suggested in the "neutral" or "pessimistic" prog­
noses about the future. It is therefore desirable to reconsider the respon­
sibilities of technicians and scientists in such a period.
 
To the extent that they are expected to function for purely technical
 
objectives NASA may alienate itself from significant sectors of American
 
opinion. The accumulation of a relatively open-ended scientific and technoloc
 
ical agenda and the bureaucratic momentum established in compiling such an
 
agenda almost guarantees some harmful results: It could stigmatize NASA as
 
an institution that is out of touch with national economic, social 
and polit­
ical realities. Then, constraints on NASA's budget can intensify the gap
 
between what NASA would like to do and what it 
can do. Obviously, this
 
would ul.timately lead to lowered staff moral and recruitment problems.
 
Basically, NASA must recognize a new era 
inAmerican society, one
 
that does not accept purely technological or scientific agendas as ends
 
in themselves. Rather, the trend is toward a skeptical view that demands
 
a clearer relationship between scientific research and other social 
values.
 
It is therefore crucial to NASA's survival as a base for future space
 
exploration to-inject a clearer emphasis on 
goals and va-lues throughout
 
its planning processes--including the initial.stages that are traditionally
 
limited to technological considerations. Indeed, this is what the Long­
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Range Plan drafters have tried to do. They have selected optimistic
 
values and goals to justify maximal programs and ignored neutral or pessi­
mistic assumptions designed to facilitate programs within a broad frame­
work of constraints.
 
Somewhere in the planning process, then, it is important to give
 
sources of support
sufficient emphasis to policy goals and to assumed 

for particular proposals; to clarify important hidden assumptions about
 
com­certain missions and technologies; to go beyond a purely technical 

pilation; and to do an effective job of relating policy goals, programs,
 
groups in society and long-range social-political change. Of course, it
 
is not necessary to do these things in a document identified as a "long-.
 
range plan"; but it is necessary to attempt,at some point, a comprehensive
 
analysis of all the factors related to program areas.
 
There is a danger that the task will otherwise fall between stools.
 
As one of us,in collaboration with H. Kahn,-wrote in a recent study:
 
Because of new technologies, new wealth, new conditions
 
of domestic life and of international relations, unprecedented
 
criteria and issues are coming up for national decision; But
 
in the usual bureaucratic situation an executive is expected
 
to be concerned with his own immediate responsibilities and
 
not to worry unduly about others except for purposes of'"po­
litical" bargaining or compromise. The only man who has nomi­
nal responsibility for the "overall" problem is the President
 
(or other chief executive), who has little time to spend on
 
anything except already "felt" pressures; and his competence
 
obviously is limited. Furthermore, executives often do not
 
make the crucial design decisions or even have much effective
 
influence on them; they tend to make choices among already
 
designed systems. As a result the principles of contingency
 
design are often neglected, or the choices and compromises
 
that are formulated may be far from optimal.
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Thus'the national executive viewpoint may be narrow
 
simply because there is no group whose professional and
 
continuous job it is to worry about the appropriate issue.
 
We have seen more than one instance in which a new issue
 
is identified, all the officials to whom it is pointed
 
out agree that it is significant, and it remains neglected
 
simply because no one in the bureaucratic structure has a
 
"mission" that would permit him to take cognizance of the
 
new problem. Simi'larly itoften happens that although
 
there are offices inmany parts of the government that are
 
responsible for various parts of a problem, there is no"
 
one who has responsibility for the problem as a whole, for
 
fitting the traditionally recognized part into a newly
 
glimpsed total system--except of course the Chief Executive,
 
for whom the problem may be at too high or low a revel of
 
abstraction or too low in priority in comparison to more
 
pressing (and possibly less important) demands on his at­
tention. It is one of the most important objectives of a
 
policy-oriented research organization to function as a
 
"lobby for the future": that is, to make a deliberate
 
attempt to take a broad and long-range view of problems,
 
and to try to create intellectual pressures on behalf of
 
considerations outside the institutionalized criteria,
 
particularly those considerations relevant to the long­
run future or to the larger community, as in the case of
 
issues such as international security. Policy studies
 
should seek to discover important issues that are not
 
currently recognized and should try to see that they are
 
not unduly neglected in favor of more obvious, more
 
pressing, or better-institutional ized considerations."
 
SUMMARY OF TRENDS AFFECTING NASA PROGRAMS
 
The Uses of Branch-Point Analyses
 
Our review of a number of branch points, or unresolved major issues
 
that will influence the over-all direction of American society, -has been
 
a preliminary exploration. To some extent, we have deliberately over­
dramatized some alternate consequences of different branch-point outcomes.
 
The objective has been to underscore the importance of some specific fu­
ture developments, to indicate that the Advanced Missions and Concepts should
 
consider these branch points as key open questions, should remain alert
 
"Herman Kahn & Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000: A Framework for
 
Speculation (New York: Macmillan, 1967) pp. 390-391.
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they develop, and should be attuned to the relationships
to the answers as 

Preliminary planning
between various combinations of these future events. 

for specific outcomes should be undertaken as developments appear to be
 
ripening in any of these areas. The objective has been to sensitize
 
planners to the issues rather than to propose excessive planning for
 
unlikely events.
 
Dominant Trends
 
In our judgment, the dominant trend in American society for the fore­
seeable future is reflected in the "neutral," "straight-line" and "pessi­
mistic" prognoses rather than the "optimistic" ones.
 
We foresee a period of constraints on NASA. These constraints stem
 
from the following general factors:
 
Despite much public rhetoric concerning
The international Climate: 

the space age and the future, it is essential to acknowledge the degree
 
to which the space program is rooted in the past--the age of the cold war,
 
the missile gap, and Soviet one-upmanship resulting from Sputnik. Since
 
World War II,we have passed through three eras: the immediate postwar
 
period, the cold war period, the emergence of a detente. The space agency
 
To the extent that
achieved its initial impetus from the second period. 

NASA has relied heavily on Soviet policies to justify U.S. space programs,
 
NASA's role in an era of detente is no longer self-evident, particularly
 
if the Soviet Union makes a de facto concession that the U.S. has in fact
 
won the space race.
 
The Domestic Climate: The diminishing sense of national mobilization
 
for cold war has been paralleled by dispute over new national priorities
 
backlogged from the cold war period and emerging from changing.values.
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Sp~ce Achievements: Much of NASA's'momentum'was centered on thd aim
 
of landi'ng men on the moon. Clearly, the reception to the first .hesitant
 
suggestf~ons that the U.S. shoul-d undertake a similar commitment, to Mars
 
has been less than enthusiastic.
 
The most likely future for NASA will therefore be-an ambi'valent.en­
vironment. Expressed in monetary terms, there will be substantial resist­
ance to increases in NASA budgets,for the followihg reasdns:
 
I; 	Hostility from al'l segments of the public, particularly Middle
 
America, to increases in Federal taxation and spending
 
2. 	Hostility from.the Intel lectual the Humani'st
Eate, Left, and the
 
lower class to any projects which divert funds from-social programs.
 
3. 	Hostility from the Humanist Left to science and'technol'ogy, width some 
spread of this attitude to the Intellectual Estate, tthe Respons-ible 
Center and-perhaps even Middle-Am&rica. 
­
4'. 	 Increased concern by Intellectual Estate scientists for "ure sci'ence"
 
projects with decreasing tolerance fdr nationa-Pist and charismatic goals.
 
5. 	The Responsible Center will give increasing attention to social
 
programs.
 
6. 	Responsible-Center and Mi'ddle America are 
likely to successfully
 
resist substantial defense budget cuts. If social programs are
 
to be increased, this may have to be done at the expense of.non­
defense programs, including NASA.
 
Conversely, the following trends will favor NASA and hinder major
 
budget decreases:
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i. 	Continued public awareness of the general, long-term benefits of
 
science and technology.
 
2. 	Skepticism about the value and effectiveness of social programs,
 
particularly among Middle Americans.
 
3. 	Continued public interest in space, particularly in the manned
 
program.
 
4. 	An increasing number of technically educated Middle Americans
 
who will strongly identify with and strongly support the space
 
program.
 
5. 	A continuing though diminished Russian challenge.
 
6. 	A fear that cancelling or severely cutting back the space pro­
gram would have detrimental effects on national prestige and 
mo ra Ie. 
7. 	Interest--NASA employees, contractors, their employees, their
 
local economies, and their politicians have an interest in main­
taining the space program.
 
8. 	Inertia.
 
These factors lead us to assume that NASA:
 
(a) Cannot expect any significant increase in its budget.
 
provided that
(b) Can continue to be funded near its current level, 

NASA's programs continue to be, or appear to be, favorable to
 
the goals of the significant elements in society.
 
(c) Can avoid becoming an isolated target for budget cuts, but will
 
not escape general cuts affecting many Federal agencies.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
 
bne cannot expect a consideration of alternative futu'res such as we
 
have presented above to lead directly to detailed recommendations for policy
 
planning. The function of alternative contexts is to affect choices that
 
are made by policy planners principally on other, m6re immediate grounds.
 
Rather, the primary function of this report must be to stimulate the imagin­
ations of NASA planners themselves and to enhance their awareness of what
 
is entailed in long-range choices. Since we who are outside NASA and untrainec
 
in the space-related sciences must be naive about program choices, it is our
 
hope that raising the issue may have some heuristic value for those who are
 
more knowledgeable about the technical bases for choice.
 
Nevertheless, we feel we should attempt the exercise of identifying
 
some of the recommendations that seem to us to emerge from the work we
 
have done: We must emphasize that the work is still in a preliminary
 
stage; that we would expect, 'in a continuation of thi's project, greatly
 
to increase our knowledge of some of the detailed and current issues in­
volved in NASA planning, and that we have no difficulty in imagihing that
 
NASA planners immersed ificurrent issues would view what we bring to
 
their attention quite differently than we do.
 
The following recommendations are put forward merely as provocative
 
and heuristic illustrations of the fact Xhat plausible recommendations
 
might be derived from scenarios like the foregoing, and as invitations to
 
NASA planners to reconsider both the scenarios and the conclusions that
 
can be drawn from them. We do not hold these recommendations strongly:
 
they are sensitive to answers to many questions which need further inves­
tigation by us, by NASA, or both. We expect to change our minds as our
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knowledge increases. The point of the exercise is simply to indicate that
 
if certain assumptions are made about the results of mission analysis, the
 
If the analyses change, so
scenarios can help point to program choices. 

- will the choices. 
function within hew significant socio-political andSince NASA will 

economic constraints, it will be necessary to review the entire range of
 
possible projects in the future, establish priorities for the,
 
purpose of preliminary mission analysis, clarify the implications of
 
alternatives, and make more explicit the bases on which priorities are
 
assessed;
 
This implies a need to analyze, in broad terms, the implications of
 
the 	following conclusions and questions:
 
1. 	Only a comparatively small amount of new funds will become
 
available to NASA from the "peace bonus" resulting from re­
duced U.S. commitments in Vietnam, and probably not until'the
 
mid-1970's.
 
2. 	Thereafter the NASA budget will probably not rise faster than the
 
than the GNP for another decade, and there will be years in which
 
it may be cut back.
 
3. 	Under certain plausible conditions extremeiy bad planning by NASA
 
officials might cripple or even kill the U.S. space program.
 
This implies a need to consider appropriate staging of and relation­
ships among the conclusion of Apollo; the beginnings of two possible
 
orbital laboratories (small and large); the development of shuttles; and
 
the beginning of major Mars programs. Recommendations then turn on the
 
answers to questions such as: Are Apollo program costs mostly fixed,
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whether or not the program is accelerated? If so, is it possible to phase
 
in a full-scale space station program that will take up the slack following
 
Apollo--in order to avoid both higher budget requests due to overlappi'ng,
 
or budget cuts due to the space stations's lower requirements in the initial
 
stages? Ifwe can turn from Apollo directly to the space station, will
 
much time be -lost by postponing expensive starts on other deep space
 
missions? Can the space station and a minimal space exploration program
 
overlap within the period of the expected budget constraints? What specific
 
goals are needed to justify the space station effort? What kinds of results
 
will be needed later in order to be valued by Congress and the'public?
 
What is the best way to insure maintenance and effective use of the
 
national space mobilization base, looking forward to the time when suffi-t
 
cient progress has been made in meeting other national needs to permit
 
increases in the NASA budget? Inour judgment, groups in American soci­
ety who now oppose a major space program will become more interested in
 
space efforts once their present demands are satisfied. These groups
 
therefore have a stake--whether they know it or not--in the goal of main­
taining the space mobilization base. The public interest goes beyond
 
public relations, and the responsibility of a public agency should some­
times conflict with its responsiveness.
 
In this context,the following suggestions-should be evaluated:
 
Inwhat seem to be the most plausible of the alternative futures
I. 

we have considered, considerations of domestic morale and international
 
prestige (symbolizing to the world American elan and confidence) will, be
 
an uncertain basis for justifying NASA programs. Leadership in science
 
and technology, however, may provide a much more stable cohesive force.
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2. If analysis shows that dropping Apollo in favor of some new pro­
gram will not offer the public comparably impressive results and successes
 
in the immediate future, then the current series of Apollo lunar landings
 
should probably be continued through to their currently scheduled comple­
tion with Apollo 17. IfApollo were to be dropped, and were not to be
 
followed by any new and similarly significant program, this would be in­
the American
terpreted both at home and abroad as a sign of the erosion of 

ethos and visible evidence of"the weakening technological and military
 
posture of the country. The loss that the attendant dissolution of man­
power and plant would bring is clear.
 
3. If analysis shows that the scientific advantages to be gained
 
from an orbiting manned scientific laboratory, in contrast to orbiting
 
unmanned scientific facilities controlled by men on earth, are not sig­
nificant for most purposes, and if the costs of the latter are signifi­
cantly lower, then obviously the latter missions should be favored. The
 
gaining of increased experience with problems of maintenance of men in
 
space becomes a less important objective if the orbiting manned scientific
 
laboratory has already been precluded, and if, as suggested below, the
 
Mars shot is to be postponed.
 
In the absence of a middle-range manned space program, are there good
 
reasons for beginning now to develop a capacity to maintain large numbers
 
of-men in orbit for long periods of time? If not, are there good reasons
 
to develop a technologically sophisticated space station, as a preliminary
 
to a later manned Mars program? Does this necessitate a low-cost shuttle
 
and a capacity to maintain a small number of men in orbit for reasonably
 
long periods of time? If so, can the current budget permit this effort
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to begin immediately? Can spending on it be phased in.so as to take up
 
the slack created by the phasing out of the Apollo program? By the time
 
the Apollo program is completed, would it be possible to pursue the orbit­
ing space station at an equivalent budgetary level? (If there i-s no sig­
nificant diminution in Apollo expenses until completion of the Apollo
 
project and if--at the same time--it is not economical to initiate the
 
orbiting space station without taking time to build up to a three- to
 
four-billion-dollar level, then is there some other program that can fill
 
that gap?)
 
4. Does analysis show that in order to initiate a serious space
 
exploration program before 1976, while maintaining both Apollo and space
 
station programs, a significant increase in the NASA budget would be
 
necessary? Given the plausible future possibilities we have sketched it
 
seems implausible that public or Congressional support will be available for
 
the needed increases in funding. Assuming such fiscally-constrained choices
 
must be made, does it follow that further space exploration ought to be
 
deferred? Is it-possible to initiate such a program in the late 1970's,
 
following successful completion of Apollo, and successful operation of a
 
space station? If so, and if too much delay were not introduced, funds and
 
public support for what now seems to be a reasonable follow-on step might
 
then be forthcoming.
 
5. Is NASA's earth applications program a major contender for an in­
crease in emphasis? In addition to reasonable arguments which have been 
heard for some time, there is now much naive enthusiasm for applying the 
methods and personnel of space technology to social problems "here on
 
earth." Does analysis show that the large-scale organization of techni­
cal personnel and large-scale management of highly technical engineering
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problems is not easily transferrable to the far less tractable social
 
problems with which domestic policies are concerned at various levels of
 
are there other less ambitious potential applications
government? If so, 

of technology and even perhaps of systems analyses produced by NASA to
 
other social and political applications?
 
new
Historically, however, NASA is said to have spun off much of its 

technology to other public agencies and corporations. Would it not be wise"
 
to continue this practice? Would a change in this policy affect ao organi­
zational and economic pattern far beyond the confines of NASA? Would NASA
 
be an effective alternative in comparison with its competitors such as
 
universities, corporations and research organizations, which are increas­
ingly entering the new socio-technical areas and applying the resources
 
of systems analysis and large-scale technical management which also have
 
been used by NASA?
 
6. Underlying these questions is the commonly held view that a new
 
direction for NASA, to follow the Apollo project, will soon be urgently
 
needed and should be defined now. Some conspicuous achievement is a highly
 
desirable goal for a technical organization, if it is to maintain professional
 
morale, attract imaginative and talented staff, and command public and Congress­
ional acceptance and enthusiasm, respectively. Is there some new direction
 
which can be chosen on the basis of systematic and explicit consideration of
 
budgetary limits, other costs, and--to the extent feasible--the merits of the
 
alternatives? If not, can more limited programs be paced so as to make an
 
adequate contribution to a wide enough range of aeronautics and space goals?
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Itmay be that current very constrained conditions and host'ility to
 
NASA may make this a poor time to advocate'-a'new, and ambitious (and ex­
pensive) space goal. Perhaps this is the time'to adopt a low prof ile pos­
ition, laying over for better days. If so, a low profile position does not
 
necessarily require inaction--quietly and relatively inexpensively, NASA can
 
prepare the mobilization base for grander missions. For example, 'instead
 
of proclaiming a deep-space exploration objective at this time, pursue those
 
missions which are necessary incremental steps such as determining what are
 
the problems inherent in keeping men in space for extended periods of time,
 
and sending the necessary unmanned reconnaissance probes.
 
7. To deal with questions such as these requires concerted attention
 
to the implications for the analysis of program choices, of the methodology
 
of projection of futures, the analysis of the present and projected struc­
ture of social valuation, and the mechanisms of translation of social valu­
ation into decisions reached by political processes outside and inside NASA.
 
Difficult as these tasks are to study separately, they must be dealt with
 
in an integrated manner. Only then can the results be used by top manage­
ment to shed some light on what is involved in the'program choices for
 
which they are responsible. To furnish support for the making of major
 
decisions, NASA's mission analysis and plann'ing activities should present
 
case analyses which explicitly relate technical choices before NASA to
 
alternative future environments in which criteria for valuation will vary.
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NEW DIRECTIONS FOR NASA
 
It is clear that in the past NASA has principally emphasized manned
 
space flight with an explicit and implicit intention of employing these
 
programs to achieve the goals which we have categorized as man's conquest
 
of space, success in various types of U.S. and U.S.S.R. competition, as
 
well as scientific and technological advance. As we have emphasized in
 
this report, (particularly in section IV), these goals are by no means
 
universally held in society; Perhaps the goal which ismost basic to
 
high NASA staff--man's conquest of space--seems to be limited to a tiny
 
,segment of our society. The great mass of Americans is not especially
 
excited by scientific and technological advance, unless they can be
 
shown that there is some reasonable and immediate chance of direct bene­
fits from some activities--the highly visible NASA programs appear to
 
them to be extremely expensive with unknown returns. NASA is also aware
 
that there is a small but well-placed and highly vocal group of critics
 
of the space program who are indifferent and/or hostile to the nationalist
 
goals of U.S.-U.S.S.R. competition--these people we have identified here as
 
the Intellectual Estate and Humanist Left. It seems from public statements
 
and internal documents that NASA wishes to satisfy the desires of people
 
who are unhappy with the current policies and programs. In this section
 
we shall examine the implications of more NASA emphasis upon several space
 
goals that would appear at first glance to be more widely supported by
 
currently unenthusiastic elements in our society--to space programs which
 
would be internationalist rather than nationalist in emphasis and to
 
programswhich will deliver tangible and immediate real earth benefits to
 
the citizenry. And we also briefly discuss possibilities for low-cost
 
space ventures and the importance of mobilization bases for future oppor­
tunity.
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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
 
Currently there is wdespread discussion w'thin NAS-A'about the advlIst­
bility of increasing the agency's empliasis on cooperative Ventures in space.
 
The recently appointed Administrator has been quoted as favoring such a thrust.
 
Reasons for More International Cooperation
 
1. Gain Public Support of Key Groups
 
As we discussed at some length in our section on the Intellectual -Estate
 
in Section IV, the academicians and high level journalists'of our nation
 
are unenthusiastic and indeed, hostile, 'to appeals to nationaPiMsm -and­
patriotism. To some degree they view themselves as part of an inter­
national, enlightened elite. Again, to some extent, they identify more
 
with persons of similar background and values in foreign nations, even
 
hostile ones. For example, we cite the uproar caused by theSoviet 'Union's
 
pressure on professional writers; a good deal less sympathy is shown to
 
Communist oppression of workers and peasants. People of the Intellectual
 
Estate man a great number of institutions which are devoted to promoting
 
international cooperation and/or'operati'ng on -an internat-ional scale-­
such as the United Nations, the State Department, the Agency for Inter­
national Development, foreign affa'irs and relations councils, foundations,
 
and charitable organizations of all kinds. There is no question that
 
space programs aining to encourage international cooperation would be
 
more favorably received by these people.
 
Also, the Intellectual Estate and the Humanist Left are extremely hostile
 
to the waging of the Cold War. Like all of us, they very much desire a detente
 
and friendship with the Soviet Union and other hostile powers; however, compared
 
with members of the Responsible Center and the Right they prefer not to emphasize
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basic ideological and national conflicts of interest between ourself and
 
these hostile states. Advocates of international cooperation generally
 
believe that whatever differences exist are not very important consider­
ing the community of mankind, and the community of interest that we all
 
have in averting war, particularly in averting thermonuclear war. There­
fore such people will be very much more sympathetic to programs which en­
courage cooperation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., which will demon­
strate that cooperation is possible and which will bring Americans and
 
Russians closer together, on the assumption that ifwe know and understand
 
each other we are less likely to fight.
 
Many Congressmen, including most of those who woul'd describe themselves
 
share the view of the intellectual Estate
and are described as "Liberal," 

Some NASA people
that international cooperation is good for its own sake. 

obviously are members of the groups mentioned above who would be favorable
 
co­to international cooperation, at least partially because international 

operation could be expected to elicit a favorable response from scientific
 
colleagues and personal friends outside of NASA who value internationalism
 
and devalue nationalist and military activity. There may also be a group
 
within NASA that believes that mankind's conquest of space is a desirable
 
and necessary goal for the human race--and that even though it would be
 
better if America accomplished this historic task, if America is not going
 
to do it, someone else must do it.
 
2. International Cooperation Might Provide Money
 
This concept requires some elaboration. It seems quite unlikely that
 
over the long run any substantial amount of foreign money will be used to
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pay for U.S. space efforts. Even if there is a joint U.S. foreign spac ­
program with a substantial foreign contribution, in the long run such a
 
joint program is very likely to involve as much foreign spending as foreign
 
funding. But foreign funding of a joint program can mean that the<U.S. can
 
achieve space goals--in cooperation with non-U.S. partners--at a smaller
 
price in U.S. dollars than would be required if the U.S. were to pursue the
 
same program alone.
 
And for a period of a few years it is possible that foreign funding may
 
be available for space program expenditures in the United States. This point
 
will be discussed below.
 
Obviously saving money is a less controversial and more "solid" object­
ive than the desirability of international cooperation per se. However,
 
there are only limited possibilities for saving money on a scale that would
 
be important to NASA. There are only three places that could conceivably
 
put up enough funds for a joint project with NASA to have a major budgetary
 
impact. These are the Soviet Union, Japan, and a group of European countries.
 
The possibility of cooperation with these will be discussed below.
 
3. Helping U.S. Foreign Policy
 
There are two ways in which cooperation on space projects might be
 
thought to help. U.S. foreign policy. One possibility is a foreign policy
 
objective of increasing this country's image of international cooperation
 
for peaceful purposes, our image of being a good neighbor, etc. The second
 
possibility is that a cooperative space program would be used to enhance a
 
foreign policy purpose related to some particular country. For example,
 
we might enter into a joint program with Japan on an equal partnership basis
 
in order to encourage the international recognition of Japan as a super-power
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because we believe that Japan should gain super-power status without having
 
to acquire nuclear weapons.
 
4. 	Spreading Responsibility
 
It is possible that occasions may arise where there are controversial
 
space projects, the orbiting belt of di-poles ("needles") might be an example
 
of such a "controversial" project. The U.S. might feel that it was undesir­
able to undertake such a project on U.S. sponsorship alone and seek sponsor­
ship of an international group of nations or an international agency.
 
5. International Cooperation As A Way of Aehieving Commitment
 
It iswidely believed that one of the key reasons why the U.S. was
 
able to land a man on the moon in 1969 was that we had made a firm commit­
ment to do so through the statements of President Kennedy in 1961. Such
 
long term commitments to a scientific or technical objectives are rare. One
 
way of getting a form of commitment which might have a similar strength would
 
be an international partnership to accomplish-a-particular goal. For example,
 
there is some reason to believe that both the British and the French, at
 
different times, would have preferred to drop out of the Concorde project if
 
doing so had not been so embarrassing for British-French relationships. In
 
other words, it was the partnership commitment that sustained this program.
 
Motivations of Foreign Countries for International Cooperation
 
Looking at the other side of the coin, why should other countries
 
cooperate with us? There are several reasons which might affect their
 
decision making in this regard: perhaps the most important is national
 
prestige. At various times in history nations feel obliged to undertake
 
certain types of activities to demonstrate their status. In the 18th
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century it was de rigueur for a prince to have- a welFlttdTh-6dT'6 tf-iirlTh 
army and prestigious court musicians. slit In the 19th century railroads
 
and artillery were required. As we know, in the 20th century even the
 
poorest mud-hut republic must have an airport, a modern hotel,/and at
 
least a squad of paratroopers. Also a modern state feels itselrf obliged
 
to support s6ientific advances, because that is what civilized countries
 
do. Nations with some pretence at grandeur believe it necessary to have
 
some sort of space program, however trivial; witness Egypt. Currently
 
most of these efforts, we think here of Europe and Japan, are minimal.
 
But it may be that in the near future such trivial efforts will 
be
 
insufficient to guarantee the desired level of prestige 'and mbre ambitious
 
programs may be required by these nations to maintain and increase their
 
status.
 
Also we must not ignore the military potential of space operation.
 
Given the current state of the military art, a really first class natibn
 
has ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Nuclear weapons are rela­
tively easy to manufacture, if a nation has the will 
to do so.- Effe.ctih
 
ballistic missiles are a,more difficult proposition, and many nations wI....
 
would deny even to themselves that they have any desire for such weap6r
 
must have, in the back of their minds, the idea that some day it might
 
necessary to'deploy them for self-defense.. Toward this end, a space
 
capability would constitute a mobilization base for late 20th century
 
weapons systems.
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Possible Cooperators
 
A discussion of international cooperation must have at its 	outset
 
Within
a reasonable discussion of with whom and how we can cooperate. 

the next 15 years the possible candidates for cooperation will be limited
 
to the following powers: 1) the U.S.S.R., 2) China, 3) Japan, 4) a European
 
combination, 5) a consortium of all other countries in the world, 6) some
 
of the above. In addition there may be
combination of some or all 

bi-national partnerships between the United States and individual small
 
a
powers. Undet most circumstances these would have the second power as 

very minor junior partner of the United States. Such cooperation may be
 
as trivial as the establishment of a NASA tracking station in a underdeveloped
 
country such as Tanzania.
 
Europe is an important possible cooperator in space. Europeans have
 
a high degree of technical competence, plenty of money, and somewhat of a
 
desire to make themselves independent of both the United States and the
 
However, the Europeans have not demonstrated that they
Soviet Union. 

have the will or the desire to spend large amounts of money 	on space.
 
They find it difficult to force themselves to fund their own defense.
 
A large part of their additional wealth is devoted to social welfare
 
Despite efforts at untty, the Europeans still remain fragmented
programs. 

and except in a few (and very successful) areas cannot cooperate on
 
major ventures.
 
on the other hand, lacks most of these disadvantages. Japan
Japan, 

more in the near
has plenty of money, and is likely to have a good deal 

The Japanese are highly competent technically, and have a real
future." 

'For an extended discussion of Japanese potential see: Herman Kahn,
 
The Emerging Japanese Superstate, (New York, 1970).
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appreciation of the desirability of scientific and technological advance.
 
Japan already has a small but promising space program.
 
But most important is that Japanese have P highly developed sense of
 
national purpose, a powerful urge to excel in the world. The Japanese want
 
prestige and status. The traditional means of obtaining world power status-­
nlilitary strength--is for historical reasons not particularly attractive
 
to the Japanese at this time. They-have strong lobbies in their own country
 
which are opposed 
to armaments, and especially nuclear armaments. A resur­
gent Japan may overcome these forces, but not without a sharp initial fight.
 
Itwould be a good deal easier for the Japanese to seek international.pres­
tige through an ambitious space program. With U.S. space budgets being cut,
 
it is quite within the realm of possibility that Japan could support a space
 
program as large as that of the United States today without straining their
 
economy. And considering the efficiency of the Japanese management and
 
labor, they could possibly get a good deal-more effect for such a budget.
 
The Japanese have the potential for being a,competitor with .the U.S. in space;,
 
however, it would take them a very long time to catch up with us in technol-

Dgy.
 
The observer of specific Japanese industries in the--20th century
 
can discern ,aclear pattern in their products lines. At first, they-would ..
 
nerely copy foreign products, then they would improve upon them, and finally­
they would produce superior goods. Assuming the Japanese were interested in
 
space, it is reasonable to assume that they-would at first.wish to imitate
 
foreign goods. However, advanced space equipment cannot be purchased on 
the
 
)pen market, shipped to Japan, taken apart, and reproduced line for line.
 
If they were interested in going into space, the Japanese would be willing to
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pay a good deal for the privilege of obtaining access to such equipment-

In other words, it is within the realm of possibility that the Japanese
 
might be very favorably disposed to an international space agreement with
 
the United States which would give the Japanese parity with the United
 
States--parity with the U.S. being a major step up for the Japanese--as
 
well as permit them to establish a technological base for their own space
 
ventures in the future. In a domestic context which very much limited
 
the space program, U.S. space officials, perhaps partially motivated by
 
cosmopolitan desires to see man conquer space, night look with favor upon
 
such an arrangement in order to keep the space program moving.
 
We do not believe it is realistic to consider any cooperation between
 
the U.S. and Communist China before 1985 at the earliest. On the contrary,
 
the belicosity of that power might even provoke closer cooperation between
 
the U.S., Japan, and the U.S.S.R.
 
In examining possibilities of cooperating in space with the Soviet
 
Union, a few general observations may be in order. For one, the Soviet
 
Union at present is the only country in the world with comparable, or near­
equal capabilities in space. Thus, the first question: "is cooperation
 
feasible" can be answered in the affirmative as far as technical capabili­
ties. are concerned. Moreover, the Soviet Union is the only country in the
 
world with whom major space cooperation would be feasible right now. In
 
fact, some modest beginnings of such cooperation are already apparent, and
 
have been outlined in another section of this report.
 
On the other hand, the desirablility of such cooperation, especially
 
on a large acale, presents us with a very thorny political problem. Again,
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should1 the current detente cont'iHue along the lines we have sketched in at
 
the beginning of the Japanese scenario, then some forms of cooperative en­
deavor would hot only be possi,ble, but even quite likely to occur. Should 
­
the U.S.-S.U'. climate improve--for example, as a result of a breakthrough' 
at SALT and/or a favorable Middle East settlement--then prospedts of some
 
joint enterprise with the S.U. might improve commensurately. Essentially,
 
then, we mlght rather inquire wHat forms this cooperation should not take,
 
rather than examining the broad spectrum.of possible cooperative scenarios.
 
1) The how limited and informal exchange of information could be gradually
 
broadened, if the S.U. were to agree, for example, to -interpret the tele­
metered, information received from'their moon landers. 
 This would amount to
 
broadcasting such information "in the clear,"-and would invite some 
recip­
rocity on our part.
 
2) In'all future manned flights, the'U.S. might brief the Soviets in de­
tail on the medical-physiological "spects of the'mission. Such briefings
 
are unlikely to arouse'much polltical antagonism, and would gain us favor
 
in the eyes of those Americans intent on strengthening the current'atmos­
phere'of detente.
 
3) At a later date, informal (but not-surrepti-tious) efforts could be made
 
to coordinate the two countri'es' space programs, mainly so as to avoid du­
plication. 
-For instance, future U.S.-S.U. lunar missions could divide the
 
work-load by specializing on some aspect of lunar exploration, and leaving
 
others to'the other country, proided the information gathered by each were
 
made available on ah equal basis to the other. 
Here again, perhaps the one
 
kind of division of labor to be avoided would be to'divide the lunar surface
 
6-24 HI-1272/3-RR
 
along topographic, rather than functional lines. Claiming one half of the
 
moon as "ours," and conceding the other to them as "theirs" might be both
 
highly politically unpopular as well as risky, in that if the cooperative
 
attitude of the Soviets were to deteriorate in the future, we might be ef­
fectively barred from significant areas'.on the moon's surface. Thus exis­
ting antagonisms would be intensified, and extended into space to boot.
 
Aside from avoiding duplication by information exchanges, it is dif­
ficult to write a cooperative scenario with the U.S.S.R. which would spec­
ifically benefit NASA directly. The price of cooperation with the Soviets
 
might very well be the reduction of NASA budgets, even for such programs
 
where the U.S. would be "going it alone," such as the space shuttle. In
 
the eyes of middle Americans, NASA might be "tainted, and therefore less
 
worthy of support. And it would be even more difficult to deal successful­
ly with "priorities" issues unless the performance of the U.S. economy and
 
the "Great Society" programs were to improve dramatically.
 
In general, it might be less risky to respond favorably to Soviet
 
offers of cooperation, but the current domestic context does not allow
 
for many dramatic U.S. initiatives. And" it will probably continue to hold
 
true into the '70's that Soviet competitive efforts would act as a much
 
more effective stimulant to the U.S. space program than any form of co­
operation one could devise.
 
Varieties of Cooperation
 
There is a wide spectrum of means by which the United States may
 
cooperate with other nations in space ventures for various purposes. The
 
type of cooperation necessary would depend largely upon the results that
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all the parties involved'seek to gain from cooperation. "If-cooperatiofi
 
is sought among more than two ,parties, some type of new form of space
 
organization will likely be necessary.- If it is desired to have a space
 
program involving many nations, -iti,slikely that some sort of extra­
national space organization would be needed. The United Nations would
 
be a model for such an arrangement. An independent international space
 
authority could be created which would be above and apart from any
 
national, agency and.operated-by a extra-national space bureaucracy. Such
 
an arrangement'would likely be well received throughout the world, but­
would not likely be as -favorably accepted' in the-United States. Like the
 
United Nations, An international, space authority would probably be
 
principally supported and: funded by the United States, but.the little
 
nations would have disproportionate poweff in making decisions and in
 
accepting credit. 'In effect, the U.S. taxpayer would-be footing the bill ­
with little to' show from it directly. If such an international space, 
authority'were treated it is reasona6le that the'bulk of the original 
positidns in the authority would be filled by those men who have the 
most experiende-in -space administration--that-is, NASA ,(and perhaps Russian)­
officials. Even though such an arrangement might look-desirable to-high 
space officials, it is not likely to be so favorably received elsewhere. 
A more likely model would be a multi-national space agencyj Instead
 
of being above and outs-ide of the nation states, a multi-national agency
 
would be created by and answerable to the cooperat-ing nations. Intelstat
 
would be'a model for such an organization. Indeed, Intelstat 'is an even'
 
more apt model because the Russians could be invited, and if they refuse
 
(which is likely) the multinational' space agency would effectively be
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a free world body dominated by the United States. Insome ways it would
 
.or NATO, or any other free world agency--international,
be like Intelstat 

but U.S. dominated. Compared with the extra-national model described
 
above, the multinational organization has great advantages from a
 
domestic American political point of view: again, assuming Russia would
 
not cooperate, it would be a non-Communist body, which could continue to
 
compete militarily and polit'cally and prestige-wise with the Soviet bloc.
 
The most likely form of international cooperation in space is through
 
partnership--that is, bilateral agreement between the United States and
 
Compared with the models described above, partnership has
other powers. 

great advantages of flexibility, ease of negotiation, and lack of
 
"consititutional problems" of who has the power and who pays the bill.
 
Partnership agreements can be negotiated with any power (including the
 
Soviet Union) and can cover a multitude of activities ranging from, at the
 
very minimum, mere talking about international cooperation, to information
 
sharing on any level desired by both parties, division of labor, particu­
larly in earth application and/or interplanetary exploration, up to much
 
more sophisticated arrangements as contributing various components to
 
vehicle configurations and even partnership in the construction and crewing
 
of space vehicles.
 
Obstacles to Intenational Cooperation
 
The domestic obstacles to International cooperation should be made
 
quite explicit.- In our discussions on the value systems of the groups
 
which make up Middle America we emphasized the very strong national feel­
ings held by these people. If the United States should undertake inter­
national cooperation in space to the detriment of predominately U.S.
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endeavors, this would likely undercut a great deal of the present support
 
given for NASA. At the very least, a international cooperation agreement
 
which appeared to deny the United States full credit for space achieve­
ments would Aot be acceptable if the United States was paying most of the
 
price. A hypothetical middle American would likely say, "why should we
 
pay for it, if we are not getting anything for it?" This attitude was
 
expressed quite clearly by the"Congressional resolution wh'ich prohibi'ted
 
NASA from flying a U.N. flag on the Moon.. I't was not the United Nations,
 
or mankind in general, that made this great achievement--it was the United
 
States of America that did it; America has the right to be proud of the
 
achievement, and to take ful-l credit.
 
There i's an even higher price to be paid or cooperation with the Soyiet
 
Union. Despite the official denials by the U-S. government and NASA officials
 
that the U.S'. space program is predominately peaceful in nature, it is clear
 
that the average man on-the street believes that the conquest of space has
 
extremely important military implications. The military concepts of "high
 
ground " and technological superiority are well known to most adult.Americanso
 
They know that the Russians are very active in space also, and they presume
 
that they are up there for the same reasons that"We are--to make themselves
 
stronger. 'Explicit and obvious cooperation with the Soviet Union would
 
seem to indicate that military objectives .are not present. If the pro­
motion of national securi'ty is not a purpose of the space program, then
 
those people who support the space program on that basis will be lost from
 
the NASA constituency. The nationalist right 'nad large element of Middle
 
America will also be extremely hostile to international cooperation with
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the Soviet Union because this represents collaboration with a communist
 
power which is viewed as an immoral, evil, and dangerous force in the world.
 
According to this point of view, we do not shake hands with the devil.
 
Neo-Isolationism
 
Inour previous discussion of the value systems of the various groups
 
within American society we commented upon the great value held for the
 
"international cooperation" space goal by both the Intellectual Estate and
 
the Humanist Left. However, recent tendencies suggest that this goal may
 
be less attractive to these groups. There seems to be, among the Humanist
 
Left, and spreading somewhat to the lIntellectual Estate, a turning away from
 
internationalism. We do not perceive that these groups are becoming
 
more nationalist rather than internationalist; rather, the recent disil­
lusion with our post-war containment foreign policy promoted particularly
 
by the Vietnam war, has encouraged these people to turn away from various
 
aspects of internationalism, such as collective security. This new
 
movement is commonly called by its critics ,neo-isolationism."
 
Compared with a decade or two decades ago, educated academics, particu­
larly young ones, are less interested in the outside world, and are indiffer­
ent or even hostile to U.S. involvement with foreign countries. This lack
 
of interest or hostility is attributable to a feeling among these people that
 
U.S. foreign activities are pernicious to the outside world as well as to the
 
United States. U.S. cooperation with other leading industrial countries is
 
seen as a conspiracy between the rich nations of the world. U.S. cooperation
 
with the U.S.S.R. is seen by some radical Humanist Left elements as a plot
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between two-9uper powers to dominate the'world. The great-visible symtol'
 
of international- &ooperation--the'United Nstions--is frequently viewed
 
as an irrelevant talk-shop. 'Under''these conditlon , then, attempts to
 
appeal to the Humanist Left and to the Intellectual Estate th.rough attempts
 
at international cooperati'on will be less successful than they would have
 
been, say, five years ago. To some degree, this phenomenon relates to the
 
age of the members of the group. Most older members of the Intellectual
 
Estate would'share the belief of the Responsible Center that a belief in
 
international-ism is synonymous with progressive, enlightened thought,
 
whereas isolatibnism is a -sign of obscurantism. However, the younger
 
members of these groups, whose experience is limited to the decade-of the
 
1960's, are far less sensitive to a bel-ief-in what Wendel Wilkie called
 
"one world."?I At the present time:, few members of these groups would-be
 
incensed by a project having important impl-ications for international
 
cooperation (unless it had a counter-insurgency implication--sudh as use
 
of satellites for improved social and/or political control in an under­
developed nation).- But most of them will certainly be a good deal less
 
e
enthusiastic about such programs compared with their-6lders.
 
It seems to-a certain extent that this 'isa world'wide movement. We
 
see-a' tendency among many countries to turn inward, to take the position
 
that they-sould deal first of all with-their own problems and not worry-'
 
themselves so much about what is going on in other parts of the world.
 
The trend is obvious among the hew elite in the developing world and can
 
"E. Allison, "Cool It.; the Foreign Policy of Young America'' Foreign Policy,
 
Winter 70-71; pp. 144--t60; J.A. Johnson, 'ANew Generation of Isolationists"
 
Foreign Affairs, Oct. 70; pp. 122-135.
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be seen among the young elites of the industrial states of Europe, North
 
America, and less so, in Japan. In the words of Voltaire's Candide, they
 
feel 	that first of all they should "tend their own gardens."
 
This 	trend will probably continue throughout the decade of the
 
1970's and will be limited probably by some event which drives home strongly
 
the 	point that security is, indeed, world wide. Some disaster, such as
 
the 	Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1939, will probably be necessary
 
to break this trend. In the'meantime, NASA and other government agencies
 
who 	seek to appeal to the Intellectual Estate and the Humanist Left' by putting
 
forth 	programs emphasizing international cooperation will likely find this
 
appeal to be less persuasive than it would have been in the 1950's and
 
-early '6Os.
 
General Obiections that Apply to One or More Forms of Cooperation
 
This 	is a brief list of the kinds of problems that international
 
cooperation can face. Of course decision about international cooperation
 
-involves a balancing of benefits and costs. The first question is "what
 
benefits does the cooperation produce?" If there are no substantial or
 
only 	small benefits, then it is unwise to proceed even if the costs are
 
small. If, on the other hand, the benefits appear to be substantial, then
 
it makes sense to proceed even in the face of substantial costs.
 
1. 	Hurts decision-making
 
This is likely to be the overwhelming objection to international coop­
eration on space projects. It is clear that some forms of cooperation are
 
not subject to this objection. For example, information can be exchanged
 
between national programs in a way that does not hurt decision making. How­
ever, when we think of international cooperation here, we are talking about
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joint projects. International projects will require international decision
 
making.
 
While some may argue that the international politics influehcing a
 
joint project would be no worse than the internal politics tHat already
 
exist in an agency as large as NASA, it should be noted that the fact
 
that htere are international politics will not elminate local-politics.
 
The two problems simply add to each other. If nothing else, international
 
decisionmaking ia almost certain to be $lower than national decisionmaking.
 
Organizationally an international program may mean that the State Department
 
is almost certain to be included in the decisionmaking process.
 
2. 	The problem of recrimination
 
The problem of recrimination for accidents, failures, and cost over­
runs, is likely to.be more severe in an international program than in a
 
national one.
 
3. To the extent that space programs are undertaken'for reasons of
 
prestige, or can be thought to produce prestige benefits, then an inter­
national program is something that reduces these benefits by involving
 
a sharing of credit.
 
4. In some cases a joint program might interfere with military appli­
cations of space programs.
 
MILITARY EMPHASIS*
 
Another possibility is that NASA should emphasis the military import­
ance of its activities. A military emphasis would follow the nationalist
 
goals of Middle America. To a large extent, what little support NASA has
 
had with "the man on the street" has come from his perception that NASA
 
*This discussion is derived from Max Singer's studies of international
 
securities issues.
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already is a predominantly pilitary pr9gram. It is almost certain that
 
the Agency's insistence upon its peaceful, pacific mission has cost it
 
support among the general public.
 
In considering the advisability of a military emphasis, we must take
 
into account the domestic and foreign 5ontexts. Americans are not especially
 
militaristic or aggressive, they view military expenditures as justified only
 
by a foreign threat. For most purposes that a space threat can only come
 
from the Soviet Union.
 
Obviously one of the most important factors on the international scene
 
NASA is concerned is the Soviet Union and the U.S.-Soviet relation­as far as 

ships. The underlying relationship between the United States and the Soviet
 
Union is relatively fixed and long-lasting. It is determined by the size
 
and power of the two countries, and the profound differences between the
 
fundamental political ideology of the two governments and the people of the
 
United States. While relatively few Americans-feel that non-expansionist
 
Communists are enemies whose existence is unacceptable, there are a great
 
many Americans who would be profoundly disturbed by the spread of Communism.
 
On the other side, while the Communist leadership, and any.likely succeeding
 
leadership, is not reckless or in any way committed to war or any other
 
short-term solution to co-existence, the Communist leadership does regard
 
the West as enemies in a very profound sense. There is no point in doing
 
any planning on the basis of a change in these underlying elements of the
 
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.
 
On the other hand, the "tone", or as some specialists like to say the
 
"the atmospherics", of the U.S.-Soviet relationship do fluctuate over the
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years. -Ingeneral, .the Soviet'Union'determines whether or not we'shalt 
have a period of relative tension or relative "detente.' ­
Particularly'afte the Cuban missi-le crisis there has been a rel6­
tively long period of a "'detente" tone to U.S.-Soviet rel'ationslhi-p The
 
question for NASA i' whether this long standing tone of the relationship
 
is likely -to continue,' or to sharply change. 'We would like to-suggest
 
that NASA 'take very serious'ly the possibil'i'ty of'a change.. This'is not
 
a predictio-that 'there will be'a change, rather, -this is'a statement*
 
that there is a good 'possibility:of a change. 'Ifone were forced to be
 
quantitative, we woul4'say- that there is'at least an 6veh money chanc6'­
that over the next'ten years the tone-of'U.S'.-Soviet relationihips wil'l
 
'p 
change in the direction of sharply reduced 'detente atmosphere as compared
 
to the last half of the '60s.-

We should make very clear the limits of this "statement. No'fice, fo
 
example, that'we are not saying that there will necessarily be a war,'or
 
even a major riss or threat'of war.- Nor are we saying that the'f ida­
mental'attitudes of the 'Russians are'-likely'to change for the wors6 We
 
are talking about the tbh6 of the' rdlationship. Thik is somethihg'that
 
manipulated by the Soviet Onion'for their internal'purposes. A worse to
 
more tension andu'npleasantness, does'not mean thdy are'rea'ljy more"War
 
like" or "anti-U.:S."; it merely means that they have'decided that a differeht"
 
tone temporarily'suits their purposes.
 
Although for many fundamen'tal issues whether the tone of'U.S.-Soviet
 
relationship is more like detente ormore like-cold war doesn't make miuch
 
difference.' The issue of tone, or atmospherics, or mood, can make an
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important difference in terms of support for the space program, and the
 
shaping of the image and exact nature of the space program.
 
There are basically two reasons why there is a good chance that the
 
Soviets will move away (and the U.S. will respond similarly), from a
 
detente atmosphere. The first reason is that this is a phenomena that
 
seems to -us to be inherently a fluctuating one. Therefore, after any
 
long period with one kind of atmosphere there is some reason at least to
 
expect a change. In this case the Co-ld War can either get "cooler" or
 
"warmer'. But apart from this general rule, there are some strong signs
 
of things that have already happened that look in the direction of a
 
change in the tone of U-.S.-Soviet relations, although they are not any
 
means of proof that this will happen.
 
The first reason to think that there may be a worsening in U.S.-

Soviet relationship iswhat seems to be the current Soviet view of the
 
Middle East. They seem to be taking the position, and to some extent
 
this may reflect their real feelings, that the Middle East is their proper
 
sphere of influence and that the U.S. is interfering and ought to get out.
 
To the extent that this view requires Soviet support for Arabs to the
 
point that Israel is truly endangered, 1t is not likely to be acceptable
 
to the United States and it might not be acceptable for other reasons as
 
well. In other words, there seems to be a good chance that the U.S. and
 
the Soviet Union have essentially incompatible view of their proper rela­
tionship in the Middle East and until this incompatibility is resolved,
 
there will be an important reason for bad relations.
 
The second recent trend that suggests a possible worsening of U.S.-

Soviet relations is that in the last few years the Soviets have been
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spending a great deal of'money sharply indreasihg their strategic force!
 
and moving the balance--at 4least the numerical balance--of strategic
 
forces sharply in their direction. There is a good chance that they
 
will feel that this chahge in the "objective factors"os the strategic
 
relationship will entitle them to some political advantage. At least
 
they may fel that they have a duty to try to get some politica'l advan­
tage out of al the mone'ythey have spent on strategic forces. *Th'is
 
attempt on their part, to the extent that it is made, may also tend to
 
produce a more tense atmosphere.
 
A third reason for thinking that the tine of the U.S.-Soviet tela-'
 
tionship is likely to get worse is that for'the first time the Soviet
 
Union has been using virulent antiLAmerican propaganda at the personial
 
level. That is, posters; etc., in the Soviet Union are now designed to
 
stir up hatred against individual Americans in a way that has not been
 
seen since the the anti-German propaganda used during World War H."
 
While this propaganda is not likely to have a great deal of effect on
 
the mass of Soviet citizens, it is.interesting to ask the reason for the
 
Soviet decision to undertake such a propaganda campaign, and what it ma
 
imply for future' relations.
 
A fourth factor in the same direction is that soviets, or at
 
least some of them, seem to overestimate the importance of internal
 
disorders in the-United States. Looking at American dissent, political
 
disorder and "public immorality" in the light of Marxist doctrine, some
 
of them get the feeling that the United States is falling apart. This i
 
consistent with the basic communist view of history inwhich communism
 
"'This was reported to us by a recent visitor to the Institute, a
 
Quaker scientist devoted to peace who was greatly troubled by what he
 
saw in Moscow.
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spreads throughout the world in the wake of capitalist collapse because
 
The communists
of "internal contradictions" in the capitalist system. 

a time of danger to them because of the possibility of a
see this as 

internal decay. But they also

"'lashing-out" by the West as a result its 

feel a duty, to Communism or to history, to hasten the collapse of the
 
West by putting pressure upon it. It seems quite possible that this
 
interpretation of events in the United States could contribute to a Soviet
 
decision to.move away from detente.
 
Just as foreign developments can impact upon U.S. futures, domestic
 
developments tan -impact,upon-foreign.nationso We have discussed the
 
possible importance of the development of "new values" -inAmerica. These.
 
can have crucial implications in our-relationships with foreign states.
 
In the Soviet Union, according to the official' Marxist ideology, theser new
 
values are interpreted as bourgeois capital'ist decadence. Marxi'sts believe
 
that a socialist form of government is a necessary and an inevitable out­
growth of capitalist society. According to their scheme of history, the
 
last stages of capitalism ,will see a moral breakdown of the system--capital-ist
 
youth will become disaffected from the system, and their better elements
 
will turn to Marxism, others to ,corrupt hedonism. In its decadent phase,
 
capitalism can no longer count upon the confidence of'the people who live
 
under its sway. According to Marxist ideology, this is a particularly
 
dangerous phase for the socialist states because the more perceptive ele­
ments in the capitalist world will recognize this impending collapse and
 
their immediate-absorption into the socialist system; therefore, they will
 
be tempted to make a preemptive strike to attempt to destroy the socialist
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states 'which will inevitably supplant them. The social.ist states must'be
 
on their guard and wel-l armed. However,'basically the capitalists are
 
morally bankrupt and getting continuously weaker, Sooner or later they
 
will collapse.
 
In order to promote the revolution to socialism, the socialist states
 
have a historical obligation to continue to put pressure on the capitalist
 
states, pr6bing for the weak paints, and accelerating their decay. -American
 
phenomenon such as the rising use of drugs, the spread of-pornography, upper.
 
class alienation, hippies, peaceniks, wide-spread strikes, terrorism, demon­
strations, and public disorders of various kinds indicate to the Soviet
 
Union that capitalism is-the state of dissolution long anticipated by Marxist 
science. Giveh this interpretation of U.S. events, it is sensible and cor-,.. 
rect for Soviet policy makers to get tough with the Americans, knowing that 
toughness Will likely pay off in the achievement-of world.wide socialism. 
Of course, Soviet policy makers must be somewhat cautious for fear of a 
last gasp strike at the Soviet Union . Note tha't this conjectural Marxist 
analysis does not require that the Soviet Union attack the United States-­
such an attack would be pointless, because the sociali'st victory is already
 
in sight. The Soviet Union must only prepare to defend itself from capital-.
 
ist aggressi-on and to conti'nue to put pressure on America in order-to pro­
mote the in'ternal decay of capitalist society. Up to certain limits, it is
 
quite safe to put such pressure on America, because the Americans no longer
 
believe in their system and will not fight for it.
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From a Marxist point of view, therefore, an America in which Humanist
 
a tempting target for Soviet pressure. From
Left values are spreading is 

their point of view it would be immoral not to take advantage of such an
 
Now, how might such Soviet pressure be promoted? One way
opportunity. 

is to take .advantage of all opportunities to press against American
 
Europe are
positions throughout the world--the MLddle East and Central 

Cobviou theatres of operations. Another way for the Soviets to lean on
 
America is in space. Ideally," the Soviets wquld wish to create defensive
 
systems against American strategic forces which would effectively block
 
any attempt by an American capitalist clique which wished to knock out
 
Also, the Soviet Union
the U.S.S.R. before it could~supplant the U.S.A. 

,would wish to have a strong deterrent against an American preemptive
 
strike.' A strong deterrent force would also have very important
 
By gaining obvious
possibil-ities for encouraging the decay of the U.S. 

superiority in space,, the Soviets would, hope to further discredit
 
the-American capiitalist establishment which has; in the past, placed
 
great emphasis upon-space-and strategic superiority. An obvious Soviet
 
military dominance in space would-also stimulate the breakdown of
 
American sbciety by offering to the corrupt American people a clear
 
and imminent threat of destruction, thus encouraging the spread of
 
Such a Soviet

"better-Red than dead" doctrines among the population. 

space threat need not necessarily be cost effective in traditional
 
threat.
strategic terms in'order to have the maximum possible moral 

Something which is obviously impressive to the layman--such as the
 
sixty megaton thermonuclear devices exploded in the late 1950's--would
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have the desired effect. Such a device could take the form bf an armed
 
(and manned?) space station permanently over North America. It may be
 
easy to prove that ICBM's from Soviet launch-sites are a superior weapon
 
system, but missiles hoverinq directly overhead are a more obvious and
 
frightful threat to the average citizen, and therefore a better weapon
 
against morale.
 
Fifth, aid finally, it is possible that a move away from detente
 
would be motivated significantly by concerns internal to the Communist
 
Bloc. Itwould be easier to improve Soviet-Chinese party relations in
 
a period in which the Soviet was moving away'from detente with the U.S.'
 
It might also-be true that the Soviet's hand would be strengthened in its
 
relationships in Eastern Europe, or that they would think it would, in 
a
 
period in which the-Soviet was moving against detente.
 
There are at least two ways in which NASA might be influencdd by a
 
reduction of the detente atmosphere with the Soviet Union. First, there
 
might be an inareased sense that the United States had to keep ahead of
 
the Soviet Union in space. In other words, there might be an increase of
 
the prestige, incentive, or the general sense of wanting to race with the
 
Soviet Union in space. Secondly, there might be raore military support for
 
military space activities.
 
There ate several reasons for thinking that if the need were felt
 
in the United States for'increased defense efforts to respond to Soviet'
 
programs and increased tension, that a good share of this increased U'.S.
 
effort would go to a military space program. The first reason is that the,
 
strategic economic case for military space expenditures looks a lot better
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For example, space-based anti-missile systems_
than it did ten'years ago. 

are now much closer to reality and economic feasibility than they were,
 
and there has been a certain amount of disillusionment with ground-based
 
It is possible that there will be some irrational pre­defense systems. 

the arena for increased efforts to counter, the
 ference for using space as 

as rational reasons. Space competition might look
Soviet Union as well 

"cleaner" Or less controversial, or-less complicated, than other poss-

The Vietnam War has left a strong legacy of dissatisfaction,
bilities. 

to a lesser extent with the other more
particularly with the Army, and 

elements of the military operation. While these elements
traditional 

have been '-failing".the space program has been a success. *Therefore, if
 
we are going to increase military efforts, there may be the feeling that
 
space is the area where we are most effective and- that we should,consen­
trate on that area.
 
Obviously, a military emphasis for NASA is almost the opposite'of the
 
international cooperation emphasis discussed'above. Indeed, the peopte
 
likely to be excited by international cooperation will find a.military
most 

program to be anethema. And a military emphasis at this time would likely
 
We suggest the con­draw a sceptical response from Middle America as well. 

sideration of a military emphasi.s only in the context of an obvious Cold
 
War revival engendered by blatant Soviet bellicosity. Should the Soviets
 
become nasty, the "doves" will necessarily become somewhat discredited;
 
young people will become disillusioned with prospects for instant peace;
 
and "cold warriors" 1950-style may again be fashionable.
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, Such prospects may be even more-lreasonable to consider for the 1970s
 
when we'examine the shifts in the domestic political and cultural milieu
 
that have been taking place during the last year. Although it-is too ­
soon to identify trends clearly, there are certain signs that the humanist
 
left "counter-culture" may be on the-wane: the decline of demonstrations­
on college campuses, the fragmentation and factionalism'of the "New Left",
 
the apparent deflation of revoluti6nary organizations such as the Weathermen
 
and the Black.Panthers, the advent of terrorism and.hysteria among radicals,
 
the failure of.rock festivals, the switching of pop signers from revolution­
ary to religious themes, the turning-of~avant-garde youth to drugs and
 
quietism, the vast popular and commercial success of the romanti.c film
 
"Love'Story". Among-the larger society perhaps-it is significant tonote
 
the-adoption of nationalist and "law-and order" symbols and slogans by
 
liberal politicians such as Lindsey and Adali Stevenson III, -and-the
 
' 

"turning to the right of several important national magazines. An inter­
esting phenomenum is the success of Charles Reich's The Greening of America-­
this counter-cul ture book is current the nation's best seller, which means­
it-is widely read by-middle class housewives--the counter-culture has,.be­
come-respectable, banal,-and middle-aged (Reich is 42),. and therefore no
 
longer-a suitable vehicle for expressing the individuality of the qoung and 
avant'garde. If this be so, then the revolution is over. - ­
So'wd need not accept the prediction of John Mitchell that "this country
 
is moving so far to the Right that you won't recognize it'.' in order to note
 
that there are some indicators that suggest a conservative shift in public
 
opinion, even among those elements among whom humanist left values have been
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growing during the past decade. If this be so, then there would be more
 
fertile soil for a strong nationalist/military response to a heightened
 
Soviet (or Chicom) challenge and a military emphasis by NASA.
 
Needless to say the price NASA would pay for a military emphasis would
 
be possible military domination. In terms of meeting the needs and goals
 
pf groups in society, NASA would lose support from the largely anti-nation­
alist, anti-mil-itary, pro-detente Intellectual Estate and Humanist Left.
 
The agency would clearly bec6me part of the so- alled "military-industrial
 
complex" and would be open to-attack. However, since such people are
 
already opposed to-the space program on the basi's of "priorities" issue,
 
it is reasonable to wonder if more opposition from that side could hurt
 
any more than it is hurting now. (Conceivably, NASA could be the target
 
of Leftist terrorismi but the Agency's facilities would seem to be secure
 
from'these incompetent attacks.)
 
1lf humanist 'left values should-spread further among the Intellectual
 
Estate, the agency and-its contractors might have trouble recruiting young
 
scientists. Perhaps,-,but there are now more than enough of such men to
 
the space program for a decade, and- even a rapid expansion of the anti­man 

military feeling-would leave at least a substantial minority ready to work
 
on defence projects. In any event, economic considerations will have'their
 
effect on "idealistic" young people. NASA personnel might have to endure
 
hostile'remarks at upper middle class social gatherings, but that is a
 
small pri-ce to pay for contributing to national defense and the conquest
 
of space.
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EARTH APPLICATIONS-

Criticisms of the large expenditures of the U.S. space program
 
and the apparent lack of visible, tangible benefits are commonly answered
 
by discussions of the large potential benefits of the NASA space appli­
cations program, as well as the technological transfers ("spinoffs") to
 
the civil industrial sector and the increment to the national GNP in the
 
form of aerospace employment. In fact, few credible estimates have been
 
made of the present and-future economic benefits of the American space
 
program, so that quantitative economic justification for various NASA
 
missions (as well as for NASA funding levels) in the way of cost/benefit
 
analyses is not readily available. Since we expect that strict budget­
ary constraints will be imposed on NASA during the next decade, quanti­
tative measures of the tangibi space benefits could provide excellent
 
support for certain NASA missions and partially justify others which pre­
-sent less visible payoffs.
 
Since the economic benefits of NASA endeavors'are important factors
 
in political decision-making within'the present ambivalent, almost austere
 
science policy environment, -it is reasonable to'assume that Congressional
 
and public criticism of high NASA spending could be influenced by high
 
quality cost/effective studies performed by independent:academic and/or
 
research ingtitutions.* These studies would be periodically updated as new
 
technological developments unfold and as space mission requirements evolve
 
in response to social, political, and military pressures.
 
Meteorological satellites provide an interesting example of an area
 
in which cost/benefit analysis can play a decisive role in marshalling
 
support for NASA programs. In 1965 a National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
 
The following section is by Dr. Barry Smernoff.
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report estimated that the development of accurate long-range weather fore­
casting would result in annual savings of $2.5 billion to the U.S. economy.
 
One year later, a Stanford study"" estimated the annual economic benefits
 
of a proposed Metsat system costing $600 million to be over $6 billion. In
 
the construction industry alone, weather damage amounts to between three
 
and ten billion dollars a year.
 
The portion of the NASA budget allocated to meteorological applications.
 
is clearly justified if a network of weather satellites can save the U.S.
 
economy billions of dollars each year; one might even argue that-such huge
 
savings alone justify the entire NASA budget. However the NAS and Stanford
 
efforts are not suffiently credible to warrant widespread e.pectations
 
regarding the economic return of specific Metsat programs. Although, it is
 
somewhat reassuring that both studies arrived at the same large size of
 
benefits, Jack Thompson, a professional meteorologist involved in the study
 
of economic benefits of long-range weather forecasting, gives little credence
 
to the NAS and Stanford results.
 
Quite visible benefits of weather satellites include the saving of
 
lives and property dde to advance storm warnings. The Environmental Science
 
Services Administration (ESSA) estimates that 50,000 people might have been
 
killed in Hurricane Camille without the early warning, tracking, and credi­
'
%C
bility provided by satellite pictures and data (70,000 people were evacuated)Y*5
 
"National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, Economic
 
Benefits From.Oceanographic Research, 1965.
 
_'SPINMAP, Stanford Proposal for an International Network for Meteor­
ological Analyses and Prediction--Summary Report. Stanford University,
 
May 1966.
 
Space Program Benefits, Hearing before the Committee on Aeronautics
 
and Space Sciences, U.S. Senate, April 6, 1970.
 
....
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On the dther hand, the-satellite-aided decisfon not to"evacuate and not
 
t6 protect property-during Hurricane Laurie saved over $3 million.- Ac­
cording to the Natiodal Science Foundation, average annual hurricane
 
losses tf $250 million could be cut by one-third if only minor changes in
 
stormii intensity or path can be achieved.* The world-wide economic'benefits
 
of the automatic picture-taking systems'onboard U.S. weather satellites,-by
 
which over fifty countries can View daily weather patterns in their area,
 
have not yet been quanti'fied (but should be).
 
C6muncation satellites provide 'another example of tangible benefits.
 
By providing economical links across the Atlantic, Pac'fic, and Indian
 
Oceans, communication sateilites are having major impact on trans-oceaiic
 
traffic. West Coast to Japan cable circuit costs of $15,boo per month
 
remain much higher than the corredponding Comsat service costs of $4,000
 
per month, using Intelsat III."" The annual'savings to the U.S. goverfiment
 
is estimated at $9.5 million for this class of rate 
reductions. In addition
 
the Ddpartment of Defense now operates near-synchronous Comsats, as well'as
 
a tactical Comsat, whidh are of high economic and military value. 
 The'poten­
tial utility'bf direct broadcasting satelli'tes to the developing countries
 
is impossible't6 estimate at the present ti'me, btt should'encompass substan­
tial increments to the increasing GNPs of these countries in thd form of
 
educated people with higher productivities and a sense of national'unity and
 
purpose. The typi'cal developing country may be able to acquire a nation­
wide communications network using Comsats at 10-20% of the cost and time 
it
 
would take to build a conventional microwave network.
 
*A Survey of Space Applications, NASA Sp-1 42, April 1967
 
**When Intelsat' IV Satellites become operational in 1971, this figure
 
will drop to $1,000.
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There are many other areas of economic importance in applications
 
satellites. Navigation satellites can preclude the 120-mile lateral sepa­
ration requirement for aircraft (an anticollision measure), thereby reducing
 
A Navsat
fuel expenditures and saving $30,0 to $50,000 per plane-year. 

system which reduces lateral separation to 30 miles would yield an estimated
 
savings of $20 million a year for the North Atlantic -routes alone." Remote
 
sensing of overgrazing, weed infestation, and other range management prob­
lems could give rise to 3.5 million more calves per year in increased car­
rying capacity, valued at $350 million. A more timely and perhaps more
 
of. remote satellite sensing involves air pollution; an
important goal 

accurate measurement of the rising trend of atmospheric CO and of any
 
global warming trend would be invaluable in any assessment of global ecology.
 
The bare economic benefit of environmental sensing is difficult to assess,
 
sensors in managing the environment.
 
In conclusion, it appears -that the case for NASA funding can be con­
siderably strengthened by the ,performance of clear, hprd-headed cost/effec­
tiveness analyses of NASA-programs. Existing studies, although often super­
ficial-and overly'qualitative, indicate that further efforts should prov-ide
 
NASA with sufficient analytic leverage such that NASA can rationalize its
 
planning strategy and accrue more public support.
 
Of course, it is possible that a rigorous cost benefit analysis of the
 
gains to be received from such earth applications might not be cost effective
 
compared with other means of achieving the same ends. For exampfle, it appears
 
that communication satilites are certainly cost effective when compared with
 
Space Program Benefits
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cables; however, it may be that meterological or earth resources satellites
 
might be much more expensive than other means"of achieving the saie results,
 
such as aircraft, or even ground surveys.
 
The second drawback to an applications emphasis is that it'might not
 
be possible to justify the manned space program on this'basis. If NASA
 
is saying--look at all the nice things we are doing--the public may reply
 
"yes, we like all those nice things that you are'doing--but why are you
 
trying to send men to space as well." To some extent hbwever, an earth appli­
cations emphasis might at least answer the criticism that NASA is aoin§
 
nothing useful. The great mass of our citizens belleve that government is
 
necessarily inefficient, so they are pleased if-they get any return for
 
their tax dollar, and might not look too closely at what could'-appear to
 
be a wastage in the program.
 
LOWER,COST PROGRAMS.
 
If the constrained condition persists through most of'the decade of
 
the 70's--which we believe likely to dccut--then NASA might well consider
 
means of keeping the space program alive through Various rather inexpensive
 
means--such as concentration on earth applications missions; Another pos­
sibility is that it might become necessary to s~verely curtai'l or even
 
abandon manned space flight.
 
A large part of criticism of NASA has come from elements in scientific
 
communities who believe that the manned space program is penicious and waste­
ful. These critics are members of what we call I'ntellectual Estate, and'
 
their opposition to'mannd space program can be fairlyeasily'explainedon
 
the basis of their values. They very much disl'ike the patriotic emphasis of
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the manned space program; they very much dislike the idea that 
test pilots
 
are being sent to perform scientific investigations, rather that 
trained
 
are rational and do not like the flamboyance and "honky­scient'ists; they 

a vulgar attempt to cater
 tonk" aspects of the program which they see as 

to the baser elemements of Middle'America, and they very much.value-human
 
taken by the astronauts.
 life, and are offended by the great risks which are 

These people are extremely hostile to the manned space program on this 
basis,
 
and point to the Russian program as an-example as hbw a sensible 
program
 
ought.to be conducted.
 
there is a devergence of opinion between
However, on this space goal 

Intellectual Estate and Humanist-Left.- The Humanist -Left does not 
share
 
the 

reason and tend mote to.value adventure
the Intellectual Estate's belief in 

To them: the great adventure of space -constitutes
and human self actualizing. 

The Humanist 'Left position is 
ar­a great almost spiritual endeavor by man. 

ticulately expressed by Norman Mailer's Of A Fire On The Moon--to Mailer the
 
main fault of the astronauts-is that they are too bland and technocratical.
 
first class wi.th the
Like all American instituti'ons, NASA likes to g 

But some­latest sophisticated systems specifically tailored to the task. 

times it is not possible to go first class--we must make do with what we
 
Americans are rather good at this too--witness the quick success of
 have. 

the Huntsville team at adopting the Jupiter for a launch vehicle after the
 
sputnik success and the Vanguard fizzle. This precedent is particularly
 
apt because the ground work had been prepared for the Jupiter-Explorer con­
a back­figuration. Everyone hoped.that Vanguard would succeed, but quietly 

up position had been prepared.*
 
these the "Cadillac" and the "hot rod"
*Metaphorically, we might call 

options. Cadillacs are better, but many people lack the funds and 
have the
 
to convert mundane machines into exciting vehicles.
skill 
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NASA might consider devising means of getting maximum impact from
 
existing equipment and adaptions therefrom. NASA might make a catalogue
 
of all space equipment held by itself, the military, contractors, to in­
clude even proto-types and obsolescent vehicles, with an eye to how this
 
equipment might be fruitfully employed.
 
MOBILIZATION BASES
 
All the possible emphases discussed above--international cooperation,
 
earth applications, military, and low cost space programs--have one thing
 
in common: they are not what most people in NASA would really like to do.
 
They are not manned space exploration. From the point of view of America's
 
space goals of the '60s, they represent a falling-off of vigor in obtaining
 
"pure" space goals. But it seems that this retrograde step may be impelled
 
by the changes in the values of society at large and revisions in the
 
international climate. NASA recognizes that it can no longer expect to be
 
given a blank check, as it was by President Kennedy. So, the agency and
 
its supporters are seeking other means of achieving the real and perceive
 
needs of cociety.
 
Each of the new directions discussed above has another common factor:
 
it will to some extent provide a mobilization base for more ambitious space
 
ventures -in the future. At the very least all of these emphases will serve
 
to keep the agency operating and the space program alive during lean years.
 
The integrity of organizations will be maintained. Funding will continue,
 
trained personnel will keep their skills current. The space program will
 
be alive. Furthermore, the agency will have an opportunity to demonstrate
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to the publi 6 at large that it can accomplish goals that are valued by
 
With this experience
substantial or significant segments of the public. 

behind it and this reputation established, NASA would be in a good position
 
to plan and eventually undertake much more ambitious space ventures further
 
toward the end of the century when it may be reasonably expected that con­
ditions for grander space ventures will be much more favorable.
 
